(dissenting). I respectfully dissent.
i
nature of the case
Defendant, a school employee, drove her own car and, while acting within the scope of her employment, she negligently collided with plaintiff Tim Haberi’s car, causing him serious injuries. Because defendant was performing a governmental function when she caused the accident, and because she was not grossly negligent, she should be immune from tort liability under the clear language of MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107). We should reject plaintiffs’ claim that MCL 257.401(1); MSA 9.2101(1) (which imposes liability upon the owner of a vehicle for negligence) applies to create liability here where governmental immunity explicitly precludes it because the individual governmental immunity law admits of no such exception or construction.
*267n
ANALYSIS
Before 1986, the law of governmental immunity as it related to individual officers, employees, and agents, was a creature of judicial decisionmaking. Nalepa v Plymouth-Canton Community School Dist, 207 Mich App 580, 585; 525 NW2d 897 (1994). In 1984, in an attempt to clarify and comprehensively explain governmental immunity law, the Michigan Supreme Court decided Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567; 363 NW2d 641 (1984). In response to Ross, in 1986, the Legislature enacted 1986 PA 175, which amended MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107), Nalepa, supra at 585, and created, for the first time in Michigan, statutory immunity for individuals. The specific portion of the governmental immunity act at issue here (immunity for individuals, MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996[107]), provides in relevant part:
(2) Except as otherwise provided in this section, and without regard to the discretionary or ministerial nature of the conduct in question, each officer and employee of a governmental agency, each volunteer acting on behalf of a governmental agency, and each member of a board, council, commission, or statutorily created task force of a governmental agency shall be immune from tort liability for injuries to persons or damages to property caused by the officer, employee, or member while in the course of employment or service or volunteer while acting on behalf of a governmental agency if all of the following are met:
(a) The officer, employee, member, or volunteer is acting or reasonably believes he or she is acting within the scope of his or her authority.'
(b) The governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function.
(c) The officer’s, employee’s, member’s, or volunteer’s conduct does not amount to gross negligence that is the *268proximate cause of the injury or damage. As used in this subdivision, “gross negligence” means conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results. [Emphasis added.]
Here, defendant was “acting on behalf of a governmental agency” when, as a secretary to the superintendent, she distributed agendas for the upcoming board meeting. In addition, all three requisites for individual immunity were met here. First, the jury found that she acted within the scope of her employment. Second, the board of education was unquestionably engaged in the exercise of a governmental function. Finally, the record supports the circuit court’s conclusion that defendant was not grossly negligent in causing the accident. Therefore, I would find that plaintiffs’ case against defendant was properly dismissed because defendant was immune from liability.
in
CIVIL LIABILITY STATUTE IS INAPPLICABLE
Plaintiffs argue, and the majority agrees, that the Michigan civil liability statute, MCL 257.401(1); MSA 9.2101(1) applies to this case, and supports liability notwithstanding the governmental immunity statute. Though the majority’s reasoning has surface appeal, it cannot withstand closer scrutiny. The civil liability statute, which imposes liability upon the owner of a motor vehicle, has been a part of Michigan statutory law in some form since it was originally enacted by 1909 PA 318, § 10. In its current form, it provides in relevant part:
(1) This section shall not be construed to limit the right of a person to bring a civil action for damages for injuries *269to either person or property resulting from a violation of this act by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle or his or her agent or servant. The owner of a motor vehicle is liable for an injury caused by the negligent operation of the motor vehicle, whether the negligence consists of a violation of a statute of this state or the ordinary care standard required by common law. [MCL 257.401(1); MSA 9.2101(1) (emphasis added).]
The purpose of this statute was to place the risk of damage or injury on the person who has ultimate control of the vehicle — the owner. North v Kolomyjec, 199 Mich App 724, 726; 502 NW2d 765 (1993). The public policy underlying the statute is to ensure financial responsibility for those injured as a result of negligent operation of motor vehicles — that is, to ensure compensation for victims of negligent use of a motor vehicle. See Citizens Mut Automobile Ins Co v Fireman’s Fund Ins Co, 234 F Supp 931, 935 (WD Mich, 1964). In Dale v Whiteman, 388 Mich 698, 703; 202 NW2d 797 (1972), the Michigan Supreme Court stated:
“The owner liability statute . .. was passed in response to an overwhelming public need. Common-law liability, circumscribed as it was by the doctrine of bailment, respondeat superior, agency, and the like, was unable to cope with the rising tide of injuries resulting from the use of the new mechanism, the automobile. Principal among the legislative answers were the owner liability laws. Their purpose . . . was to extend and complement the common law. The legislative theory was simple to state and broadly applicable: An owner was liable for the negligent operation of the machine owned by him when he had consented to its use.” [Citation omitted.]
Implicit in this rationale is the conclusion that the liability statute does not apply when the owner and the driver are the same person. See Kolomyjec, supra *270at 725-726 (statute “created a new cause of action against a motor vehicle owner for injuries arising out of a non-owner’s negligent operation of the vehicle”) (emphasis added). Also, because the liability statute is in derogation of the common law, it must be strictly construed. Geib v Slater, 320 Mich 316, 320; 31 NW2d 65 (1948), overruled in part by Moore v Palmer, 350 Mich 363; 86 NW2d 585 (1957). Therefore, even without regard to the immunity issues, the civil liability statute has no applicability here, because defendant was both the owner and the driver of the car. However, and more importantly, even if the facts were different (i.e. defendant was driving a car owned by another person), the provisions of the immunity statute must prevail over the provisions of the civil liability statute.
rv
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
The history of both the civil liability statute and the governmental immunity act further suggests that the result reached by the majority is not appropriate. The liability statute (MCL 257.401[1]; MSA 9.2101[1]) was first enacted in 1909. The broad statutory governmental immunity provisions (MCL 691.1401 et seq.) MSA 3.996(101) et seq.) were codified in 1948. These provisions included a specific exception to immunity — the government can be held liable where injuries arise from the negligent use of a government-owned vehicle (MCL 691.1405; MSA 3.996[105]).
However, in 1986, when the individual immunity statute1 was enacted, the statute did not similarly *271waive individual immunity from liability for negligently caused injuries arising from use of individuals’ own vehicles. Rather, the Legislature maintained immunity for individual government employees notwithstanding that injuries might occur by way of automobile accidents. It is a well-known principle that the Legislature is presumed to be aware of, and thus to have considered the effect on, all existing statutes when enacting new laws. Walen v Dep’t of Corrections, 443 Mich 240, 248; 505 NW2d 519 (1993). Therefore, we must proceed as though the Legislature enacted the individual immunity statute in 1986, with full knowledge of the well-recognized exception to governmental immunity for government-owned vehicles. It is quite implausible that the Legislature was unaware of such a significant exception, given that it is one of the five major exceptions to the governmental immunity statutes.2 Certainly, we must recognize that Legislators have paid staff and volunteers who use their own cars to conduct government business. Therefore, it is highly implausible that this precise issue (immunity when automobiles are involved) would have escaped the attention of our legislators, when it is such a major part of governmental (as opposed to individual) immunity law. Yet, in the 1986 amendments, the Legislature chose not to create an exception to immunity for individuals when they are driving their own vehicles in the scope of their government responsibilities.
*272Specific rules' of construction concerning these two statutes also dictate that immunity should prevail here. The governmental immunity act is a very broad grant of immunity subject to a limited number of statutory exceptions. Hickey v Zezulka (On Resubmission), 439 Mich 408, 421; 487 NW2d 106 (1992). Ross made clear that the statutory exceptions must be given a narrow reading. Ross, supra at 618; Baylor, Governmental Immunity In Michigan, § 2.4, p 2-8 (ICLE, 1991); Hickey, supra at 421. Accordingly, rather than reading (or rewriting) the statutory motor vehicle exception (for government-owned vehicles) broadly, it must be read narrowly. On the other hand, the liability statute is in derogation of the common law and is therefore to be strictly construed. Geib, supra at 320. This analysis further reinforces the conclusion that the governmental vehicle exception to immunity should not be broadened judicially to include individually owned vehicles.
Finally, for the judiciary to create another exception from the broad sweep of governmental immunity would improperly cast the judiciary in the role of the Legislature. Lenawee Co Rd Comm v Dep’t of Transportation, 128 Mich App 528, 530; 340 NW2d 316 (1983). With regard to government-owned vehicles, the Legislature weighed the competing interests of (1) compensating victims of automobile-related torts and (2) protecting government from claims arising out of ordinary negligence, and struck a balance in favor of victim compensation. With regard to individual government employees with privately owned vehicles, it is apparent that the Legislature struck the balance in favor of protecting government workers. We should not assume that the Legislature was unaware of the *273policy choices and implications of the two competing interests here when it considered precisely the same interests as they relate to the government itself. Having chosen to protect individuals with the cloak of immunity, the Legislature made a policy choice with which we may disagree, but which we are not free to undo.
MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107).
See MCL 691.1402 et seq.; MSA 3.996(102) et seq. (defective highways), MCL 691.1405; MSA 3.996(105) (government-owned vehicles), MCL 691.1406; MSA 3.996(106) (public buildings), MCL 691.1413; MSA 3.996(113) (proprietary function exception), and MCL 691.1407(4); MSA 3.996(107)(4) (government hospitals).