(concurring in part & concurring in result in part).
I concur in all issues except issue II, where I concur in the result only. The reasoning of the majority opinion in issue II is flawed. I would simply hold that even though the statute of frauds applies in the first instance, partial (or even full) performance of the verbal agreement removes the necessity for a signed writing. In other words, Braunger paid the money on an option to buy, which money would have applied against the balance of the purchase price, if he had elected to buy. Although Braunger did not elect to buy, he did list the property in a Minneapolis advertisement in an attempt to sell it. These facts and the unsigned writing support the proposition that Braunger and Snow partially (or even fully) performed the agreement, which performance removes the necessity for a signed writing. See: Berg v. Carlstrom, 347 N.W.2d 809, 812 (Minn.1984) (An oral agreement may be taken out of the statute of frauds by part performance); Matter of Estate of Gosmire, 331 N.W.2d 562 (S.D.1983); Cooke v. Blood Systems, Inc., 320 N.W.2d 124, 127 (N.D.1982) (An agreement for the leasing of property for more than one year is invalid unless there is a written note or memorandum evidencing the agreement, but part performance of an oral contract may bar the assertion of the statute of frauds if, in fact, there is an oral agreement.) Essentially, this was a question of credibility and proof, previously determined against Braunger under issue I.