concurring.
The majority notes in footnote 1 that “Corey’s standing to enforce the 1978 divorce decree has not been challenged and we do not address the issue.” Because the issue of Corey’s standing was not raised or briefed and, as I assume for purposes of this concurrence, standing is not jurisdictional, I agree with the majority. I write, however, to express some skepticism over Corey’s standing. Ordinarily a litigant may assert only his own rights. Application of Otter Tail Power Co., 451 N.W.2d 95 (N.D.1990); Hovet v. Hebron Pub. Sch. Dist., 419 N.W.2d 189 (N.D.1988).
Although it may appear Corey is enforcing his own right, it is Rosalie, his mother, who has the right under the divorce decree. Thus in Anderson v. Anderson, 522 N.W.2d 476 (N.D.1994) and Sullivan v. Quist, 506 N.W.2d 394 (N.D.1993), it was the mother who brought the action. Here, Rosalie was not a party to Corey’s proceeding until named as a third-party defendant by William. I am skeptical that so-called “third-party beneficiaries” should be allowed to sue to enforce provisions of divorce judgments. Cf. Thorson v. Thorson, 541 N.W.2d 692 (N.D.*1921996) ["denying personal representative motion to substitute herself as plaintiff in divorce action to pursue equitable distribution of parties’ marital property to children after plaintiff died]. Marriage is a relationship personal to the parties of the marriage. N.D. Cent. Code § 14-03-01. The divorce is between the parties, not the children of the parties. N.D. Cent. Code § 14-05-01(2). Because the concept of third-party beneficiary, upon which Corey relies, is a contract concept, my skepticism is heightened in light of our holdings that the contract between the parties is merged into the order of the trial court, e.g., Eberhart v. Eberhart, 301 N.W.2d 137 (N.D.1981), and that a contract analysis of the divoi'ce judgment is improper.
I am concerned the majority opinion will be construed as an invitation for creditors or others who claim interest in the divorce decree to bring action to enforce it. They should not. Under normal circumstances enforcement of the decree is a matter for the parties and our holding might well be different were the standing issue raised.
SANDSTROM, J., concurs.