(dissenting).
[¶ 18.] I dissent. On September 29, 1997, Sorensen and Hawk made constructive appearances before a judicial officer for the purposes of the 180-day rule and were released on bond, subject to substantial conditions. The trial court properly dismissed the charges against them with prejudice because their trials were not scheduled within 180 days as of that date. We should affirm the dismissal.
*685[¶ 19.] THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE CHARGES AGAINST SORENSEN AND HAWK FOR VIOLATION OF THE 180-DAY RULE.
[¶ 20.] The majority opinion claims that the 180-day period began on November 18, 1997, when Sorensen and Hawk made their first appearance on the indictments. However, the trial court found that the 180-day period commenced on September 29, 1997, when they “appeared” before the county clerk of courts and were released on bond. I agree and we should affirm the trial court’s decision.
[¶ 21.] On September 29, 1997, Sorensen and Hawk were released from custody on bond and required to execute waivers of their, extradition rights. As noted by the majority opinion, bond requirements included submission to random PBT and urinalysis tests and that Sorensen remain at his residence when not at work. At that time, significant restraints were placed on Sorensen and Hawk, and, as the trial court observed, they had charges “hanging over their heads.”
[¶ 22.] SDCL 23A-4-1 requires that “[a] law enforcement officer shall, without unnecessary delay, take the arrested person before the nearest available committing magistrate.” SDCL 23A-4-1 further provides:
If a person arrested without a warrant is brought before a committing magistrate, a complaint shall be filed forth-mth. When a person, arrested with or without a warrant or given a summons, appears initially before a committing magistrate, the committing magistrate shall proceed in accordance with the applicable provisions of §§ 23A-4-2 to 23A-4-5, inclusive.
(Emphasis added). SDCL 23A-4-4 provides that the committing magistrate “admit the defendant to bail as provided by ... chapter 23A-43.” SDCL 23A-43-2 provides, in part:
Except for a defendant charged with an offense punishable by death or a defendant who is currently released on personal recognizance bond, a defendant shall, at his appearance before a committing magistrate or court be ordered released pending trial on his personal recognizance or upon the execution of an unsecured appearance bond in an amount specified by the committing magistrate or eourt[.]
(Emphasis added). The State selected how Sorensen and Hawk were to appear and evidently felt a physical appearance was not necessary in order to set their bail. In practice, many defendants are released on bond without physically appearing before a magistrate or judge.
[¶ 23.] The 180-day rule was adopted to prevent delays, procrastinations, and dilatory practices. State v. Hoffman, 409 N.W.2d 373, 376 (S.D.1987) (Wuest, CJ, concurring specially). It would circumvent the purpose of the 180-day rule to treat defendants such as Sorensen and Hawk differently than those defendants released on bond who physically appear before a magistrate or judge. See State v. Kordonowy, 523 N.W.2d 556, 557 (S.D.1994) (stating that a construction of 23A-44-5.1 which allows the State unlimited time to file an information after a defendant makes a first appearance on a complaint would “effectively defeat the purpose of the 180 day rule, and cannot be accepted”).
[¶ 24.] It would also circumvent the purpose of the 180-day rule to allow prosecutors to manipulate the commencement of the 180-day period by altering filed documents. The bond agreements and waivers of extradition rights signed by Sorensen and Hawk are stamped filed September 30, 1997. The stamped dates on all are altered to November 17. No explanation is offered in the record for these alterations. In addition, the State cannot, on its own motion, dismiss the proceedings and indict simply for the purposes of avoiding the sanctions of the 180-day rule and *686starting a new 180-day period. State v. Tiedeman, 433 N.W.2d 237, 240 (S.D.1988). Therefore, the State must establish a justifiable reason, constituting good cause, or the time will be counted. Here, the State failed to do so.
[¶ 25.] Sorensen and Hawk made constructive appearances before a judicial officer for purposes of the 180 day rule when they were released on bond and subjécted to substantial conditions. The 180-day period began on September 29, 1997 and expired on March 28, 1998. Therefore, Sorensen and Hawk were not brought to trial within the time required by SDCL 23A-44-5.1.
[¶ 26.] By reversing the trial court’s dismissal, the majority opinion condones the sloppy, careless procedure used by the State in this case. The majority opinion violates the letter and the spirit of the 180-day rule. This case involves exactly the situation the rule was intended to address. I fear that the majority opinion sends the absolute wrong message and will eventually result in the case we all dread— the major case where the procedures are so sloppy, it must be dismissed on the merits. We should draw a line in the sand now and not permit the State to cavalierly thumb its nose at the 180-day rule. Now, before it is too late. Therefore, we should affirm the dismissal with prejudice for violation of SDCL 23A-44-5.1.
[¶ 27.] AMUNDSON, Justice, joins this dissent.