The issue here is whether separately purchased items of added reparation benefits may be aggregated despite a policy provision by which such is prohibited. Our decision in these cases is not written on a clean slate. We have heretofore considered issues of stacking in Allstate v. Dicke, Ky., 862 S.W.2d 327 (1993), Hamilton v. Allstate Ins. Co., Ky., 789 S.W.2d 751 (1990), Chaffin v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Ins. Co., Ky., 789 S.W.2d 754 (1990), Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. Stanfield, Ky., 581 S.W.2d 555 (1979), and Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Siddons, Ky., 451 S.W.2d 831 (1970), and other cases without a direct application here.
The legally significant facts of these cases are identical. In each case, the appellee was injured in a motor vehicle accident while being covered by two or more policies of added reparation benefits. After payment of basic reparation benefits and payment pursuant to one item of added reparation benefits, appellees sought to recover under additional items of added reparation benefits, but their *326claims were denied on grounds of policy provisions which prohibited stacking. As with the facts, the decisions of the courts below are likewise identical. In State Farm v. Mattox, 92-SC-577-DG, the Pulaski Circuit Court granted appellee’s motion for summary judgment and the Court of Appeals affirmed. In State Farm v. Thomas, 92-SC-581-DG, the Jefferson Circuit Court granted appellee’s motion for summary judgment and the Court of Appeals, relying on Mattox, affirmed.
At the outset, it should be noted that these eases do not deal with basic reparation benefits. Appellees have conceded that basic reparation benefits may not be aggregated by virtue of KRS 304.39-050(3). As explained in Capital Enterprise Ins. Co. v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Insurance Co., Ky.App., 804 S.W.2d 377 (1991),
“Unless optional additional benefits have been purchased, KRS 304.390140, the maximum amount of BRB payable to any one person as a result of any one accident is $10,000.... [T]he statute specifically states that this is so regardless of the number of different providers of security which might be obligated to pay such benefits, KRS 304.39-020(2),....” Id. at 378.
Appellant contends that language in the added reparation benefits statute, KRS 304.39-140(2), which permits the reparation obligor to “incorporate in added reparations benefits coverage such terms, conditions and exclusions as may be consistent with premiums paid” authorizes exclusion of all but one of the added reparation benefits coverages. We answered this contention in Allstate v. Dicke, supra, by observing that similar “terms and conditions” language did not authorize elimination of an item of coverage which was required by statute to be written upon request. As with underinsured motorist coverage which must be written if requested, KRS 304.39-140(1) requires each reparation obligor to provide added reparation benefits if requested. The elimination of an item of coverage which the statute requires to be written upon request is vastly beyond the statutory authorization with respect to terms, conditions and exclusions.
The only issue which remains, therefore, is the central question addressed in Hamilton and Chaffin. As with the foregoing cases and Allstate v. Dicke, in the instant case, one or more items of coverage which the insureds had acquired pursuant to a statutory right was excluded by the terms of the policy. In Chaffin, we explained that with insurance which is personal to the insured for which a separate premium is paid, there arises a reasonable expectation of coverage, the exclusion of which is prohibited by public policy. We are unable to rationally distinguish between the statutory and contractual structure of added reparation benefits and underinsured motorist coverage as in Dicke and uninsured motorist coverage as in Hamilton and Chaffin. In each instance, the coverage is indeed personal to the insured in that it applies to any motor vehicle injury. The similarity continues by virtue of payment of separate premiums, the manifest desire of the insured for extra protection, and the reasonable expectation that it will be provided.
We affirm.
COMBS, LEIBSON, REYNOLDS and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., concur. STEPHENS, C.J., dissents by separate opinion. SPAIN, J., dissents by separate opinion in which STEPHENS, C.J., joins.