concurring and dissenting.
I concur with the majority concerning the issues of indirect ownership, the Texas Equal Rights Amendment, equal and uniform taxation, and due process. Because I conclude that section 23.56(3) of the Texas Tax Code1 conflicts with article VIII, section 1-d-l of the state constitution and violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the federal and state constitutions, however, I respectfully dissent.
In GNB’s third point of error, it contends that section 23.56(3) of the tax code is unconstitutional because it conflicts with article VIII, section 1-d-l of the Texas Constitution.
When addressing the constitutionality of section 23.56(3), the majority relies on HL Farm Corp. v. Self, 820 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, writ granted). HL Farm relies on two cases to support its holding that section 23.56(3) is constitutional. The cases are Gragg v. Cayuga Independent School District, 539 S.W.2d 861 (Tex.), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 973, 97 S.Ct. 478, 50 L.Ed.2d 581 (1976) and Alexander Ranch, Inc. v. Central Appraisal District, 733 S.W.2d 303 (Tex.App.—Eastland 1987, writ refd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1026, 108 S.Ct. 2005, 100 L.Ed.2d 236 (1988). Gragg addresses section 1-d of the constitution, not section 1-d-l. In fact Gragg was decided in 1976, some two and one-half years before section 1-d-l became effective in 1979. In a footnote, the Gragg court observed that the Texas Legislative Council had published an analysis of section 1-d before its adoption. The analysis stated that section 1-d was designed to help keep farmers and ranchers whose land is both a home and a means of livelihood from being driven away by increasing tax burdens. The analysis also found preservation of the family farm to be an argument in favor of section 1-d. See Gragg, 539 S.W.2d at 864-65 n. 2. But this does not change the fact that Gragg does not interpret section 1-d-l at all. Alexander Ranch’s interpretation of section 1-d-l relies on Gragg and San Marcos Consolidated Independent School District v. Nance, 495 S.W.2d 335 (Tex-App.—Austin), writ refd per curiam, 502 S.W.2d 694 (Tex.1973). See Alexander Ranch, 733 S.W.2d at 307. San Marcos also only addresses section 1-d. See San Marcos, 495 S.W.2d at 337. Hence, the authorities used to support the holdings in HL Farm and Alexander Ranch do not speak at all to the meaning of section 1-d-l.
It is our duty in construing the constitution to ascertain and give effect to the plain intent *60and language of a constitutional amendment. Gragg 589 S.W.2d at 865-66 (citing Deason v. Orange County Water Control & Improvement Dist, No. 1, 151 Tex. 29, 35, 244 S.W.2d 981, 984 (1952)). The purpose of section 1-d-l is clearly stated in its first sentence, which begins: “To promote the preservation of open-space land_” The majority, however, construes this sentence to mean that the purpose of section 1-d-l is to promote the preservation of the family farm. This error in construction is apparently based upon reliance on Gragg and later language in section 1-d-l that gives effect to the purpose of preserving open-space land by providing for favorable taxation of open-space land devoted to farm or ranch purposes. The majority’s interpretation has recently been refuted by the Texas Supreme Court, which stated:
The Texas Constitution promotes the preservation of open-space land by authorizing the legislature to tax open-space land devoted to farm or ranch purposes on the basis of its productive capacity. Tex. Const, art. VIII, § 1-d-l (a) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
Tarrant Appraisal Dist. v. Moore, 845 S.W.2d 820, 821 (Tex.1993). Because the purpose of section 1-d-l is the preservation of open-space land rather than the preservation of the family farm, there is no legitimate basis to discriminate against nonresident aliens, and to do so violates both the state and federal constitutions.
It is the general policy of the law, where rights have been fixed under a constitutional provision, that the legislature is without power to destroy or impair rights. It is also the general rule that the legislature does not have power to enact any law contrary to a provision of the constitution, and if any law, or part thereof, is undertaken to nullify the protection furnished by the constitution, such law, or part thereof, that conflicts with the constitution is void. City of Fort Worth v. Howerton, 149 Tex. 614, 619, 236 S.W.2d 615, 618 (1951). The legislature has no power to change the meaning of a constitutional provision or to enact laws that conflict with the constitution. Jones v. Ross, 141 Tex. 415, 419, 173 S.W.2d 1022, 1024 (1943). The purpose of section 1-d-l is to promote open-space land. Section 1-d-l has a broad scope that is based on the type of use to which the land is devoted and, unlike section 1-d, not on the type of person who uses the land. When the legislature enacted section 23.-56(3), it denied the open-space exemption to one type of landowner who qualified for favorable tax treatment under section 1-d-l. This places the two provisions in conflict with each other. I would hold that 23.56(3) is unconstitutional as applied to GNB.
GNB also contends in its sixth point of error that section 23.56(3) is unconstitutional because it violates GNB’s right to equal protection.
The states, in the exercise of their taxing power, are subject to the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 526, 79 S.Ct. 437, 440, 3 L.Ed.2d 480 (1959). A corporation is a “person” within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 882 n. 9, 105 S.Ct. 1676, 1684 n. 9, 84 L.Ed.2d 751 (1985). GNB is a corporation that has been denied tax abatements under section 23.56(3).
Whatever the extent of a state’s authority to exclude foreign corporations from doing business within its boundaries, that authority does not justify the imposition of more onerous taxes or other burdens on foreign corporations, unless the distinction between foreign and domestic corporations bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 667-68, 101 S.Ct. 2070, 2082-83, 68 L.Ed.2d 514 (1981).
In determining whether a challenged classification is rationally related to the achievement of a legitimate state purpose, a court must consider two questions: (1) Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose, and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose? See Western & S. Life Ins. Co., 451 U.S. at 668, 101 S.Ct. at 2083.
The purpose of section 1-d-l is to promote open-space land. The legislature has enact*61ed a statutory process to implement section 1-d-l in sections 23.51-.57 of the tax code. The legislature had a legitimate and permissible purpose in enacting sections 23.51-57.
But was it reasonable for lawmakers to enact section 23.56(3) and single out corporations owned by nonresident aliens for exclusion? There is a point beyond which the state cannot go without violating the Equal Protection Clause. Allied, 358 U.S. at 527, 79 S.Ct. at 441. Section 23.56(3) is not rationally related to the promotion of open-space land because it is irrational to exclude a tax abatement to a corporation that is using its land as open spaces simply because it is owned by nonresident aliens. When the purpose is the preservation of open-space land, how can it be permissible under the Equal Protection Clause to allow a domestic corporation to undertake the exact same kind of land use that a corporation owned by nonresident aliens cannot undertake? The foreign corporation and the domestic corporation would equally preserve open space.
Accordingly, I would hold that section 23.-56(3) violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution and the Texas Constitution.
. TexTax Code Ann. § 23.56(3) (Vernon 1992).