{dissenting). I disagree with the majority’s decision not to extend the equitable parent doctrine to reach the circumstances of this case. I would find plaintiff to be the equitable parent of Alicia Marie Van and Zachary Scott Van. I would remand the case to the trial court with instructions to provide appropri*343ate custody and parenting as befits the children’s best interests.
The majority states that, with the promulgation of the Child Custody Act,1 the judiciary is not the proper entity to create new rights or extend theories to reach new situations. However, the act explicitly provides that it is “equitable in nature” and its provisions are to be liberally construed. MCL 722.26; MSA 25.312(6). A liberal construction of it supports a finding that this Court is well within its power to expand the equitable parenthood doctrine to a situation such as is presented here.
The majority accurately notes that the Child Custody Act does not contain a specific provision allowing a person in Mr. Van’s circumstances to pursue rights under a theory of equitable parenthood. The majority observes that, because the Child Custody Act defines the rights of a “third person” under MCL 722.26c; MSA 25.312(6c), Mr. Van is ineligible to bring an action to pursue parental rights here. It states that the act addresses the rights of “biological parents.” It does not. In fact, it says nothing about “biological” parents. It does not so much as define the word “parent.”
The doctrine of equitable parenthood allows the court to decide who is a “parent” for purposes of the act. Thus, should this Court decide that Mr. Van is an equitable parent, he would be accorded “parental” status and fall within the provisions allowing him to seek custody of the children.
Moreover, the statute specifically provides even third parties the opportunity to seek reasonable *344parenting time. MCL 722.27(1); MSA 25.312(7)(1) states in pertinent part:
If a child custody dispute has been submitted to the circuit court as an original action under this act or has arisen incidentally from another action in the circuit court or an order or judgment of the circuit court, for the best interests of the child the court may do 1 or more of the following:
* * *
(b) provide for reasonable parenting time of the child by the parties involved, by the maternal or paternal grandparents, or by others, by general or specific terms and conditions. [Emphasis added. ][2]
Under MCL 722.23; MSA 25.312(3), a trial court is given extremely broad latitude in deciding what is in the best interest of the child. 3 The plain language of *345two provisions, in conjunction with the wording in MCL 722.26; MSA 25.312(6), demonstrates that the Legislature fully recognized the courts of Michigan as necessary to defining the process.
The Legislature is ill-equipped to deal with the myriad situations in which children find themselves. It has long been a foundational tenet of American jurisprudence that, when legal remedies prove inadequate to solve a problem, society looks to the doctrine of equity and the courts.
Indeed, as this Court has previously emphasized:
One of the glories of equity jurisprudence is that it is not bound by the strict rules of the common law, but can mold its decrees to do justice amid all the vicissitudes and intricacies of life. The principles upon which it proceeds are eternal; but their application in a changing world will necessarily change to meet changed situations. If relief had been granted only where precedent could be found for it, this great system would never have been developed; and, if such a narrow view of equitable powers is adopted now, the result will be the return of the rigid and unyielding system which equity jurisprudence was designed to remedy [Spoon-Shacket Co, Inc v Oakland Co, 356 Mich 151, 163; 97 *346NW2d 25 (1959), citing Bowen v Hockley, 71 F2d 781, 786; 94 ALR 856 (CA 4, 1934).]
Currently, a man who is not the biological father of a child may be considered a parent if he desires such recognition and is willing to support the child. Atkinson v Atkinson, 160 Mich App 601, 608-609; 408 NW2d 516 (1987). Admittedly, concerns regarding the sanctity of marriage could be tangentially affected by an extension of the equitable parenthood doctrine to situations arising outside a marriage.
However, when child custody or visitation is at issue, the Legislature has decreed that the overriding concern is not the ultimate preservation by the state of the institution of marriage.4 It is, instead, the attainment of the best interests of the children. Id. at 611; MCL 722.27; MSA 25.312(7). Keeping that overriding interest firmly in mind, I would expand the doctrine of equitable parenthood to cover the circumstances in this case.
The fact that defendant and plaintiff were not married when Alicia and Zachary were bom should not preclude a finding that plaintiff was their equitable parent. Plaintiff considers them to be his children. Indeed, until March of 1996, he was the only father the children had ever known. Plaintiff obviously desires to continue to exercise the rights afforded to a parent, having been actively involved in their lives since birth.
*347Moreover, defendant encouraged the development of a parent-child relationship by filing a paternity action naming plaintiff as the father of both children on March 25, 1996. Defendant swore under oath that plaintiff was the father of the two children. The children bear his name. Also, there is every indication that plaintiff is most willing to continue to support the children, both financially and emotionally.
The majority attempts to appeal to the defendant’s kinder nature in hoping that she will grant plaintiff the ability to reestablish contact with Zachary and Alicia. Although this sentiment is admirable, it does not replace what I see as this Court’s duty to involve itself in equitable matters such as this one. The children’s opportunity to continue a nurturing familial relationship with plaintiff should not be left to the whim of defendant, perhaps to be used as a carrot or a stick. Such a result is not in their best interests.
I would, therefore, find that plaintiff is the equitable parent of Zachary and Alicia. I would remand the case to the trial court with instructions to decide appropriate custody and parenting time following the trial court’s determination of the children’s best interests.
MCL 722.21 et seq.; MSA 25.312(1) et seq.
The majority maintains that the Child Custody Act is not implicated because there is no active custody dispute between Ms. Zahorik and the biological fathers of the children. This ignores the plain language of MCL 722.27; MSA 25.312(7). In this case, the dispute at issue arose from defendant’s filing of a paternity action against plaintiff on March 25, 1996. Whether plaintiff would originally have had standing to seek custody of the children is irrelevant. Once defendant filed her paternity suit, the questions of custody and visitation arose incidentally to the necessity of deciding the rights of the parties.
MCL 722.23; MSA 25.312(3) provides that, to determine the “best interests of the child,” a trial court is to consider:
(a) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the parties involved and the child.
(b) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to give the child love, affection, and guidance and to continue the education and raising of the child in his or her religion or creed, if any.
(c) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care recognized and permitted under the laws of this state in place of medical care, and other material needs.
(d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity. *345(e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home or homes.
(f) The moral fitness of the parties involved.
(g) The mental and physical health of the parties involved.
(h) The home, school, and community record of the child.
(i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court considers the child to be of sufficient age to express preference.
0) The willingness and ability of each of the parties to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between child and the other parent or the child and the parents.
(k) Domestic violence, regardless of whether the violence was directed against or witnessed by the child.
0) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particular child custody dispute. [Emphasis added.]
Indeed, as Justice Brickley so eloquently notes, the majority mistakenly stresses Michigan’s public policy favoring marriage, yet provides no statutory support. The distinction the majority draws seems to be a purely arbitrary one. It has effectively trumped the statutory “best interests” test with general public policy to promote marriage, and punishes the children for plaintiff and defendant’s failure to marry.