*334ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
Appellees have raised several matters in their amended motion for rehearing which we deem necessary to briefly discuss.
Appellees contend that we erred in “separating the 20 acre tract in question into two tracts of 13.26 acres and 4.46 acres each, when determining there was no evidence to support appellees’ claims of adverse possession as against the plaintiff’s claim of record title to the 20 acre tract.” The plaintiff (appellant) did not seek to recover title to the 20 acre tract. His petition described the 13.26 acre tract by metes and bounds as Tract No. 1 and the 4.46 acre tract by metes and bounds as Tract No. 2, and he sought to sustain record title to each tract, so described. Likewise, ap-pellees Anderson and wife answered claiming title to the 4.46 acre tract described as Tract No. 2, and the remaining appellees answered claiming title by adverse possession to “the lands and tenements claimed in plaintiff’s petition . .
Appellees then assert that we erred in “overlooking the fact of the deed to the State of Texas for a right of way,” the use thereof, and facts “reasonably to be inferred therefrom.” Title to the right of way was not involved in the suit, but the deed was not overlooked. It is not in evidence, but there was testimony about the conveyance, and there is a plat of the right of way contained in the statement of facts. At the time Mrs. Irwin conveyed the right of way, neither she nor J. A. Irwin had record title to the land. The right of way conveyance, while it may have been evidentiary of her claim of title, could not supply the missing essential elements of use and possession which are required to establish title by adverse possession.
Appellees state that the record does not show that any of the exhibits were offered or received in evidence. The statement of facts contains exhibits 1 through 12 of the appellant, being his chain of title from the sovereignty and from the common source. Appellees stipulated that these 12 exhibits “being offered by the plaintiff in this case, are admissible in evidence showing the title to the land from sovereignty of the soil down in to the plaintiff and the common source of title as designated in the presentation of these instruments by agreement.” Not only are the exhibits listed and described, but copies are contained in the statement of facts. The statement of facts is certified by the reporter to be correct and complete, and it is signed by the attorneys for appellees as being a “full, true, correct and complete” statement of facts in the cause. Statements in appellant’s brief that these instruments were received into evidence are nowhere challenged by appellees. In the face of these facts, it can hardly be contended that these deeds were not in evidence.
Appellees next say that the judgment does not appear to be final, because it does not mention Saundra Anderson or M. H. Perkins. Saundra Anderson was appel-lee George Anderson’s wife. M. H. Perkins was named as an original defendant. Saundra Anderson answered with her husband. M. H. Perkins did not answer and the record does not reveal whether or not he was served with citation. In any event, however, the Supreme Court has settled this point contrary to appellees’ contention in the case of North East Independent School District v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893 (Tex.Sup.1966).
Appellees complain that, in support of our holdings we have cited cases decided on “insufficiency of the evidence” or “against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence,” whereas, our decision is one of “no evidence.” The distinction is fine in an adverse possession case, since a substantial period of time is involved in which there must be consistent acts of possession of a certain type or character. When there are gaps in the possession or a lack of the type of posses-sory acts required, courts sometimes say that the acts or the possession is “insufficient.” Usually what is meant is that such acts are “insufficient in law” or “insuffi*335cient as a matter of law,” which is the same as “no evidence.” When we say that appellees’ evidence showed neither the character nor the continuity of use required by the statutes, we mean that the evidence introduced was insufficient as a matter of law. The cases cited to sustain our conclusions were not intended in all events to be in point factually with the case at bar, but they were cited on the statements of law contained therein which we deemed were pertinent to the particular question then being discussed.
Finally, appellees point out that appellant’s chain of title shows that James H. Landrum reserved an undivided one-half of the oil, gas and other minerals when he conveyed the land in question to appellant. This being true, the opinion is modified to render judgment for appellant for the title and possession of the surface of the land described in his petition, and an undivided one-half interest in the oil, gas and other minerals in and under said land.
Except for the modification mentioned above, the amended motion of appellees for rehearing is overruled.