dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I would hold that, based on Officer Spragins’s probable cause affidavit, the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that the search warrant would uncover evidence of wrongdoing, specifically evidence of possession and manufacture of methamphetamine, and that, therefore, the trial court properly denied Appellant Jeffery Scott Davis’s motion to suppress. Accordingly, I would overrule Appellant’s issue and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
A distinction exists between the standards of review applicable to warrantless searches and searches pursuant to a search warrant. Swearingen v. State, 143 S.W.3d 808, 811 (Tex.Crim.App.2004). The standard of review to be applied to the review of a magistrate’s determination of probable cause in issuing a search warrant is the deferential standard of review articulated in Illinois v. Gates1 and in Johnson v. State2 Swearingen, 143 S.W.3d at 811 (instructing appellate courts to apply the “deferential standard of review articulated in Gates and Johnson” in reviewing a magistrate’s decision to issue a warrant).
The deferential standard of review was articulated in Gates as follows:
we reaffirm the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis that traditionally has informed probable-cause determinations. The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing *404court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a “substantial basis for ... concluding]” that probable cause existed.
462 U.S. at 238-39, 103 S.Ct. at 2332 (citations omitted). In Johnson, the standard was articulated as follows:
Appellate court review of the sufficiency of an affidavit is not a de novo review. The magistrate’s determination of probable cause should be given great deference by the reviewing court. “[T]he traditional standard for review of an issuing magistrate’s probable cause determination has been that so long as the magistrate had a ‘substantial basis for ... eonelud[ing]’ that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing, the Fourth Amendment requires no more.”
803 S.W.2d at 289 (citations omitted).
The sufficiency of a search warrant affidavit is determined by considering the totality of the circumstances set forth in the affidavit. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. at 2332. The affidavit must be interpreted in a common sense and realistic manner, and reasonable inferences may be drawn from the facts and circumstances within the four corners of the affidavit. Jones v. State, 833 S.W.2d 118, 123-24 (Tex.Crim. App.1992), cert, denied, 507 U.S. 921, 113 S.Ct. 1285,122 L.Ed.2d 678 (1993).
The majority’s thoughtful analysis is flawed, in my view, because the majority does not interpret the affidavit in a common sense and realistic manner and does not defer to reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts and circumstances within the four corners of the affidavit. Instead, in my opinion, the majority dissects the affidavit in a hypertechnical way, at odds with the required standard of review, instead of focusing on the totality of the circumstances set forth in the affidavit.
The majority holds that the affidavit is silent as to Westervelt’s experience, his proximity to the residence, the length of time he spent outside the residence, or anything else that would show the reliability of Officer Westervelt’s suspicion. Accordingly, the majority holds that the affidavit is insufficient to support the warrant. The affidavit states, however,
On 3-18-03, at approximately 0400 hrs, Officer Mitchell Westervelt was on patrol in Nocona and drove past [the] residence. Westervelt stated that he could smell a strong chemical odor he has associated with the manufacture of methamphetamine emitting from the residence at 701 Young Street. Wester-velt informed Chief Holcomb of the odor and Holcomb contacted your Affiant.
The majority concedes that the magistrate was entitled to rely upon this information as reliable3 but claims the affidavit does not set forth information establishing Westervelt’s expertise or experience in recognizing an odor associated with the manufacture of methamphetamine. The affidavit indicates that Westervelt is a police officer, that on March 18th he personally smelled a strong chemical odor emitting from Appellant’s residence, and that he “has associated”4 that smell “with the *405manufacture of methamphetamine.” A common sense and reasonable interpretation of this statement demonstrates that Westervelt, a police officer, has enough experience and expertise that he has previously smelled the same chemical odor and “has associated” it previously with the manufacture of methamphetamine. See Gish v. State, 606 S.W.2d 883, 886 (Tex.Crim.App.1980) (officer affiant did not detail his expertise in recognizing smell of ether; affidavit simply stated that he smelled it and that it was associated with manufacture of methamphetamine). I cannot agree with the majority that a police officer who has had the experience of previously smelling the strong chemical odor associated with the manufacture of methamphetamine must say more than this to establish his expertise and ability to recognize the same smell when he smells it again. Nor can I agree with the majority that Officer Westervelt needed to explain why he believed the odor emanated from Appellant’s residence — the why is because he smelled it coming from that location. Such a holding fails to interpret the affidavit in a common sense and realistic manner and fails to permit reasonable inferences from the facts and circumstances within the four corners of the affidavit. See Jones, 833 S.W.2d at 123-24.
Looking to the totality of the circumstances presented in Spragins’s affidavit and giving great deference to the magistrate’s probable cause determination, I would hold that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing. Officer Spragins is a ten-year police veteran. He is a Narcotics Investigator assigned to the North Texas Regional Drug Enforcement Task Force. He has attended training in narcotics investigations, including the manufacture of controlled substances, and is certified by the Drug Enforcement Agency to enter and seize clandestine drug manufacturing laboratories. As a Narcotics Task Force Investigator, he, along with other investigators, “have been conducting” an investigation regarding Davis’s manufacture and distribution of methamphetamine; that is, they were currently involved in the investigation. “During this investigation investigators have gathered information that Davis was manufacturing methamphetamine at 701 Young Street, Nocona, Texas.”5 Investigators obtained additional data from confidential informants who said Appellant was manufacturing methamphetamine inside a shed in his backyard, from Crime Stoppers who told police Appellant was manufacturing methamphetamine at his house and described a chemical odor emitting from Appellant’s residence, and from Appellant’s purchase of starter fluid and coffee filters, items used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. Officer Westervelt smelled a strong chemical odor he has associated with the production of methamphetamine coming from Appellant’s residence on March 18, 2003, and “[biased on the information received from numerous sources and the odor emitting from the residence,” Officer Spra-gins swore that he firmly believed Appellant was intentionally and knowingly in possession of a quantity of methamphetamine at his residence. Spragins obtained the search warrant that day, March 18, 2003, authorizing him to search Appellant’s residence and outbuildings at 701 Young Street for methamphetamine and evidence of its manufacture.6
*406Giving great deference to the magistrate’s determination of probable cause, Officer Spragins’s affidavit sets forth a substantial basis for the magistrate’s conclusion that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing, specifically possession or manufacture of methamphetamine.7 I would overrule Appellant’s issue and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
. 462 U.S. 213, 234-38, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2330-32, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983).
. 803 S.W.2d 272, 289 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (disapproved in part by Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681, 685 n. 6 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert, denied, 501 U.S. 1259, 111 S.Ct. 2914, 115 L.Ed.2d 1078 (1991)).
. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965) (holding information provided by other police officers is presumed reliable by magistrate); Janecka v. State, 739 S.W.2d 813, 825 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) (same); Marquez v. State, 725 S.W.2d 217, 233 (Tex.Crim.App.) (same), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 872, 108 S.Ct. 201, 98 L.Ed.2d 152 (1987).
. The majority omits the "has” from its analysis; thereby concluding that Officer Westervelt never previously smelled the odor associated with the manufacture of methamphetamine.
. I cannot agree with the majority that the affidavit fails to provide a time frame for the mentioned investigation — the affidavit indicates this investigation is currently ongoing— or fails to associate Appellant with the 701 Young Street residence.
. The majority claims that the State concedes the affidavit rests or falls on the adequacy of *406the information supplied to Investigator Spra-gins by Officer Westervelt, but the State's brief argues, “The combination of information from the two officers informed the magistrate that a police officer who knows the smell produced by a methamphetamine lab detected the odor of a lab coming from Appellant’s home, and that a very experienced investigator with other corroborating facts concluded that the smell was probably coming from methamphetamine production in the home.”
. The cases cited by the majority are, in my opinion, not controlling. Rowell v. State involved a warrant to search for a firearm allegedly located at the appellant’s residence, and the warrant was issued six months after appellant redeemed the pawned firearm, not a warrant issued on the same date that a police officer smelled a strong chemical odor emanating from the residence to be searched like in this case. 14 S.W.3d 806, 810 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2000), aff⅜ 66 S.W.3d 279 (Tex.Crim.App.2001) (explaining that "[t]he warrant was not issued for another six months after the second redemption”). Lowery v. State involves information provided by a "tipster” who had been given the information by a third person, not information provided by a police officer based on personal knowledge on the date of the issuance of the warrant like in this case. 843 S.W.2d 136, 141— 42 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1992, pet. ref'd) (explaining that “the untested informant’s secondhand information” which was not corroborated was not reliable).