(dissenting).
Because I find nothing in the record to indicate that these children are other than children of tender years, and because I find no compelling reason why plaintiff should not have custody of her children, I would reverse the decision of the trial court. Kester v. Kester, S.D., 257 N.W.2d 731; Stearns v. Stearns, 80 S.D. 443, 126 N.W.2d 124. Even if it could be said that the nine-year-old boy was not of tender years, I do not know that it could seriously be suggested that the younger boy was not. If plaintiff is entitled to custody of the younger child, perforce she should have custody of the older. Cf. Andera v. Andera, S.D., 277 N.W.2d 725.
*448Plaintiff’s arrangements for caring for the two young children were far superior to those proposed by defendant. Plaintiff, who had had custody of the children for a full year prior to the date of the divorce, fixes breakfast for the boys each morning before they are left with a thirty-one-year-old mother of three for fifteen to twenty minutes prior to their five-block walk to elementary school.
Plaintiff is apparently a sensitive person of an intellectual bent. Apparently at times the children get on her nerves, but I doubt that there are many mothers of boys this age who would not plead guilty on that count. Plaintiff’s views regarding discipline may differ from that of a man’s, but in the absence of any evidence to the effect that these boys are being reared under circumstances that will warp their personalities, how is it for us to say that defendant’s philosophy of discipline is so inherently superior to plaintiff’s that it constitutes a compelling reason to award him custody?
I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the ease with directions that custody be awarded to plaintiff.