concurring specially.
The issue in this case arises out of the fact the report was dated and certified prior to the receipt of the blood-alcohol level from the State Toxicologist. Section 39-20-03.1(3), NDCC, provides that the report is to be a “certified written report in the form required by the commissioner (director) .... ” The form prescribed by the Director contained the following statement: “I personally certify as a law enforcement officer that this written report is true and correct to the best of my knowledge at the time of writing this report.”
The problem, of course, is that the “time of writing the report” is, presumably, the date it was signed. The officer did not know the blood-alcohol level at that time. However, as the majority opinion notes, the State Toxicologist, not the officer, is the person to determine the blood-alcohol level. Nevertheless, if the statement prescribed by the Director were “of the essence” I would agree with Ding. I believe, however, that the phrase “at the time of writing this report” is not essential. In this respect this case is akin to cases determining whether or not a blood-alcohol test was “fairly administered” in order that the results be admissible in accord with the provisions of section 39-20-07, NDCC. In cases such as Moser v. North Dakota State Highway Com’r, 369 N.W.2d 650 (N.D.1985), we concluded that because section 39-20-07, NDCC, permits admission of evidence without expert testimony to establish accuracy and reliability, all the requirements of the statute must be scrupulously met to ensure a uniform basis of testing through the State and fair administration. We held that the foundational requirements needed to show that a breathalyzer test was fairly administered so as to render the results admissible could be met either *502through testimony of the State Toxicologist or through the introduction of certified copies of approved methods and techniques filed pursuant to the statute. See also, e.g., Wagner v. Backes, 470 N.W.2d 598 (N.D.1991); Price v. Dept. of Transp. Director, 469 N.W.2d 560 (N.D.1991); Glaspey v. Backes, 462 N.W.2d 635 (N.D.1990); State v. Schwalk, 430 N.W.2d 317 (N.D.1988).
On the other hand, where the variance from the directions of the State Toxicologist could not have substantially affected test results, and is administrative rather than scientific in nature, we have not applied the Moser rationale but have upheld the admission of the test results by the Director. E.g., Schwind v. Director, Dept. of Transp., 462 N.W.2d 147 (N.D.1990) [officer rather than nurse checked the box on form which indicates whether or not the container seal on the blood kit canister was intact before use]; Heinrich v. N.D. State Hwy. Com’n, 449 N.W.2d 587 (N.D.1989) [officer’s post-test correction of standard solution number could not have affected accuracy and reliability of intoxilyzer test results]; Schense v. Hjelle, 386 N.W.2d 888 (N.D.1986) [discrepancy in serial numbers identifying simulator could not have affected test results].
I would apply a similar rationale to the instant case. The completion of the form by inserting the blood-alcohol level received from the State Toxicologist after the form had been dated and signed could not affect the accuracy and reliability of the results. Although the form certified by the officer contains necessary information other than the test results, such as the officer’s statement of probable cause, which is essential to the issues to be decided at the administrative hearing (see section 39-20-05, NDCC), the officer’s completion of the certification prior to the date of receipt of the blood-alcohol level could not have affected that information. The officer did appear and testify at the administrative hearing. Furthermore, since the form was prescribed by the Director it is, as it is with the State Toxicologist in cases such as Mos-er, for that official to determine if the defect is of a nature to destroy the efficacy of the form. Although Ding attempts to cast the issue as one of jurisdiction, the receipt of the certified completed form provided the Director jurisdiction. Defects such as the one Ding magnifies in this case may be relevant insofar as admissibility and weight of evidence are concerned, but they are not jurisdictional. Indeed, such defects may not be apparent from the face of the form.
For the reasons stated herein, I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion.
LEVINE, J., concurs.