(dissenting).
Risking an accusation of intolerance and bigotry, I am impelled to dissent from the controlling opinion in this case. There are six hospitals in this state owned and operated by religious denominations, three Protestant and three Catholic. No doubt they are all interested in obtaining grants for the expansion and improvement of their facilities, and no doubt it is purely accidental that the first of these institutions making an application and bringing a test suit happens to be the appellee in this case. I would much prefer that the applicant be the Baptist Hospital, to which faith I adhere, so that my views of the questions before us would not be misinterpreted. I approach the matter with a full realization of the great humanitarian work being done by these denominational hospitals to all patients regardless of faith or creed, and nothing herein is intended to disparage the usefulness of these institutions nor the sincerity and unselfishness of those who have dedicated their lives to such altruistic purposes. If the appellee here were the Mississippi Baptist Hospitals, my views would be the same.
This country was discovered and populated by persons of many creeds and faiths, including primarily *459Catholic, Protestant and Jewish. They united in the common cause of wresting our independence from British rule and after a Divine Power had crowned their efforts with success they handed themselves together in the formation of our system of government as expressed in the Constitution of the United States, and, with the experience of the ages as their guide, they provided therein that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. Thus there was erected a new nation, one of whose pillars rested upon the wise principle of the complete separation of church and state, under which all sects hav-e grown and prospered both materially and spiritually under a cloak of toleration. Religious freedom has become just as firmly embedded into our way of life under this government as have the principles of freedom of speech, freedom of the press, the right of peaceable assembly and the right of security against unreasonable searches and seizures. This religious liberty is no idle catch-word, but guarantees to even such organizations as Jehovah’s Witnesses the right to their beliefs, and we extend tolerance to them even though we may sometimes question their judgment with respect to some of their precepts. I do not subscribe to the thought as expressed in one of the briefs before us that the separation of church and state is a mere slogan and that it may be carelessly compounded into a viciously dogmatic instrument of ignorance and bigotry, so encrusted by long use as to be impervious to reason. On the contrary, in my feeble judgment it is a very vital part of the solid foundation of true democracy, so much so that the framers of our Mississippi Constitution, by Section 18, provided that “no religious test as a qualification for office shall be required; and no preference shall be given by law to any religious sect or mode of worship; but the free enjoyment of all religious sentiments and the different modes of worship shall be held sacred.”
*460Without intending in any manner to impugn the high motives of those concerned, let us examine the legal status of the appellee corporation. It was originally a corporation organized for profit with $50,000 outstanding capital stock. By an amendment to the charter of incorporation on October 21, 1935, it was declared to be a nonprofit corporation pursuant to the provisions of Section 4131 of the Mississippi Code of 1930, which is the same as Section 5310 of the 1942 Code. The applicable portion of that section provides that charitable associations may be incorporated upon the application of any three members authorized by the organization of its minutes to apply for the charter. It then provides “Such corporations . . . shall issue no shares of stock, shall divide no dividends or profits among their members”, etc. The appellee was expressly prohibited by this section of our law which authorized its creation from issuing any shares of stock, and if it issued such shares it did not come under the provisions respecting nonprofit corporations. After the charter amendment in 1935 the stockholders continued to hold their $50,000 stock certificates, and on July 7, 1943, those stockholders made an outright sale of their shares of stock to Sisters of Mercy of Vicksburg, another Mississippi corporation, and the stock was transferred to and reissued in the name of the latter corporation which now continues to hold the same. There was no separate sale or transfer of the physical assets of the hospital but merely a sale of its capital stock to the Sisters of Mercy. Since the appellee has outstanding capital stock issued to the Sisters of Mercy, it does not qualify under the laws of this state as a nonprofit hospital, regardless of the amount of humanitarian and charitable work which it is doing. The record shows that its surplus has increased from $354,191.85 on January 1, 1946, to $518,180.60 on December 31, 1949, but its exact net worth is not shown. Appellee’s charter was issued April 13, 1903, and by the terms of the charter *461it will expire on April 13, 1953, which is approximately three years from now. The question naturally presents itself: How can the appellee effectually guarantee to operate a hospital, maintaining 10% of its bed capacity for charity patients, for a minimum period of twenty years, when its charter will expire and it will in legal effect be out of existence in three years?
But the more serious question presents itself: What will be the status of the property of appellee upon the termination of its charter in 1953? In the case of Woodville Lodge v. Poole, 190 Miss. 798, 1 So. (2d) 780, this court held that upon termination of a nonstock corporation its assets are vested in the surviving members. It is well established that upon termination of a stock corporation, its assets are vested in the stockholders. So in either ease here the result is the same because the members of the appellee corporation are one and the same as the members of the Sisters of Mercy Corporation, in whose name appellee’s outstanding capital stock is held. The title to all of appellee’s property will therefore become vested in the Sisters of Mercy whose status as a religious society will be discussed later herein.
I am unable to bring myself into agreement with the assertion in the controlling opinion that appellee is a private hospital as distinguished from a sectarian hospital. The record here shows that its hospital is decorated with religious property and that there is a crucifix on display in every room, including those rooms to which charity patients are and will be admitted; the crucifix is generally recognized in this state as an emblem of the Roman Catholic Church and as a symbol of its faith.. I have never heard of its use by any other church in this state or section. Every member of appellee’s board of directors is and at all times must be a member of the Sisters of Mercy. Much emphasis is laid upon the fact that on October 8, 1949, these directors adopted bylaws whereby the general policy of the hospital was placed *462iu an administrative board, as set out in the controlling opinion. The Sisters of Mercy had owned appellee’s stock for more than six years before these bylaws were adopted and the new administrative board, created by the bylaws, was set up nearly four months after the filing of appellee’s application for $741,000 of public funds and just two days before approval of the application. These very same bylaws provide that they may be repealed or amended at any time by a majority vote of the. stockholders; this fact is pointed out merely to show the legal status of the organization and without any intention whatsoever of imputing bad faith to the appellee’s directors. It is provided that the corporate members of the Sisters of Mercy shall constitute the stockholders and members of the Mercy Hospital — Street Memorial, “each stockholder having an equal vote and interest”, and that it shall be managed by a board of five directors who shall bé corporate members of the Sisters of Mercy. The charter of incorporation of the Sisters of Mercy authorizes it, among other things, “to establish and maintain and own in Vicksburg and Warren County, and in the other cities and counties throughout the State of Mississippi, when deemed advisable by it, under the auspices of the Bishop or Bishops of the Catholic Diocese of Mississippi, infirmaries for sick people.” Webster defines “auspices” as “protection, patronage and care, guidance.” The same authority defines “guidance”, among other things, as “the superintendence of a guide, direction, government. ’ ’ There is no substantial difference between this charter and that of the Mississippi Baptist Hospital which has as its members a board of trustees, elected by, and serving under the auspices and control of the Mississippi Baptist State Convention.
The record in this case shows that there has been no material change in the status of the Sisters of Mercy since the decision of this court in the case of Maas v. *463Sisters of Mercy of Vicksburg, 135 Miss. 505, 99 So. 468, 469. In that case this court said:
“The Sisters of Mercy of the Catholic Church is an organization through which the Catholic Church carries on a large part of its religious, charitable, and educational work. It is a monastic sisterhood, established in Ireland by Catherine McAuley in 1827. Notwithstanding its origin is comparatively recent, the society has extended its charitable, religious, and educational work over a large part of the earth. The members of this sisterhood, as shown by the evidence in this case, are governed by the constitution, laws, and usages as laid down in the following authorities, which were properly identified at the trial and introduced in evidence: Volume 10, Catholic Encyclopedia, pages 199 to 200; Bules and Constitutions of the Religious Sisters of Mercy, published by the Baltimore Publishing Company, containing 78 pages; Religious Profession, a commentary on a chapter of the new code of canon law by Hector Papi, S. J., Professor of Canon Law, Woodstock College, published by P. J. Kennedy & Sons, New York, containing 81 pages; Catechism of the New Religious Provision, translated from the French, and revised in conformity with the new code.
“It will be observed from the constitution and bylaws of the society that, after a given course of service and training preparatory thereto, the Sisters of Mercy take vows of poverty and obedience.
“By the vow of poverty the Sisters of Mercy in substance bind themselves to be entirely disengaged from the love of the things of this world; that they will be ‘content with the food and raiment allowed them, and willing at all times to give up whatever has been allotted to them; that they will not give or receive any present without permission from the Mother Superior, and when, with her permission, they receive any present from their relatives or other persons, it must be considered as for *464the use of the community and not for the particular use of the receiver. By the vow of obedience they forever renounce their own will and bind themselves to become resigned to and follow the direction of their superiors. The vow concludes with the language that ‘they shall obey the call of the bell as the voice of God.’
“The ‘Catechism of the Religious Profession’ defines what the oath of poverty means. In substance it is that it effectually deprives the members of the society of all right'to own property in their individual capacity, and places them in a state of material subjection and dependence to their superiors; that any property owned by a sister at the time of profession, as well as any property she may thereafter acquire by legacy, inheritance, conveyance, or otherwise, shall inure to the benefit of the society; that the Sisters of Mercy receiving property shall be deprived of the ‘use and usufruct of such property as well as of the free and independent disposal thereof; that even the bare legal title cannot be disposed of by the holder thereof without the permission of the governing authorities; that all property owned or acquired by the members of the society shall be community property, that is, the use thereof shall go alone for the benefit of the society; that a Sister shall depend alone on the food, raiment, and support furnished her by the society, which shall be the same as furnished to every member thereof. No member of the society shall have any right to or claim under any circumstances more than her support for the time she is a member. See pages 55, 56, 58, 59, 60, 64, 70, 71, 76, 78, 79, 110. Withdrawal or dismissal from the society is permitted with the approval of the Pope. When withdrawal or dismissal takes place all the property acquired by the Sister during her membership belongs to the society;, she takes none of it with her.
“Clearly the constitution, bylaws, and usages of the Sisters of Mercy constitute, so far as they deal with their *465civil rights, a binding contract between them, provided, of course, the Constitution and laws of the state are not violated. So far as the ownership of property is concerned, the members of the society are simply trustees for the benefit of the society. ’ ’
In the opinion on suggestion of error in the Maas case, the court elaborated further upon what was shown in the record and said: “In the article referred to in the Catholic Encyclopedia it is stated that, after the organization of the society of Sisters of Mercy, a question arose as to whether it should be a religious society, and that a vote was taken and the society unanimously decided to become a religious society. ... In said book, Rules and Constitutions of the Religious Sisters of Mercy, second part, chapter 1, we find the following: ‘This religious congregation shall be always subject to the authority and jurisdiction of the Diocesan Bishop, and the Sisters shall respect and obey him as their principal superior after the Holy See.’ ”
Based on these undisputed findings this court held that a devise to members of the Sisters of Mercy, in their individual capacity, was, in effect, a devise to the society and void under our Mortmain Statutes as they existed at the time of the Maas decision because there was a resulting trust in favor of the society “by means of which, if enforced, the Mortmain Statutes would be completely circumvented.” The conclusion of the court was that the devise was void for this reason.
I have reviewed at length this history of the Sisters of Mercy for the reason that the controlling opinion .states that the nature and character of the appellee hospital in this case is to be determined by its own rights and powers under its charter as a separate and distinct corporation from that of the Sisters of Mercy. The controlling opinion says “No part of the physical properties or other assets of the hospital corporation has been accumulated by the contribution of any funds from the Catholic *466Church, or any other church, or from the Sisters of Mercy of Vicksburg.” With due deference, the record shows without dispute that the Sisters of Mercy paid $50,000 for the corporate stock in the appellee corporation; I quote from the testimony of appellee’s own witness shown on page 84 of the record: “Q. In 1943 what did the Sisters of Mercy pay for this stock? A. They paid $50,000.00. Q. For the 500 shares of stock? A. That is correct.”
Again, with due deference, I have searched the record in vain to find anything in the contract to support the statement in the controlling opinion ‘ ‘. . . it has been definitely agreed as a part of the contract with the Commission on Hospital Care that the appellee hospital is now operated as a nonsectarian hospital.” If it is in the contract I am unable to find it. Two days before approval of the grant by the commission the appellee did adopt some bylaws and did file them with the commission, but, as elsewhere pointed out herein, these bylaws specifically provide in the very last article thereof “These by-laws may be amended, repealed or alerted in whole or in part by a majority vote of the entire outstanding stock of the company at any regular meeting of the stockholders or at any special meeting where such action has been announced in the call and notice of such meeting.” Thus the commission and all who may examine its files were put on notice that the Sisters of Mercy (for they compose all the stockholders) reserve the right to change the bylaws at any time.
Reviewing the record as to the rights and powers of appellee, briefly summarized, it is this: All its stock is owned by Sisters of Mercy; all its corporate members are and shall always be members of that society; all its board of directors are and shall always be selected from the members of the Sisters of Mercy; these members are always subject to the authority and jurisdiction of the Diocesan Bishop; they can own *467no property themselves and all the material belongings in their possession are held by them as trustees for the society which is under the control of the Bishop of the lioman Catholic Church. The Church, therefore, has absolute dominion and control over the appellee and all its property, and this fact is not altered simply because there are presently existing bylaws, which are subject to change at any time, whereby the present general management of the hospital is vested in an administrative board. As stated in the Maas case, the question arose long ago as to whether the Sisters of Mercy should be a religious society and ‘ ‘ a vote was taken and the society unanimously decided to become a religious society. ’ ’ These are the undisputed facts reflected by the record before us, and while a majority of the court has determined that the appellee is in fact a sectarian institution, the controlling opinion nevertheless proceeds with the recital of facts and citation of authorities in an apparent effort to show that it is not such, and its whole conclusion is based upon the bylaws which were adopted just two days before the approval of the application for this grant of public funds and which specifically reserve the right to change or repeal the bylaws at any time. Nor can I see any alteration of my conclusions in the fact that the medical staff of the hospital, that is, the physicians and surgeons who are authorized to attend their patients in the hospital, are members of the Protestant faith; this staff has nothing to do with the ownership or management of the hospital. I can see no escape from the conclusion under the facts before us that appellee is a sectarian institution, and that it is utterly impossible to separate it from the Sisters of Mercy, as is done in the controlling opinion, merely because it is a separate corporate entity. Appellee’s stock is now owned outright by Sisters of Mercy and when its charter expires in 1953 everything that it owns will by operation of law become vested in Sisters of Mercy.
*468The Nevada Constitution, article 11, Section 10, provides that “No public funds of any kind or character whatever, state, county, or municipal, shall be used for sectarian purposes.” In the case of State ex rel. Nevada Orphan Asylum v. Hallock, 16 Nev. 373, the court was confronted with the question as to what was meant by “sectarian purposes” and the court held that the Nevada Orphan Asylum, operated by the Sisters of Charity at Virginia City, was a sectarian institution regardless of the fact that children of all faiths and creeds were admitted to it, and that an appropriation of public funds for its support was in violation of the constitution of that state. The court in that case said: “A religious sect is a body or number of persons united in tenets, but constituting a distinct organization or party, by holding-sentiments or doctrines different from those of other sects or people. In the sense intended in the constitution, every sect of that character is sectarian, and all members thereof are sectarians. The framers of the constitution undoubtedly considered the Boman Catholic a sectarian church. Const. Debates, 568 et seq. The people understood it in the same sense when they ratified it.” Besponding to the contention that there was a consideration for the appropriation in that the funds would be used for the support of orphans, charges of the state, irrespective of religious belief, the Nevada court said: “The $75.00 appropriated for each orphan is a contribution only. Should it be given it would be used for the relief and support of a sectarian institution, and in part, at least, for sectarian purposes. Should it be admitted that it would be used in part for legitimate purposes, still, it is impossible to separate the legitimate use from that which is forbidden.”
In the case of Bennett v. City of LaGrange, 153 Ga. 428, 112 S. E. 482, 486, 22 A. L. R. 1312, there was under review a contract between the city and the Salvation Army whereby the latter had contracted to handle chari*469table cases for the city for the actual costs of such services not to exceed $75 per month and the question presented was whether this contract was in violation of a provision in the Constitution of Georgia that “No money shall ever be taken from the public Treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, sect, or denomination of religionists, or of any sectarian institution.” Article 1, Section 1, par. 14. The Supreme Court of Georgia held that even though the Salvation Army was not denominational, yet, because it conducted meetings at which the tenets of the Christian faith were advocated, it was sectarian in character notwithstanding the high principles upon which it is founded and the great work which it is doing. It is in point here to note that the court said that the contract gave ‘a great advantage and the most substantial aid to the Salvation Army in the prosecution of its benevolent and religious purposes. The giving of loaves and fishes is a powerful instrumentality in the successful prosecution of the work of a sectarian institution.”
It is also worthy of note at this point that in the annotation following the report of the above case, in 22 A. L. R. at page 1319, it is said: “The weight of authority is to the effect that a contract between a state, county, city or other political subdivision and a sectarian institution, whereby the former agress to pay the latter for services rendered or expenditures incurred thereunder, is within the meaning of a constitutional provision inhibiting the use of public funds in aid of sectarian institutions, and void. ’ ’
A similar question was again before the Georgia Supreme Court in the case of Richter v. Mayor & Aldermen of the City of Savannah, 160 Ga. 178, 127 S. E. 739, when the City of Savannah was prohibited from making an appropriation for the support of St. Joseph’s Hospital, owned and operated by the Savannah Institute Sisters of Mercy, a corporation. In that case the court said that the Sisters of Mercy and the hospital are sectarian insti*470tutions, and followed the principles announced in Bennett v. City of LaGrange, supra.
In the case of Collins v. Kephart, 271 Pa. 428, 117 A. 440, there was involved the question whether grants of public funds to four different hospitals were in violation of a provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution which provides “No appropriation . . . shall be made for charitable, educational or benevolent purposes to . . . any denominational or sectarian institution, corporation or association.” P. S. Const, art. 3, Section 18. One of these was Passavant Hospital of Pittsburgh, owned by a corporation whose charter provided that the persons composing the society are members of the Evangelical Lutheran Church and that the directors, though two might be laymen, must be members of said church in good and regular standing. Another of the hospitals under consideration was St. Timothy’s Memorial Hospital and House of Mercy, a corporation composed of members of the Protestant Episcopal Church. The third was Dubois Hospital Association, a corporation, owned and operated by another corporation called Sisters of Mercy of Crawford and Erie Counties, composed of members of the Roman Catholic Church. The fourth was Jewish Hospital Association, a corporation, under control of persons of the Jewish faith, but neither the chief physician nor the chief nurse was a Jew. These hospitals, without exception, admitted all persons without distinction as to race, color or religion. There was also involved in this same decision an appropriation to Duquesne University of the Holy Ghost, an incorporated educational institution; it was pointed out that the words “Holy Ghost” were used “in recognition of the relation existing between said corporation and another distinct Catholic organization known as ‘The Society of the Holy Ghost,’ ” just as the word “Mercy” in the corporate title of appellee in the case at bar unquestionably was selected in recognition of the relation existing between appellee and *471the Sisters of Mercy, which relation is emphasized by the fact that sixteen times in their brief counsel for appellee have referred to it only as “Mercy Hospital”. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that all of these five institutions are sectarian, and said: “There can be no doubt that all the institutions at bar are worthy charities; but it is equally clear they are within the inhibited class, so far as state aid is concerned. We did not write the Constitution; but, whether agreeing with or dissenting from the rules of public policy there announced, our sworn duty is to enforce them. Those who adopted the restriction against appropriating money to sectarian institutions must change the rule, if desired, either through an amendment to the present Constitution or by making a new one. Neither the Legislature, acting-alone, nor the courts have power so to do.” The court further said in this case “. . . when a charitable, benevolent, or educational establishment is ‘denominational or sectarian’ according to the meaning of this term as understood by the average man, even though the institution in question may bestow its 'benefits on others, and permit those outside the ranks of the sect or denomination involved to take part in its management, it is none the less a sectarian or denominational institution. ’ ’
Section 86 of the Mississippi Constitution says “It shall be the duty of the legislature to provide by law for the treatment and care of the insane; and the legislature may provide for the care of the indigent sick in the hospitals in the state.” It will be noted that there is a positive obligation to provide for the treatment and care of the insane, but only a permissive authority to provide for the care of the indigent sick. Now, the controlling opinion emphasizes the fact that this section mentions the hospitals in this state and not merely the hospitals of this state, but it is a well known rule of constitutional construction that all portions of the constitution must be considered together, each as limiting the other, and if *472Section 66 prohibits that which is here sought to be done, then Section 86 cannot authorize it. In Craig v. North Mississippi Community Hospital, 206 Miss. 11, 39 So. (2d) 523, 528, we did not say or hold that the Legislature is under any obligaton to provide for the care of the indigent sick but what we said was that the law providing for the grants-in-aid to nonprofit, nonsectarian hospitals of the state “does bear a reasonable relation to a governmental purpose as expressed in Section 86;” it was nowhere said or intimated that there was an obligation so to do. Furthermore, our holding is boiled down to this conclusion, which certainly is no support for appellee’s position here, viz: “. . . We do not hold that the Legisture has the authority to appropriate public funds out of the state treasury for the care of the indigent sick in the nonprofit, nonsectarian hospitals of this state in accordance with the above quoted Section 86 of the Constitution, particularly where the expenditure of such funds for such purpose is under the supervision and control of a state agency.” The controlling opinion further quotes from the Craig case “If the end be public, it matters not that it is attained through a private channel”, but it must be noted that the channel there mentioned is a private channel and not a sectarian channel.
Adverting to the question of the legislative duty, regardless of whether it be obligatory, to provide for the care of the indigent sick in the hospitals in this state, and whether “in this state” means all hospitals, sectarian and otherwise, it is significant to note what was said by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in answer to this very question in the case of Collins v. Martin, 290 Pa. 388, 139 A. 122, 125, 55 A. L. R 311: “Whether the charitable work is compulsory or discretionary, the performance is controlled by the Constitution. No function of government can be discharged in disregard of or in opposition to, the fundamental law. If the performance of the proposed function can be done only in one way and *473that way is prohibited by the Constitution, then there can be no function or duty of government relating to the thing to be done. If the function may be performed in two or more ways, one of which is prohibited, then the performance of the function or duty cannot take place in such prohibited way. Overshadowing any proposed exertion of power, there is always the limitation of the Constitution. In this case no money shall be given ‘to denominational or sectarian institution, corporation, or association. ’ It stands as a sentinel in its limited sphere to warn and prevent those in control who may attempt to invade the forbidden ground, and, when attention is directed to their conduct, the Constitution articulates 'through the courts. The state cannot secure performance of a governmental duty through a medium that has been prohibited from acting. ’ ’
The controlling opinion in the case at bar proceeds upon the theory that the grant here in question is neither a gratuity nor a donation for the reason that it is supported by a valuable consideration, to wit, an agreement on the part of appellee to operate a hospital and maintain 10% of its beds for charity patients. The courts have frequently had occasion to deal with such contracts between a state agency and a sectarian institution. For instance, in Collins v. Martin, supra, the very same argument was advanced and the court said in response thereto: “Even if it be conceded that the arrangement entered into between the department and the hospital represents the purchase of a commodity, the all-important fact still remains that, by virtue of that very arrangement, and payment under the act of 1925, the sectarian institution is enabled to furnish the commodity — care of the indigent sick — and it is thereby enabled to do it as a sectarian institution. It still exists as such, and, even though no profit be made, or though the compensation covers only the cost, or less, the institution is thereby, to that extent, enabled to function as a sectarian institution, and on the people’s money.”
*474The foregoing quotation should he a sufficient answer to the statement in the controlling opinion that “Administering to the sick is not sectarian”. There is neither magic nor logic in such a statement and it is of no aid in solving the question before us. By the same token it might be said that care of the orphans or educating the youth of our country is not sectarian and that consequently the treasury may be opened to religious orphanages and schools. The true test, as shown in the last cited case, is whether the use of public funds, regardless of the character of use, by a sectarian institution enables such an institution to function and carry on its work as such.
The case of Synod of Dakota v. State, 2 S. D. 366, 50 N. W. 632, 635, 14 L. R. A. 418, is directly contrary to the contentions of appellee. In that case the Presbyterian Synod operated an educational'institution under the name of Pierre University, to which students of all faiths were admitted. The board of education was authorized by the legislature to discharge the state’s obligation to train teachers by designating educational institutions where students should be taught the methods and practice of teaching in the common schools and to pay out of the public funds the tuition of the students availing themselves of this educational opportunity. Under the direction of the board of education the university set up and operated a special department known as the ‘ ‘Normal Department” which adopted the course of study prescribed by the board of education and conformed in every respect to its regulations. The university applied for payment of tuition accrued under its contract and upon refusal brought suit against the state to recover it. The constitution of So.uth Dakota, article 6, Section 3, provides that “No money or property of the state shall be given or appropriated for the benefit of any sectarian or religious society or institution” and in denying recovery by the university the Supreme Court of South Dakota *475said: “But the learned consel for plaintiff strenuously contend that the sum due plaintiff will not he contributed for the benfit of or to aid the university, but in payment for services rendered the state, or to its students, in preparing them for teaching in the public schools. This contention, while plausible, is, we think, unsound, and leads to absurd results. If the state can pay the tuition of 25 students, why may it not maintain at the institution all that the institution can accommodate, and thereby support the institution entirely by state funds Í The theory contended for by counsel would, in effect, render nugatory the provisions of the constitution, as the claim that the appropriation was made as compensation for services rendered could be made in all cases.” The court quoted several of the powers reserved by the board of education in connection with the operation of the Normal Department, and said “But while, by these and other provisions in the law and the regulations, the board of education reserved to itself large powers in the control and management of this department, it nevertheless clearly appears that the teachers in this department were employed and selected by the plaintiff, subject to the approval.of the board of education. They were paid by the plaintiff, and under the control of plaintiff as to all matters not specially reserved to the board of education. They constituted a part of the faculty of a sectarian school, and the funds claimed in this action are not to be paid to such teachers specifically, but, if paid, will be received by the plaintiff, and used for its institution. ... We recognize fully the learning and ability of the faculty of the Pierre University, and the noble work in which they are engaged. We recognize also the faithfulness and fidelity with which the work of instruction was performed under its alleged contract with the board of education, but, with our views of the mandate of the constitution, we are compelled to deny to the plaintiff any relief against the state.”
*476Another case which I think is decisive of some of the questions presented is Cook County v. Chicago Industrial School for Girls, 125 Ill. 540, 18 N. E. 183, 187, 1 L. R. A. 437, 8 Am. St. Rep. 386. Section 3 of Article 8 of the Illinois Constitution Smith-Hurd Stats, provides: “Neither the general assembly nor any county, city, town, township, school district, or other public corporation, shall ever make any appropriation or pay from any public fund whatever, anything in aid of any church or sectarian purpose, or to help support or sustain any school, academy, seminary, college, university, or other literary or scientific institution, controlled by any church or sectarian denomination whatever; nor shall any grant or donation of land, money, or other personal property ever be made by the state or any such public corporation, to any church, or for any sectarian purpose.” In the course of about fourteen months 189 girls were adjudged dependent girls under “An Act to aid industrial schools for girls”, Smith-Hurd Stats, c. 122, Section 646 et seq., and were committed by the county court of Cook County to the Chicago Industrial School for girls, an Illinois corporation. That corporation placed a part of these girls in House of Good Shepherd and the remainder in St. Joseph’s Orphan Asylum, both of which were corporations under the control of orders of Sisters of the Roman Catholic Church; it later brought suit against Cook County for the recovery of $10 per month each for furnishing clothing, tuition, maintenance and care for these girls, and upon a recovery thereof the county appealed. The Supreme Court of Illinois unhesitatingly held that the" House of the Good Shepherd and St. Joseph’s Orphan Asylum, being under control of Sisters of the church “are necessarily sectarian in their character, and in their objects” and said: “A constitutional mandate cannot be circumvented by indirect methods. Under our form of government, church and state are not and never can be united. The former must pursue its *477mission without aid from the latter. . . . Any scheme, even though hallowed by the blessing of the church, that surges against the will of the people as crystallized into their organic law, must break in pieces as breaks the foam of the sea against the rock on the shore. ’ ’
It is interesting to note that the controlling opinion herein merely brushes aside the last cited case with the statement that the aforesaid provision of the Illinois Constitution is not couched in the same language 'as Section 66 of the Mississippi Constitution, and it is startling that the controlling opinion then says that the Illinois Supreme Court “could not have found that the appropriation was in violation of the latter part of such constitutional provision, for the reason that it was not a ‘gratuity or donation.’” The quoted statement is an almost verbatim replica from the brief for appellee herein and most assuredly could not have been made from a close study of the Cook County case, supra, for therein the Illinois Supreme Court very plainly held to the contrary when it said:
“It is strenuously contended by counsel that Section 3 was only intended to prohibit gifts or donations, and that it refers to ‘state support, gifts by way of aid,’ and ‘ appropriations to be used by managers of religious institutions, without restraint or liability to account.’ The theory seems to be that, even if the two institutions are controlled by a church, and are to be the recipients of all the money paid to appellee, yet neither they nor their purposes are aided by such payment, provided only there is a consideration for the money paid. It is said that these institutions furnish tuition and clothing in return for the money received by them; and that, as they earn what they get, and are not the recipients of any gift or donation, nothing is paid in their ‘aid,’ ‘or to help sup'port or sustain’ them. The refjised propositions assert the contrary of the view thus contended for.
*478“It cannot be said that a contribution is no aid to an institution because such contribution is made in return for services rendered or work done. A school is aided by the patronage of its pupils, even if they do pay for their tuition. Because the customers of a merchant pay for their goods, it is none the less true that his business is aided by their custom. The act under discussion is entitled ‘An act to aid industrial schools for girls.’ If the payment by the county of $10 per month on account of each dependent girl committed to such a school is no aid to the school, simply because ‘tuition, maintenance, and care’ are furnished in return for such payment then the act is not properly entitled.
“The doctrine here contended for is an exceedingly dangerous one. In County of McLean v. Humphreys, 104 Ill. 378, it is intimated by this court that the state is under obligations to protect and educate such classes of female infants as were declared to be dependent girls by section 3 of the act of May 28, 1879, as that section stood before it was amended on June 26, 1885. Under this view, the industrial schools which teach and care for such girls are performing, as substitutes for the state, a duty which the state itself is bound to perform. If they are entitled to be paid out of the public funds', even though they are under the control of sectarian denominations, simply because they relieve the state of a burden which it would otherwise be itself required to bear, then there is nothing to prevent all public education from becoming subjected, by hasty and unwise legislation, to sectarian influences. By section 1 of article 8 of the constitution it is made the duty of the state to provide a thorough and efficient system of free schools.
“If statutes are passed under which the management of these schools shall get into the hands of sectarian institutions, then, under the theory contended for, the prohibition of the constitution will be powerless to prevent the money of the taxpayers from being used to *479support such institutions, inasmuch as they will render a service to the state hy performing for it its duty of educating the children of the people. It is an untenable position that public funds may be paid out to help support sectarian schools, provided only such schools shall render a quid pro quo for the payments made to them. The constitution declares against the use of public funds to aid sectarian schools, independently of the question whether there is or is not a consideration furnished in return for the funds so used.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Summarizing the holding of the Illinois court it was that a contribution of public funds cannot be justified merely because it was in furtherance or aid of an obligation which the state owes to its citizens, and this is true regardless of whether there is or is not a consideration furnished for the funds so used, and it is still a contribution even though there may be value received therefor.
The salient principles of law quoted from the numerous authorities hereinbefore mentioned are all brushed aside in the controlling opinion, as they were in the brief for appellee, with the simple statement that the constitutional provisions of these various states are not couched in the same language as Section 66 of our own Constitution. The case of Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U. S. 291, 20 S.Ct. 121, 123, 44 L.Ed. 168, which the controlling-opinion says is decisive of the question before us might also be brushed aside by the same process of reasoning because the only constitutional provision there involved was that portion of the first amendment to the. Constitution of the United States which provides “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.” But the facts in that case were that Providence Hospital, there in question, a corporation domiciled in the District of Columbia and created by an Act of Congress wherein Congress specifically reserved the *480right to amend, alter or repeal the charter at any time, entered into a contract with the Commissioners of the District of Columbia whereby the commissioners agreed to erect at their expense on the grounds of the hospital an isolation building or ward for the treatment of minor contagious diseases, two thirds of the capacity was to be reserved for charity patients sent there by the commissioners for which they would pay the hospital $250 per annum per patient. The suit was to enjoin the payment of any funds to the hospital and turned wholly upon a demurrer which challenged the sufficiency of the allegations of the complaint. It was claimed that the contract violated the above quoted provision of the first amendment, and the court said: “If we were to assume, for the purpose of this question only, that under this appropriation an agreement with a religious corporation of the tenor of this agreement would be invalid, as resulting indirectly in the passage of an act respecting an establishment of religion, we are unable to see that the complainant in his bill shows that the corporation is of the kind described, but on the contrary he has clearly shown that it is not.” In the report of this case a copy of the Act creating the corporation is set out and it shows that the incorporators were acting in their individual capacity and not as Sisters of Mercy or as members of any particular religious faith. The court further said: “As stated in the opinion of the court of appeals, this corporation ‘is not declared the trustee of any church or religious society. Its property is to be acquired in its own name and for its own purposes; that property and its business are to be managed in its own way, subject to no visitation, supervision, or control by any ecclesiastical authority, whatever, but only to that of the government which created it. In respect, then, of its creation, organization, management, and ownership of property it is an ordinary private corporation whose rights are determinable by the law of the land, and the *481religious opinions of whose members are not subjects of inquiry.’ ” It was held that even if the incorporators were all of one religious faith they did not so act in obtaining the charter and there was nothing in the federal constitution which prohibited the mailing of the contract. That decision is a far cry from what we now have before us here. The appellee in this case is owned outright by the Sisters of Mercy who are prohibited by the laws of their church from holding anything except as trustees for the church; its governing board is composed of five members of the Sisters of Mercy, and the constitutional limitation, later to be discussed, is wholly different from that which was under consideration in Bradfield v. Roberts, supra.
The controlling opinion cites the case of Chance v. Mississippi State Textbook Rating & Purchasing Board, 190 Miss. 453, 200 So. 706, 713, and says that therein this court took high ground on the question as to what is meant by the separation of church and state. Let us analyze that “high ground”. The Chance case had under consideration the question whether Chapter 202, Laws of 1940, violated Section 208 of the Mississippi Constitution which provides: “No religious or other sect or sects shall ever control any part of the school or other educational funds of this state; nor shall any funds be appropriated toward the support of any sectarian school, or to any school that at the time of receiving such appropriation is not conducted as a free school.” The court pointed out in its opinion that under Section 23 of said Chapter 202, Laws of 1940, it was provided that “This act is intended to furnish a plan for the adoption, purchase, distribution, care and use of free textbooks to be loaned to the pupils in the elementary schools of Mississippi. The books herein provided by the board shall be distributed and loaned free of cost to the children .”. The court also pointed out that the books were not purchased out of the school funds of the state *482but by a special appropriation from the state’s general funds, and its entire holding is summed up in these words: “The books belong to, and are controlled by, the state; they are merely loaned to the individual pupil therein designated; their preservation is fostered by exaction of suitable compensation for their loss or damage; . . . Nor is the loaning of such boohs under such circumstances to the individual pupils a direct or indirect aid to the respective schools which they attend, although school attendance is compulsory. Such pupil is free to attend a proper public or private school, sectarian or otherwise.” (Emphasis supplied.) The court took great care to point out in its opinion that under the free school book law the books were not donated or loaned to private or parochial schools but were merely loaned to that class of pupils who were required under the compulsory school law to attend school, the pupils or their parents were required to return the books or pay for their loss.or damage, and the pupils under our compulsory law were free to attend any public, private or parochial school which met the standards of the State Board of Education.
The controlling opinion also cites Bedford County Hospital et al. v. Browning, Tenn. Sup., 225 S. W. (2d) 41, and quotes only one sentence therefrom. An examination of that case shows that Tennessee had adopted a statute similar to that of Mississippi whereby that state formulated a state wide hospital program so that it might take advantage of the provisions for hospital aid made by the Hill-Burton Federal Act, 42 U. S. C. A. Section 291 et seq. Several Tennessee hospitals qualified for grants under this law, and the opinion clearly shows that not a single one of them was operated by any religious sect. There was no question of a sectarian use of the funds, but the sole contention was that the Tennessee Constitution, article 2, Section 31, which provides ‘ ‘ The credit of this State shall not be hereafter loaned or given to or in aid of *483any person, association, company, corporation, or municipality;” prohibited the grants to these hospitals which were of four classes: (1) Those owned and operated exclusively by counties, (2) Those owned solely by municipal corporations, (3) Those owned jointly by county and city, and (4) Those owned by nonprofit general welfare corporations. It will be noted that the quoted section of the Tennessee Constitution is very similar to Section 258 of the Mississippi Constitution which provides . ‘ ‘ The credit of the state shall not be pledged or loaned in aid of any person, association, or corporation” and which we held in the Craig case, supra, did not prohibit an appropriation out of the state treasury in furtherance of the statewide hospital program even though a part of such appropriation might be allocated by the Mississippi Commission on Hospital Care to nonprofit nonsectarian hospitals of this state. The Tennessee court quoted from and followed the Craig case, but nowhere was there any intimation or suggestion that any sectarian hospital was involved.
I have herein above discussed every case, save one, which is cited in the controlling opinion as dealing with the constitutional question involved and in all sincerity I believe that not one of them supports the conclusion therein reached. The only case which even remotely tends to support it is Kentucky Building Commission v. Effron, 310 Ky. 355, 220 S. W. (2d) 836, in which there was raised the constitutionality of the Kentucky statutes creating a statewide hospital program similar to that of Mississippi. It was contended that grants to a hospital whose board of trustees were all of the Episcopalian faith and another hospital whose trustees were all of the Catholic faith were in violation of Section 5 of the Kentucky Constitution which provides “No preference shall ever be given by law to any religious sect, society or denomination; nor to any particular creed, mode of worship or system of ecclesiastical polity. ’ ’ This is quite *484similar to Section 18 of the Mississippi Constitution which provides that “No religious test as a qualification for office shall be required; and no preference .shall be given by law to any religions sect or mode of worship; but the free, enjoyment of all religious sentiments and the different modes of worship shall be held sacred.” Nobody even contends in the case at bar that the said Section 18 would prohibit the grant here in question; on the contrary, the sole contention is that Section 66 is violated. Kentucky has no constitutional provision similar to Section 66 of the Mississippi Constitution, and if our said Section 18 were the only obstacle in the way of the grant here in question I would readily concede, as the Kentucky Court of Appeals held, that it does not pro-' hibit the grant. Since Kentucky has no constitutional provision even remotely similar to our said section 66, the decision furnishes no rule for our guidance and is no earthly authority one way or the other for an interpretation of Section 66, and it is significant to here note that in the Kentucky decision there is not cited one single case from any other jurisdiction. Moreover, if we should apply to the Kentucky case the same rule which the controlling opinion applies to the cases from other jurisdictions herein cited, i. e., that the case is no authority because the constitutional provisions are not identical, then we would be compelled to discard it just as the controlling opinion discards all' the authorities from other jurisdictions upon which appellant relies.
Coming now to the provisions of Section 66 of our Constitution, it provides that “No law granting a donation or gratuity in favor of any person or object shall be enacted . . . for a sectarian purpose or use. ’ ’ It will be noted that this section uses the word “donation” and the word “gratuity” in the disjunctive, but the controlling opinion treats them as if they mean exactly the same thing. Thereby the framers of the Constitution are held to have used superfluous words, *485but tbe law is that “In construing a constitutional provision effect must be given to every word in it. ’ ’ Trahan v. State Highway Commission, 169 Miss. 732, 749, 151 So. 178, 181. Webster’s New International Dictionary defines “gratuity” as “Something given freely or without recompense.” So, when the element of consideration for services to be rendered enters into the matter, we may concede that the grant here in question is not a gratuity. But, since the section also uses the word “donation”, we must assume that its authors intended to prohibit something besides a mere gratuity as just defined, — something which does not fall into the classification of “something given freely and without recompense.” The same dictionary defines “donation” as “Act of giving or bestowing; a grant,” and it gives as synonyms ‘ ‘ gift, benefaction, grant. ’ ’ By the very statute under which the transfer of this money to certain institutions is authorized, Chapter 430, Laws of 1948, such transfer is called a “grant”. Webster defines a grant as “A gift or bestowal by one having control or authority over it, as of land, money, or a privilege by the government. ” It is thus seen that a grant and a donation are one and the same thing, and, since a donation for a sectarian purpose or use is prohibited, then it must necessarily follow that a grant is also prohibited. It is argued, however, that the grant in this case is not a donation because it is said that it is made in consideration of services to to be rendered by appellee in the maintenance for 20 years of 10% of its beds for charity patients. However, it has been held that the mere fact of the existence of a consideration does not change the character of a donation. This was held in the case of Fisk v. Flores, 43 Tex. 340, 344, where it is said: “It is also quite evident that it is entirely consistent with the nature of a title by ‘donation’ that the donor may be moved, by reason of services rendered by the donee, to make the donation, and that it is induced by such consideration does not *486take from the transaction the character of a 'donation’.” Under these authorities it is quite clear that a grant and a donation are synonymous, and that the grant here in question falls within the definition of "donation” as used in the Constitution.
The controlling opinion takes' from Bouvier’s Law Dictionary one of the definitions of "donation”, but when we lift mere definitions from court opinions (as is done throughout in Bouvier) it is always necessary to go to the entire opinion to see just what facts the court had under consideration. It is possible to prove almost anything by quoting some brief passage from the Bible where the connecting passages are ignored. I have given Webster’s definition of "grant” and "donation” from which it appears that the two words are used interchangeably, and it must be remembered that we are here dealing with what the statute calls a "grant”. It is a well settled rule governing constitutional interpretations that "The court will look to the dominant object to be accomplished by the constitutional provisions rather than to a literal or technical interpretation.” W. Horace Williams Co. v. Federal Credit Co., 198 Miss. 111, 119, 21 So. (2d) 582, 583. Is it i;ot proper to inquire what was the dominant object to be accomplished by Section 66? Clearly it was intended to maintain inviolate the separation of church and state and to prevent the grant of public funds to the use of a sectarian institution. Those who framed the constitution came from all walks of life; some were lawyers, some were business men, some were farmers. Many were not skilled in legal phraseology or definitions taken from court opinions; they adopted language in its ordinary understanding and interpretation. ‘' Subtility and refinement and astuteness are not admissible to explain away an expression of the sovereign will. The framers of the constitution, and the people who adopted it, must be understood to have intended the words employed in that sense most likely *487to arise from them on first reading them.” Adams v. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co., 77 Miss. 194, 274, 24 So. 200, 317, 319, 28 So. 956, 60 L. R. A. 33. “A Constitution is framed for the guidance and government of the whole people, and words used therein are to he given their usual and popular signification and meaning; and, unless that be the manifest intention of the framers of the instrument, phrases or terms susceptible of two different interpretations are not usually to be given a restricted, narrow, or technical construction.” State v. Mobile J. & K. C. R. Co., 86 Miss. 172, 190, 38 So. 732, 735, 122 Am. St. R. 277. “Constitutions are not designed for metaphysical or logical subtleties, for niceties of expression, for critical propriety, for elaborate shades of meaning, or for the use of philosophical acuteness or judicial research. They are instruments of a practical nature, founded on the common business of life, adapted to common wants, designed for common use, and fitted for common understandings. The people make them; the people adopt them; the people must be supposed to read them with the help of common sense, and cannot be presumed to admit in them any recondite meaning or extraordinary gloss.” Story, Constitutions, Sec. 451.
From these authorities it is plain that the word ‘ ‘ donation” as used in our Constitution, construed in the light of Webster’s definition, which is certainly the common understanding and popular signification and meaning, is one and the same thing as “grant” and that this is true regardless of whether there is or is not a consideration therefor. It must be remembered that we are dealing with the word “grant” as a noun and not a verb, and, as I see it, the reference to the word when used as a verb in the conveying clause of a deed, as is done in the controlling opinion, is wholly beside the point.
The next question is whether such grant or donation is for a sectarian purpose or use; if it is, then it is prohibited. Section 66 says “for a sectarian purpose or use”. Again we have two words in the disjunctive and we must so *488construe the provision as to give effect to both of these words. Conceding for the moment that a sectarian purpose might be interpreted to mean in furtherance, of the promotion of the sect, we are still confronted with the fact that those who framed the Constitution intended to cover something more than the word “purpose” else they would not have also written therein the word “use”.This word can mean nothing* except a use by a sect or sectarian institution, and it is self-evident that that is exactly what was meant.
I will not extensively belabor further the question whether appellee is a sectarian institution. All its stock is' owned by the corporation Sisters of Mercy as such and not by its members as mere individuals; all its directors are and must be members of the Sisters of Mercy in their capacity as such members and not as mere individuals. In fact the controlling opinion herein suggests, and I do not question it, that in view of the long and honorable record of sacrificial service of the Sisters of Mercy they will continue to operate the proposed hospital for the additional seventeen years after expiration of appellee Js charter in 1953, but the fact remains undisputed that the Sisters of Mercy is a religious institution composed of members of one sect and pledged and devoted to furthering the principles of that sect under the absolute and complete control and dominion of the head of that sect. That appellee is a sectarian institution and that its successor after expiration of its charter will continue to be a sectarian institution cannot- be successfully denied. Hence 1 must register my dissent from the conclusion in the controlling opinion that the grant in question is not for a sectarian use. As to whether it is, in fact, for such a use, let us briefly review some of the expressions in the decisions' cited herein:
State ex rel. Nevada Orphan Asylum v. Hallock, supra; “The $75.00. appropriated for each orphan is a contribution only. Should it be given it would be used for the relief and support of a sectarian institution, and in part, *489at least, for sectarian purposes. Should it be admitted that it would be used in part for legitimate purposes, still, it is impossible to separate the legitimate use from that which is forbidden. ’ ’
Bennett v. City of LaGrange, supra [153 Ga. 428, 112 S. E. 486]: The contract gave “a great advantage and the most substantial aid to the Salvation Army in the prosecution of its benevolent and religious purposes. The giving of loaves and fishes is a powerful instrumentality in the successful prosecution of the work of a sectarian institution.”
Collins v. Martin, supra [290 Pa. 388, 139 A. 127]: “Even if it be conceded that the arrangement entered into between the department and the hospital represents the purchase of a commodity, the all-important fact still remains that, by virtue of that very arrangement, and payment under the act of 1925, the sectarian institution is enabled to furnish the commodity — care of the indigent sick — and it is thereby enabled to do it as a sectarian institution. It still exists as such, and, even though no profit be made, or though the compensation covers only the cost, or less, the institution is thereby, to that extent, enabled to function as a sectarian institution, and on the people’s money.”
Synod of Dakota v. State, supra [2 S. D. 366, 50 N. W. 637]: “But while . . . the board of education reserved to itself large powers in the control and management of this department, it nevertheless clearly appears that the teachers in this department were employed and selected by the plaintiff, subject to the approval of the board of education. They were paid by the plaintiff, and under the control of plaintiff as to all matters not specially reserved to the board of education. They constituted a part of the faculty of a sectarian school, and the funds claimed in this action are not to be paid to such teachers specifically, but, if paid, will be received by the plaintiff, and used for its institution.”
*490Cook County v. Chicago Industrial School for Girls, supra [125 Ill. 540, 18 N. E. 197] : “It cahnot be said that a contribution is no aid to an institution because such contribution is made in return for services rendered or work done. . . . It is an untenable position that public funds may pe paid out to help support sectarian schools, provided only such schools shall render a quid pro quo for the payments made to them.”
I make no apology for the length of this opinion. The amount of money involved is far greater than in any other case since my tenure of office began, and the principle involved is even more important than the question of money. I am firmly convinced that the men who framed our Constitution never intended that public funds should ever be used by any sectarian institution in the manner which is approved by the majority of the court in this case.
Lee, J., joins in this dissent.On Suggestion oe Error
Alexander, J.In recognition of the searching analyses in the suggestion of error and because of the importance of the issues involved, specific inquiries were propounded by the Court. All of these matters but one were raised and given attention in our former opinion and stressed by able and conscientious dissent but re-examination was invited by the following inquiries:
1. In view of the existence of outstanding capital stock in the sum of $50,000, can Mercy Hospital — Street Memorial quality as a “nonprofit corporation”'? In this connection a reconciliation between Code 1942, Section 5310 and Section 6, Chapter 363, Laws of 1946, as amended, was invited. The former section contemplates that charitable associations, churches, religious societies and the like may be incorporated without the issuance of stock. *491It is prospective; the corporation, to be thereafter organized, “shall issue no shares of stock”. The latter citation brings into view the Act of February 18, 1948, Laws 1948, c. 430, in which Chapter 363 of the Laws of 1946 was amended so as to identify those institutions qualified to receive grants-in-aid. To the original designation of those only which were publicly owned and operated by the state or a subdivision thereof, recognition of existing corporations was had by including also “these nonprofit institutions owned and operated by a corporation or association no part of the net earnings of which inures, or may lawfully inure, to the benefit of any private shareholder, group or individual.”
The courts of other states together with our own state, have uniformly defined charitable corporations as those which issue no stock and make, no provision for individual profit. But we are not reading into our statute a general definition. It is specific and controls the area in which the state may function. It is part of the statute itself which employs no such generality as “charitable organization” or “nonprofit corporation”, but defines the permissible recipients in the language quoted.
It is the view of the appellant that there are only two types of corporations under our law, those which issue stock and are organized for profit, and those which are nonprofit and issue no stock. Thus appellee is alleged to be of a hybrid status. Whereupon appellant insists that it is not a nonprofit institution because it has stock outstanding, and appellee says that the Act of 1948 recognizes the possibility that there may be outstanding stock in a nonprofit corporation and urges that despite the incident of stock certificates the appellee is a nonprofit institution because it does not, and cannot under the law and its charter, allow any of its profits to inure to the benefit of any shareholder.
We know of no law which would require a conventional corporation which qualifies for tax exemption or grants-in-aid to destroy outstanding stock certificates. *492It is certainly true that this translation from a profit to a nonprofit association renders the stock inert save for voting purposes and accords to it only a competency to identify the holders of the legal title to the property. Appellee is not, because it is nonprofit, of necessity charitable. Its earnings may prove to be substantial. This will be of concern to the State only as a guaranty of the continuance of the public service which it has promoted. But such earnings must be plowed back into the corporation. *
From the view point of the State it matters not that in the meantime the present and ultimate ownership is in those whose title is evidenced by so-called stock certificates or otherwise. All property is under the ownership of some person or body. The attribute which qualifies the appellee for the grant is that, “in all functions which are part of the state hospital plan”, it is in fáct and by law, by charter, and by its contract with the Commission a nonprofit institution under the supervision of the commission. Cf. Brister v. Leflore County, 156 Miss. 240, 125 So. 816. Let the certificates be lost, there is still a residual ownership, made effective upon ultimate dissolution. Woodville Lodge, etc., v. Poole, 190 Miss. 798, 1 So. (2d) 780. Let the certificates be assigned without the Commission’s approval, to another person or corporation with or without a capital gain by the present owners, or be restored to a profit status, and thereupon the entire hospital property is transfixed by a lien in favor of the State to guarantee the reasonable amount of its grant. Ch. 430, Laws 1948; Par. 6(b) of the application agreement.
• Despite insistence to the contrary no part of the net earnings or appellee can “inure, to the benefit of any private shareholder” at least for the next twenty years. We are not moved by the argument that the net earnings, by their very absorption into the institution, and its equipment and its enlargement, are thus safely im*493pounded against the day when there will he, upon dissolution or expiration, a dramatic division of accrued capital gains. The greater the earnings thus turned back into equipment the greater will be the assurance of the Commission that its wisdom, in devolving this responsibility upon appellee, has been vindicated.
The state is content to reap a harvest of public welfare and service for twenty years. In computing the benefits accruing to the State we must put out of view such grants as may be made by the Federal Government. The outlay by the State is $214,000 toward a total expenditure of $1,350,000. The Federal Government is to pay $527,000 and the remainder is supplied by the hospital. The consideration to the State must, therefore, be valued by the reasonably anticipated facilities furnished over a twenty year period, against the background of the State’s grant of $214,000. If there is only a reasonable public demand for charity beds and services, the benefit to the State, by minimum bases of computation, will far exceed its outlay. So that the State is not donating money but purchasing, with no little thrift, benefits for its indigent patients. We shall not enlarge upon nor change the views expressed in our former opinion.
2. Our next inquiry is: Does paragraph 5 (c) of the contract between the hospital and the Commission contemplate that the obligation of the former to maintain the hospital facilities extends only two years? This paragraph is as follows: ‘ ‘ In the event the hospital and/or other facilities involved in. this project as fully described and set forth in said original application should operate at a loss during the first two years after the same is/are ready to begin operations, the applicant will and does hereby underwrite the cost of such operations for such period and will provide funds and make up any such operation deficit; such funds to be provided from funds on hand and available for such purposes or to be raised and so provided by lawful means at the disposal of the applicant.”
*494Under the provisions of Chapter 430, Laws of 1948, the Commission on Hospital Care is required and authorized to examine and adjudicate whether the applicant is a qualified institution and whether “the sources of funds for the permanent maintenance of the hospital is (sic) adequate to insure the hospital’s continued efficient maintenance and operation”. To this end the contract between the parties requires appellee to underwrite the cost of such operations for a minimum of two years. But what of its obligation thereafter? Apart from the reasonable assumption that a hospital which has maintained itself for forty-seven years will under these substantial grants continue to do so, there is the definite obligation, made as part of its application, which makes forfeit its entire property to secure the grant if it should without approval dispose of its property or cease to be a nonprofit institution.
As to the possibility of some future application to the state for aid to make up an operating deficit it is a sufficient answer that the purpose of our present law is not maintenance but construction. The application filed by the hospital 'and approved by the Commission was “for the purpose of building a new hospital of 150 bed capacity at Vicksburg.”
To the assurance of appellee in its brief that it is not entitled to and did not and does not contemplate application for aid in maintenance, the appellant replies that this concession or undertaking is ex parte and informal. TIowever, we integrate this concession, conforming as it does to our construction of the applicable statutes, into our opinion. Such view is made a condition of our affirmance and must be the settled law of this case.
3. Our third query is: Does the contract with the Mercy Hospital — Street Memorial contemplate the use of state funds to reimburse the hospital for charity patients or other maintenance costs?
The arguments based upon an assumed obligation of the state to reimburse the hospital for the care of charity' *495patients brought into ominous view such cases as Bennett v. City of La Grange, 153 Ga. 428, 112 S. E. 482, 22 A. L. R. 1312; Collins v. Martin, 290 Pa. 388, 139 A. 122, 55 A. L. R. 311; and Synod of Dakota v. State, 2 S. D. 366, 50 N. W. 632, 14 L. R. A. 418, cited in the dissenting opinion.
The contention posed a problem which could not justly be ignored and which could not be solved by the subtle logarithms of sophistry. We need not enter this arena of conflict for the following reasons. (1) Under the contract with the Commission, the hospital has agreed to furnish up to ten per cent of its bed capacity free to indigent patients; (2) Section 7134, Code 1942, forbids any reimbursement to any hospital located in the same county where a state charity hospital is located. We take notice that there is such charity hospital in Warren County; (3) there is no authority in the Mississippi Commission on Hospital Care to make such reimbursement; (4) the appellee concedes and agrees as part of its contention that no such reimbursement can or will be requested.
To these contentions the learned Attorney General replies that by virtue of recent enabling legislation the charity hospital is subject to sale or abandonment; that the so-called agreement of appellee is unilateral and has no sound basis for enforcement.
To the latter contention we add that it is an assumption by this Court and a condition of its affirmance that such reimbursement is not permissible under existing law. This conclusion therefore constitutes part of the law of this case.
Our fourth inquiry is: Does the contract here involved, which provides for the maintenance of teaching facilities, violate the prohibition of Section 208 of our Constitution. This Section is as follows: “No religious or other sect or sects shall ever control any part of the school or other educational funds of this state; nor shall any funds be appropriated toward the support of any sectarian school, or to. any school that at the time of re*496ceiving such appropriation is not conducted, as a free school. ’ ’
We could not forbid a subsequent inauguration of such facilities by the hospital if it had not bound itself to furnish them in the first instance, nor could such installations retroactively invalidate a grant made in their absence. These services approach more closely a donation to the state than does the grant for construction constitute an appropriation of funds for the .support of a sectarian school.
People of State of Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203, 68 S. Ct. 461, 92 L. Ed. 648, 649, 2 A. L. R. (2d) 1338, is not controlling.
We repeat that the grant is only for construction and not maintenance. Such contemplated training is an incident, yet an important one, in the over-all plan to render such hospital an efficient aid in its duty to furnish hospital care. There is nothing in the record to indicate that such facilities are either a "school” or are "sectarian”. The maintenance of such facilities are at the sole expense of the hospital but under the control and supervision of the Commission.. No "part of the school funds” is granted.
Under Section (j) of the contract it is provided that "the hospital will contribute funds, equipment and personnel which it may have available or can make available for such purposes toward the promotion and carrying on of .a state wide program of nursing education to be inaugurated and carried on by the Commission in cooperation with participating hospitals, all to the extent and in the manner provided and contemplated by the terms of House Bill No. 430, Mississippi Laws of 1946, as amended. ’ ’
. It may be stated that this contention is noticed because of its importance and in spite of the fact that it is pressed for the first time upon a suggestion of error.
5 Our last inquiry is: Does section (j) of the contract constitute an obligation to carry out the purposes of the Act and the directions of the Commission or con*497stitute merely an undertaking to do so only to the extent of its ability!
The text of this section, quoted above, provides for the ‘ ‘ carrying on of a state wide program of nursing education to be inaugurated and carried on by the Commission with participating hospitals, all to the extent and manner provided and contemplated by the terms of House Bill 430 (Chap. 363), Mississippi Laws of 1946.” Only cooperation by the hospital is required. As repeatedly stated, the grant is for construction. The hospital has not been required to set up and guarantee maintenance of a particular standard of nursing education. This policy is to be established by the Commission. We see no vitiating significance in the undertaking by the hospital to make contributions and to extend co-operation to the extent of its ability. This is the language of high purpose and good faith and is not intended as the exigible terms of a solemn engagement. It is indefinite only to the extent that its future financial resources are not presently foreseeable, nor are the demands and requirements of the Commission standardized.
• We need add only that to expand our discussion of these several contentions would be but a repetition of the conclusions and 'the supporting authorities found in our original opinion.
For emphasis, it is again asserted that the concessions and disavowals of appellee in reply to our inquiries numbered two, three and four, to which we assent as being in accord with the law, are integrated into our opinion as a reinforcement of our declaration that the assertions of the appellee now become not only a condition of our affirmance but the settled law of this case.
Overruled.