State v. Spencer

CRIPPEN, Judge,

concurring specially.

The trial court properly concluded that appellant was taken into custody by security officers. The court was not at liberty, however, to extend the law on Miranda warnings to questioning by private security officers.

a. Custody.

Security investigator Harr confronted appellant on premises where both men were employed. Harr’s questions to appellant produced incriminating admissions, and it is evident that appellant knew at that point that his problem was “something big.” Harr summoned security officer Wagner to take appellant to a security office and to stay with him. While so escorted, and during subsequent questioning by Wagner, Harr and a third security officer, the trial court found appellant “reasonably believed his freedom of action was restricted.” Thus, the court found appellant was taken into custody by Wagner and remained in custody until questioning was concluded.

*534The trial court properly concluded that appellant was significantly deprived of his freedom and subjected to custodial interrogation. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); State v. Palm, 299 N.W.2d 740, 741 (Minn.1980). The restraint on appellant’s freedom of movement was of the degree associated with formal arrest. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 430, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 1143-44, 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984) citing a quotation from Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 713-14, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977).

b. Private questioning.

The decision in Miranda v. Arizona was directed at questioning by law-enforcement officers. State v. LaRose, 286, Minn. 517, 518, 174 N.W.2d 247, 248 (1970). See Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). There are understandable distinctions between trained security officers with uniforms and badges and the untrained individual who made the citizens arrest in LaRose. Neither the trial court nor this court, however, should act on those distinctions absent recognition of their significance by the Minnesota Supreme Court.

I concur that the trial court’s decision must be reversed.