dissenting.
Although the majority adequately describes the facts, a brief recitation of the time line may be helpful:
12/19/99 — the injury
12/20/99 — employer’s notice of injury filed by Truman Fabricating
08/08/00 — employer’s notice of injury filed by Louisiana Pacific 01/22/01 — Gonzales’ original petition filed in Jefferson County
02/06/01 — Louisiana Pacific’s request for a benefit review conference
04/10/01 — Benefit Review Conference held
06/18/01 — Motion for Abatement filed in Jefferson County case
06/01/01 — Benefit Contested Hearing began
06/27/01 — Decision of hearing officer
07/26/01 — Order denying motion to abate
11/07/01 — Decision of Appeals Panel
12/17/01 — Louisiana Pacific’s original petition filed in Hardin County
02/11/03 — 2nd Order denying motion to abate
The majority holds the trial court abused its discretion in denying abatement. The majority notes: “Whether Gonzales’s injuries occurred in the course and scope of employment with Louisiana-Pacific is an issue regarding compensability properly appealed to Hardin County district court.” The majority adds, “Permitting the borrowed employee issue to be decided in this negligence suit, rather than in the presently-pending compensation appeal — the appeal provided by statute— would by-pass the legislatively-crafted system set forth in the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act for deciding compensation issues.” The majority also justifies its holding by stating:
Abatement of this negligence action until the compensation issue is resolved avoids needless uncertainty and confusion, avoids potentially conflicting results, and avoids unnecessary and du-plicative expenditure of resources. Abatement here also preserves the exclusive power of the Commission to resolve compensation claims presented to it, subject only to the judicial review provided by the Act.
*191The majority has apparently bought into the argument made by Louisiana Pacific that the “administrative agency has dominant jurisdiction over the central issue in this case.” Louisiana Pacific argues the question of who is Gonzales’s employer is a matter within the primary jurisdiction of the Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission, citing Saenz v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, 925 S.W.2d 607, 612 (Tex.1996) and In re Luby’s Cafeterias, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 813 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist] 1998, orig. proceeding). The Saenz case does state that general proposition but is totally in-apposite. It involved the amount of compensation between an employee and a carrier who was paying compensation. The majority acknowledges Luby’s is a different circumstance than this case. Louisiana Pacific further asserts, “Accordingly, the trial court does not have jurisdiction to determine the administrative issue of Gonzales’ employment status until it has been fully and finally determined by the Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission and the statutory appeals provided for by the legislature” citing Texas Workers’ Compensation Com’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 515 (Tex.1995); Luby’s, 979 S.W.2d at 816-17, and Metro Temps, Inc. v. Texas Workers’ Compensation Ins. Facility, 949 S.W.2d 534, 536 (Tex.App.-Austin 1997, no writ). The Garcia case makes no such holding; it merely reaffirms the right to a statutory appeal and a jury trial. The Luby’s case, as noted by the majority, involves abatement while the commission process is ongoing. Metro Temps involved the exhaustion of administrative remedies to the Insurance Commission over a premium dispute, clearly not on point to this litigation.
The majority cites numerous cases, most dealing with well-known legal generalities.1 I have no quarrel with these cases nor their applicability to the issues at hand. I do quarrel with the majority’s reliance on these cases to justify this specific holding because none do so.
It is trite to acknowledge the legislature enacted the Workers’ Compensation laws to establish a scheme to compensate workers injured in the course and scope of their employment. Clearly, these statutes were not designed to provide a company the forum to assert the borrowed servant defense in a third-party negligence action. In this case, Truman Fabricating recognized Gonzales as its employee and began paying compensation. It took Louisiana Pacific nine months to file its assertion it was Gonzales’ employer and Louisiana Pacific did not request a benefits review conference until after Gonzales had filed his negligence action. There was simply no reason, other than delay, for Louisiana Pacific to insert itself into the workers’ compensation scheme. Neither the majority nor Louisiana Pacific cite a case where *192the defense is waived by not presenting it first to the commission. An analogous case, Mike Hooks, Inc. v. Pena, 313 F.2d 696, 698-702 (5th Cir.1963) noted that an employer was not a real party in compensation proceedings before the Texas Industrial Accident Board, though the employer filed a letter application for determination that the employee was not a seaman and was covered by Texas Compensation Act, and therefore the Board’s award based on findings that the employee was not a seaman, an issue not really contested by the employee and the insurance carrier, did not foreclose the employee’s suit under the Jones Act on the grounds of res judicata or collateral estoppel.
The hearing officer looked at both the jurisdiction of the Commission to determine the borrowed servant issue and the standing of Louisiana Pacific to raise the issue.2 The hearing officer noted the commission had
“... no intention, whatsoever, of interfering in any manner with the matter currently before the District Court. Since it appears likely that the issues before the Commission will be resolved and appealed to a district court, where they then can be consolidated with the current pending litigation, the Hearing Officer is not of the opinion that the parties to this Commission proceeding are harmed in any manner by any choice the district court might make regarding proceeding with the discovery phase of the case before it, since there appears no reason to believe that such case will be called to trial before such time as the matters currently before the Commission have been concluded.”
Unfortunately the hearing officer was incorrect in his conclusion that the cases could be consolidated.
Moreover, the primary jurisdiction theory, vis a vis, the administrative agency was explained in Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 208 (Tex.2002):
... [I]n [Subaru of Am. Inc. v.] David McDavid Nissan, [84 S.W.3d 212 (Tex.2002) ] we explained that the primary jurisdiction doctrine requires trial courts to allow an administrative agency to initially decide an issue when: (1) an agency is typically staffed with experts trained in handling the complex problems in the agency’s purview; and (2) great benefit is derived from an agency’s uniformly interpreting its laws, rules, and regulations, whereas courts and juries may reach different results under similar fact situations. David McDavid Nissan, 84 S.W.3d at 221 (citations omitted). We noted that, when the primary jurisdiction doctrine requires a trial court to defer to an agency to make an initial determination, the court should abate the lawsuit and suspend finally adjudicating the claim until the agency has an opportunity to act on the matter. David McDavid Nissan, 84 S.W.3d at 221 (citations omitted).
As noted by our Supreme Court, the abatement is based upon the agency’s primary jurisdiction. The majority seeks to expand this logic to the Hardin County Court litigation, The policy reasons noted in Butnaru and David McDavid Nissan simply do not apply. Here the issue is not abatement as between the Jefferson County District Court and the Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission, as was the *193facts of Luby’s; the issue here is abatement as between the two District Courts. There is simply no reason to deviate from the general rule in Texas is that the court in which a suit is first filed acquires dominant jurisdiction to the exclusion of other coordinate courts. Wyatt v. Shaw Plumbing Co., 760 S.W.2d 245, 248 (Tex.1988); Curtis v. Gibbs, 511 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Tex.1974).
The bottom line is Louisiana Pacific, for whatever reason, prefers Hardin County rather than Jefferson County as the venue to decide its assertion it is Gonzales’ employer. There is no legal reason to afford Louisiana Pacific that option. The trial judge, in my opinion, did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion to abate. I would deny the petition for mandamus.
. In the order they are cited in the majority opinion: Guerrero v. Harmon Tank Co., 55 S.W.3d 19, 24-25 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2001, pet denied)(description of borrowed servant doctrine); Burkett v. Welborn, 42 S.W.3d 282, 287 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, no pet.)(compensation benefits worker’s exclusive remedy against employer for work-related injuries); Esquivel v. Mapelli Meat Packing Co., 932 S.W.2d 612, 614 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied)(compensation benefits borrowed worker’s exclusive remedy against employer for work-related injuries); American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Fodge, 63 S.W.3d 801, 803 (Tex.2001)(Workers’ Compensation Commission has sole power to award compensation benefits); Subsequent Injury Fund, State of Texas v. Service Lloyds Ins. Co., 961 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied)(Judicial review is last step of four-tier legislative scheme for workers’ compensation issues); Rodriguez v. Service Lloyds Ins. Co., 997 S.W.2d 248, 253 (Tex.l999)(em-ployee's residence proper venue for workers’ compensation appeal).
. The Hearing Officer may have been incorrect on the jurisdiction issue. See Hooks, 313 F.2d at 699-700. Furthermore, the issue was, in reality, which "carrier” was responsible for payment of Gonzales’ benefits, which is not really an issue of compensability. See Houston General Ins. Co. v. Association Cas. Ins. Co., 977 S.W.2d 634, 636 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1998, no pet.)