(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I fully agree that the two convictions resulting from pleas of guilty must be reversed for the failure of the trial court to comply with the mandatory requirements of Article 26.13, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P. I would disassociate myself from any inference in the majority opinion, relying upon Mitchell v. State, 493 S.W.2d 174 (Tex.Cr.App.1973), and Espinosa v. State, 493 S.W.2d 172 (Tex.Cr.App.1973), that if inquiry had been made as to persuasion or promises the admonition would have been sufficient. The statute is too plainly worded to be misconstrued, see Espinosa v. State, supra (dissenting opinion), and it requires inquiry as to whether a guilty plea “is uninfluenced or by any consideration of fear, or by any persuasion or delusive hope of pardon, prompting him to confess his guilt.” (Emphasis supplied.)
I would point out that the admonition is insufficient in addition to the reasons already observed for failing to make any inquiry as to any delusive hope of pardon or any similar inquiry. See Heathcock v. State, 494 S.W.2d 570 (Tex.Cr.App.1973), and Mayse and Ross v. State, 494 S.W.2d 914 (Tex.Cr.App.1973) (dissenting opinion).
*944The conviction on the plea of not guilty is unlike Carr v. State, 495 S.W.2d 936 (Tex.Cr.App.1973), for in that case there was other legitimate evidence upon which the conviction could be predicated and the failure to charge on the issue of whether a certain witness was an accomplice witness was error, but harmless error. See Carr v. State, supra (dissenting opinion).
I concur in the result reached in the instant case (on the plea of not guilty) because I cannot find in this record where the written objection on this basis was filed, presented to or acted upon by the trial judge.