dissenting.
I must dissent; the obligation of an appellate court is to resolve the issues presented on appeal on the basis of the record presented to it, not on the basis of a record which could or should have been presented to it. See Connor v. State, 175 Neb. 140, 120 N.W.2d 916 (1963), quoting Phenix Ins. Co. v. Fuller, 53 Neb. 811, 74 N.W. 269 (1898) (judgment of district court must stand or fall upon statutory record in case).
The majority ties together the various documents bound in the bill of exceptions as separate instruments by concluding from various and sundry holes in the papers that the documents were at one time all fastened together. That may be so, but they are not fastened together now. While the majority notes that there is nothing in the record to show when the assumed fastening staple was removed or who did so, the majority notes that the documents were offered as a single 15-page exhibit. If the now separate documents were indeed a single stapled exhibit *871when received by the trial court, it was the trial court’s responsibility to see to it that the exhibit found its way into the record in that condition. The sad fact is that the majority has elected to take a view which protects the judicial bureaucracy at the expense of defendant Roy Lee Wallace’s rights.
As the documents are presented to us, not only is the Arkansas magistrate’s affidavit of probable cause not “annexed” to the Arkansas Governor’s certificate or to the court clerk’s certificate of authenticity, but as neither certificate makes any particular reference to the affidavit, there is nothing which enables me to determine that the magistrate’s after-the-fact affidavit relates to the robbery for which Arkansas has requested extradition. The record does, however, clearly tell us that the robbery for which extradition is sought is not the only robbery which Wallace is claimed to have committed.
Consequently, I would hold that the Arkansas documents are not, on their face, in order and that the extradition warrant issued by Governor Nelson is void and of no force and effect.
While the arresting officer had reasonable information that Wallace stood charged in the courts of Arkansas with crimes punishable by imprisonment for more than a year and thus had a basis for making a lawful warrantless arrest when he did so on June 19,1991, it does not appear from the record before us that Wallace was thereafter, as required by law, “taken before a judge or magistrate with all practicable speed and complaint” made against him under oath setting forth the ground for the arrest. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-742 (Reissue 1989).
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the district court and remand the cause with the directions that habeas corpus relief issue forthwith and that Wallace be discharged from custody.
Shanahan, J., j oins in this dissent.