(concurring in part; concurring in result in part).
In all expressions of law, I concur in this opinion but concur in result only on Issue IV, the legal treatment of the 225 year sentence.
Language on Issue IV does not comport with recent holdings in this Court and the United States Supreme Court. As an example, I note the restrictive language in the Janssen cite. All of the emphasis in the majority’s treatment of the sentence as being “within the statutory limits” is virtually archaic. Absolute non-reviewability, on such a thesis, is at an end. Notwithstanding, said statement is recited oft-over in South Dakota. Statutory scrutiny is subservient to constitutional scrutiny when sentencing is considered. “The overriding principle is that no sentence is per se constitutional. We hold that felony sentences are subject to Eighth Amendment propor*881tionality review.” State v. Weiker, 366 N.W.2d 823, 826 (S.D.1985) (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288-89, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 3009, 77 L.Ed.2d 637, 648 (1983)).
Here, Lykken has a long history of perpetrating violence upon females, including nearly choking them to death. At a mitigation/aggravation hearing, subsequent to his conviction, facts were developed that he would display a gun on different occasions threatening to kill people and would hold them in terror. He threatened to shoot a young boy and at one time assaulted a minister with a club, made from barbed wire, and barricaded the minister in a car. This record discloses a long history of violence by Lykken, including an attempt to kill his own brother with a hatchet; Lykken was characterized as a menace to society. There was testimony that he was a “devilistic person.” There were other occasions testified to where Lykken raped other women and these women came forward, during this hearing, to testify that they lived in total fear of him. Obviously, Judge Hertz, who is our senior trial judge in South Dakota and one of the most distinguished and knowledgeable men who ever served the bench in South Dakota, was totally impressed and impacted by this extensive testimony of the demonistic traits of Lykken.
Thus, this sentence should not shock the conscience of men generally. State v. Bad Heart Bull, 257 N.W.2d 715, 720 (S.D.1977). Nor should it shock the conscience of the men who sit on this Court. State v. Antelope, 304 N.W.2d 115, 117 (S.D.1981). There are three proportionality criteria under Solem v. Helm: (1) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (2) the sentence imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (3) the sentences imposed for the commission of the same offense in other jurisdictions. Weiker, supra at 825.
I am unable to find any statistics, studies, or data, in this record, on criteria 2 and 3 relative to the Solem v. Helm test. Thus, I have no basis upon which to base an informed judgment. However, as an appellate judge, I certainly can consider criteria 1, the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty. This was a grave offense and the penalty is not harsh considering the background of this man. There is a scenario, in this record, almost a handprint crime, depicting that Lykken, at one time, held a knife to a woman’s throat and raped her three times over a period of 3V2 to 4 hours. “Prolonged confinement?” Restriction on “movement within the premises?” Three and one-half to four hours could be an eternity to a victim whose life is, second by second, in question. Under SDCL 22-19-1, Lykken did “confine” after he did “seize” this victim and it was “to facilitate the commission of [a] felony.” In my opinion, there was “prolonged confinement” and there was a definite restriction on “movement within the premises.” The Board of Pardons and Paroles should secure the transcript of the mitigation/aggravation hearing and file it with Lykken’s case, lest the history of Lykken be not lost. Justice has been served in this case.