Kevin Dean Randall appeals from the Saunders County District Court’s judgment overruling his motion for postconviction relief from an accepted plea of guilty to a charge of second degree murder. We reverse the district court’s order and remand the cause with directions to grant Randall a new trial because the information charging Randall with second degree murder did not include malice as an element of the crime.
*719BACKGROUND
The State charged Randall with first degree murder for the November 22, 1979, death of Wayne Armstrong. On March 18, 1980, Randall pled guilty to second degree murder (Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-304 (Reissue 1989)) pursuant to a plea agreement with the State. The amended information charged that Randall committed murder in the second degree by causing the death of Armstrong, intentionally, but without premeditation. The amended information made no reference to Randall’s actions being committed with malice. The district court accepted Randall’s plea of guilty to the amended charge.
Randall was sentenced to serve not less than 30 years’ nor more than life imprisonment. He appealed his sentence, claiming error for being given an indeterminate sentence. Upon review, this court reversed, and remanded for resentencing. State v. Randall, 208 Neb. 248, 302 N.W.2d 733 (1981). On remand, Randall was sentenced to life imprisonment.
On August 5, 1994, Randall filed a second amended motion for postconviction relief seeking to set aside his conviction for second degree murder. Randall’s motion alleged that the information on which he was convicted and sentenced failed to establish the prima facie elements of murder in the second degree and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied Randall’s second amended motion for postconviction relief, and he appeals.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Randall argues that the district court erred in not granting his second amended motion for postconviction relief because (1) his conviction is void in that the amended information on which he was convicted for second degree murder failed to contain the prima facie element of malice, and (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A criminal defendant seeking postconviction relief has the burden of establishing a basis for such relief, and the findings of the district court will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous. State v. Barfoot, 248 Neb. 335, 534 N.W.2d 572 (1995); State v. Williams, 247 Neb. 931, 531 N.W.2d 222 *720(1995). The appellant in a postconviction proceeding has the burden of alleging and proving that the claimed error is prejudicial. Id.
An appellate court always reserves the right to note plain error which was not complained of at trial or on appeal but is plainly evident from the record, and which is of such a nature that to leave it uncorrected would cause a miscarriage of justice or result in damage to the integrity, reputation, or fairness of the judicial process. Id.
ANALYSIS
This court has addressed numerous times whether a defendant is entitled to postconviction relief from a second degree murder conviction when malice as an element has been omitted from the information or jury instructions. We have repeatedly held that malice is an element of second degree murder. See, e.g., State v. Barfoot, supra; State v. Lowe, 248 Neb. 215, 533 N.W.2d 99 (1995); State v. Plant, 248 Neb. 52, 532 N.W.2d 619 (1995); State v. Eggers, 247 Neb. 989, 531 N.W.2d 231 (1995); State v. Wilson, 247 Neb. 948, 530 N.W.2d 925 (1995); State v. Williams, supra; State v. Secret, 246 Neb. 1002, 524 N.W.2d 551 (1994); State v. Dean, 246 Neb. 869, 523 N.W.2d 681 (1994); State v. Ladig, 246 Neb. 542, 519 N.W.2d 561 (1994); State v. Manzer, 246 Neb. 536, 519 N.W.2d 558 (1994); State v. Grimes, 246 Neb. 473, 519 N.W.2d 507 (1994); State v. Myers, 244 Neb. 905, 510 N.W.2d 58 (1994).
The omission of malice as an element of second degree murder in an information constitutes plain error. State v. Barfoot, supra; State v. Ladig, supra; State v. Manzer, supra. The failure to include malice as an element in an adjudgment of guilt of second degree murder may be raised as plain error on direct appeal or on a motion for postconviction relief. See, State v. Barfoot, supra; State v. Plant, supra; State v. Williams, supra.
Randall pled guilty to second degree murder based on an information which failed to include malice as an essential element of the crime. The defective information constituted plain error which requires the granting of Randall’s motion for *721postconviction relief. See, State v. Barfoot, supra; State v. Ladig, supra; State v. Manzer, supra. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of, and remand the matter to, the district court with directions to grant Randall a new trial.
Reversed and remanded with directions.