(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. Appellant James Evans Johnson asserts that he was entitled to an instruction on the lesser-included offense of first-degree (heat-of-passion) manslaughter. I disagree.
We review the denial of a defendant’s request for a lesser-included offense instruction under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Dahlin, 695 N.W.2d 588, 597 (Minn.2005). The district court is required to submit lesser-included offense instructions when “(1) the lesser offense is included in the charged offense; (2) the evidence provides a rational basis for acquitting the defendant of the offense charged; and (3) the evidence provides a rational basis for convicting the defendant of the lesser-included offense.” Id. at 598. My analysis focuses on this third factor. A rational basis exists to convict of first-degree (heat-of-passion) manslaughter if there is sufficient evidence presented to find (1) the defendant killed his victim in the heat of passion; and (2) the defendant’s passion was provoked by words or acts that would provoke a person of ordinary self-control under similar circumstances. See State v. Brocks, 587 N.W.2d 37, 41 (Minn.1998).
While under the foregoing criteria the question in this case is close, I come to the conclusion that the court of appeals was correct when it held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Johnson’s request for the heat-of-passion manslaughter instruction. Johnson asserts on appeal that his emotional state was consistent with heat of passion. But as the majority correctly states, there is “very little direct evidence of Johnson’s emotional state” at the time of the shooting. The record shows that Johnson and the victim, Jullie Bottema, were engaged in an argument and that Bottema was *633upset, even “very mad” at Johnson because he had e-mailed an inappropriate photograph of her to his brother-in-law. But the testimony of the defendant, the physical evidence, and other circumstances of the shooting do not justify the majority’s conclusion that there was a rational basis to convict Johnson of heat-of-passion manslaughter.
Neither Johnson nor any of the witnesses who saw him before or after the shooting testified that he appeared angry or that his behavior was otherwise consistent with being provoked. By all accounts — including Johnson’s own testimony — Johnson was not angry at the time of the shooting. Horton did testify that Johnson had a look of “disbelief’ or “shock” on his face when he backed out of the bedroom doorway with a gun in his hand after the first gunshot was fired. But Horton’s description of Johnson is not unexpected for someone who had just shot another person, and is not probative of anger or provocation and is not enough to support a heat-of-passion instruction — especially in the context of the other direct evidence in this case.
Johnson testified that, while arguing with Bottema, she somehow gained possession of the gun, pointed it at him, and as he turned toward her to push the gun away, it fired and he was hit. If this version of the facts was at all plausible, Bottema would have had to shoot Johnson first, before she was shot, as Bottema’s wound tore out the back of her head, was fatal, and could not have been self-inflicted. This sequence of events indicates that Bottema was shot before Johnson was shot, which leads inevitably to the conclusion that the second shot was a self-inflicted wound to Johnson’s head. Moreover, this conclusion is supported by Horton’s testimony that, as he was leaving the house, he heard a second gunshot. Johnson’s story is simply not credible.5 Moreover, if Johnson shot himself, then he was not provoked by Bottema shooting him and a critical basis for the heat-of-passion instruction disappears.
As the court of appeals said:
The physical evidence and the testimony of [Horton] who was standing at the bottom of the stairs, however, contradict [Johnson’s] claim that the victim provoked him by firing the gun and shooting him before she was fatally shot. In particular, that evidence shows that (1) the victim had no stippling on her palms that would indicate that she fired the gun;6 (2) according to the forensic evidence, the victim was shot at close range from above in the back of her head, while she was crouching or sitting with her hands covering her head; (3) after *634the first shot, [Horton] standing at the bottom of the stairs saw [Johnson] back out of the upstairs bedroom with a gun in his hand; (4) [Horton] heard a second shot as he was leaving the house to call 911; (5) several minutes later, [Johnson] came out of the house with a gunshot wound to the side of his head; and (6) the victim was found in the upstairs bedroom with the gun in her hand.
State v. Johnson, No. A04-385, 2005 WL 623248, at *1, 2-3 (Minn.App. Mar.15, 2005).
Even when looking at this evidence under the “light most favorable” standard that we recently articulated in Dahlin, Johnson’s claim that he was entitled to a heat-of-passion manslaughter instruction falls short because he failed to present plausible evidence7 that Bottema shot him first or otherwise provoked him. Dahlin, 695 N.W.2d at 598. Therefore, I conclude that when the district court denied Johnson’s requested instruction, it did not abuse its discretion. The court did not need to weigh the evidence or discredit witnesses; rather, it acted within the proper purview of its discretion when it concluded that even Johnson’s self-serving testimony failed to support findings of either provocation by Bottema or heat of passion on the part of Johnson.
For many of the same reasons, I also conclude that Johnson was not entitled to a self-defense instruction. The elements of self-defense are (1) the absence of aggression or provocation on the part of the defendant; (2) the defendant’s actual and honest belief that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm; (3) existence of reasonable grounds for that belief; and (4) the absence of a reasonable possibility of retreat. State v. Basting, 572 N.W.2d 281, 285 (Minn.1997). A self-defense instruction is required only if a defendant raises the defense by creating or raising a reasonable doubt that his use of force was justified. See State v. Dodis, 314 N.W.2d 233, 237 (Minn.1982).
Here, as the court of appeals correctly concluded, the problem with Johnson’s assertion that he acted in self-defense is that the testimony of Horton and other witnesses, together with the physical evidence left at the scene, fails to provide any support for his version of the events. Rather, as the court of appeals stated:
the evidence overwhelmingly establishes that [Johnson] was the aggressor and that his use of force was not reasonable: he brought the gun into the bedroom, shot the unarmed cowering victim at close range, and placed the gun in her hand.
Johnson, 2005 WL 623248, at *3.
For all of the foregoing reasons, I conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Johnson’s request for a self-defense instruction. I would affirm.
PAGE, Justice(dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Justice Paul H. Anderson.
. While Dahlin cautions judges not to weigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses, it does not require a judge to accept a version of the facts that stretches credulity to the limits when determining whether a lesser-included offense jury instruction is warranted. See Dahlin, 695 N.W.2d at 598 (stating a district court must determine whether evidence provides a rational basis for acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting the defendant of the lesser-included offense).
. At this point, I must note that I am perplexed by the majority’s footnote 3, specifically the majority’s extensive use of a quote from the state’s brief. The dissent does not rely on that particular argument made by the state, and thus the majority's citation to this language takes on the aspect of a red herring— “something used to disguise a trail or an event in order to throw searchers off the track; a diversionary issue.” James Rogers, The Dictionary of Clichés 216 (Wings Books 1992). The medical examiner’s testimony is what it is — no more, no less. The medical examiner did not testify that it was impossible for Bottema to have shot the gun, only that there was no forensic evidence that she did shoot the gun.
. See supra note 1.