On June 13,1994, the Citizens Utility Board, Senator Fred Risser and Representative David Travis (Petitioners) sought leave to commence *488an original action against James R. Klauser, Secretary of the Department of Administration, and Tommy G. Thompson, the Governor (Respondents) pursuant to Art. VII, sec. 3(2) of the Wisconsin Constitution and sec. 809.70, Stats.1 In this declaratory judgment action initiated pursuant to sec. 806.04, STATS., the issue presented for our consideration is whether the Wisconsin Constitution, empowering a governor to approve an appropriation bill "in part," permits the governor to strike a numerical sum appropriated in the bill and to insert a different, smaller number as the appropriated sum. We conclude that Art. V, sec. 10 of the Wisconsin Constitution permits the governor to act in such a fashion.
The facts in this action are not in dispute. The Wisconsin legislature passed the Executive Budget *489Bill, 1993 Senate Bill 44, on July 16,1993. On August 10,1993, Governor Tommy G. Thompson approved the bill in part and objected to it in part. In at least nine instances, Governor Thompson crossed out dollar figures written in Arabic numerals and wrote in different, smaller numbers. Tbe legislature did not attempt to override these partial vetoes by the governor.
Petitioners2 subsequently brought this original action to specifically challenge only Governor Thompson's partial veto of the amount of appropriation in sec. 153 of the Executive Budget Bill. As presented to Governor Thompson, sec. 153 provided $350,000 for the Public Service Commission's intervention activities.3 Governor Thompson drew lines through the "350,000" appropriation adopted by the legislature and wrote above the crossed out figures the number "250,000." The resulting veto appeared as follows:
SECTION 153.
Statute, Agency and Pukpose Source Type 1993-94 1994-95
20.155 Public service commission
(1) Regulation of public utilities
JiTOjOoo _ (j) Intervenor financing PR A 550,000 350,0001 Vetoed in Part
*490Governor Thompson, pursuant to the mandates of Art. V, sec. 10(2)(b) of the Wisconsin Constitution,4 forwarded to the legislature the following reason for his action:
Section 153 [as it relates to s. 20.155(l)(j)] provides $350,000 PR in fiscal year 1994-95 for intervenor financing. This is an increase of $150,000 PR over the current base.
I object to this increase in funding because an increase of more than $100,000 is too large. By lining out' the Public Service Commission's s. 21.155(l)(j) appropriation and writing in the smaller amount of $250,000 PR in fiscal year 1994-95, I am vetoing the part of the bill which funds this provision. This will provide the Public Service Commission with adequate funding for intervention activities in that year. I am also requesting the Department of Administration Secretary not to allot these funds.
Article V, sec. 10(1) of the Wisconsin Constitution sets forth a governor's power to approve appropriation bills in whole or in part as follows:
Governor to approve or veto bills; proceedings on veto. Section 10(l)(a) Every bill *491which shall have passed the legislature shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the governor.
(b) If the governor approves and signs the bill, the bill shall become law. Appropriation bills may be approved in whole or in part by the governor and the part approved shall become law.
(c) In approving an appropriation bill in part, the governor may not create a new word by rejecting individual letters in the words of the enrolled bill.
Petitioners contend that the above constitutional provision does not authorize the governor to write numerals or words into an appropriation bill. Rather, Petitioners maintain that the plain language of Art. V, sec. 10 of the constitution authorizes the governor either to approve an appropriation bill in whole, or to approve an appropriation bill in part, returning to the legislature the parts to which the governor objects. Approval, according to Petitioners, means to give one's consent; objection means disapproval or refusal to give consent.
The last sentence in subsection (l)(b), empowering a governor to "approve! ] in whole or in part" an appropriation bill, was added to Art. V, sec. 10 of the constitution by a 1930 amendment. At the time Wisconsin approved the amendment, thirty-seven other states granted the governor the power to object to single items in appropriation bills, but no other state constitution utilized the word "part" instead of "item." The Partial Veto in Wisconsin — -An Update, Informational Bulletin 87-IB-3. (August 1988).5 Use of the *492partial veto6 was minimal up until the early 1970's when it became a more popular tool to craft policy. For instance, in 1971, Governor Patrick J. Lucey was the first governor to use the partial veto to remove a single digit from an appropriation — thereby inventing the "digit veto." Id. at 4. And in 1983, Governor Anthony S. Earl invented another version of the partial veto — the "pick-a-letter veto" (the selective vetoing of letters to form a new word, or of digits to form a new number). Id. However, as the parties here readily admit, Governor Thompson has been the state's most prolific governor, in terms of both volume and creativity, in the exercise of his partial veto authority.
Since the time of the 1930 amendment to sec. 10, the supreme court has been called upon to consider the scope of the governor's partial veto power in six cases.7 *493These cases, instructing that a governor wields a broad but not limitless power to object in part to an appropriation bill, necessarily form the basis for our resolution of this case. Thus, before examining the constitutionality of Governor Thompson's challenged partial veto in the present case, we must briefly review those six cases interpreting the governor's partial veto power.
In State ex rel. Wisconsin Tel. Co. v. Henry, 218 Wis. 302, 306-07, 260 N.W. 486, 489 (1935), the first case to construe the governor's power to object to part of an appropriation bill, the governor attempted to veto portions of an appropriation bill declaring legislative intent and creating an agency for administration of a fund. The plaintiff challenged the governor's veto on two grounds, claiming: (1) that the governor vetoed conditions the plaintiff asserted were inseparably connected with an appropriation; and (2) that the governor vetoed parts of the appropriation bill that had nothing to do with an appropriation. Id. at 309, 260 N.W. at 490.
The Henry court first concluded that the parts vetoed were not provisos or conditions inseparably connected to the appropriation bill.8 Id. The court then concluded that the governor has the authority to object *494to any separable part of an appropriation bill, even if it is not an appropriation. Id. at 314-15, 260 N.W. at 491 — 92. The court used a dictionary's broadly stated definition of the word "part," reasoning that the governor's power to object to a part of an appropriation bill was "intended to be as coextensive as the legislature's power to join and enact separable pieces of legislation in an appropriation bill." Id. at 315, 260 N.W. at 492. Wisconsin, the court explained, has no constitutional provisions prohibiting the legislature from passing general legislation that unites a number of unrelated subjects in one bill to increase the likelihood of the bill's approval. Id. Thus, the court suggested that the veto power allows the governor to approve or object to every separable piece of legislation in an appropriation bill to "prevent the evil consequences of improper joinder." Id. The question left unanswered by Henry was whether the portions vetoed need constitute a separable portion of the entire bill.
This court rendered its second interpretation of the governor's partial veto power in State ex rel. Finnegan v. Dammann, 220 Wis. 143, 264 N.W. 622 (1936). In Finnegan, the issue was raised as to whether a bill that did not include an appropriation was nonetheless an "appropriation bill" because it amended an existing law that indirectly affected fund appropriations by raising the permit fees of various types of motor carriers. Id. at 147-48, 264 N.W. at 624. The court concluded that the legislation was not an appropriation bill because there was no appropriation within the four comers of the bill. Id. at 147-48 264 N.W. at 624. In so concluding, the court adopted the following definitions as guideposts in determining whether a bill may be considered an appropriation:
*495"Appropriation bill. Govt. A measure before a legislative body authorizing the expenditure of public moneys and stipulating the amount, manner, and purpose of the various items of expenditure."
"An appropriation in the sense of the constitution means the setting apart a portion of the public funds for a public purpose."
"An appropriation is 'the setting aside from the public revenue of a certain sum of money for a specified object, in such manner that the executive officers of the government are authorized to use that money, and no more, for that object, and no other.'"
Id. (emphasis added).
In State ex rel. Martin v. Zimmerman, 233 Wis. 442, 289 N.W. 662 (1940), the court addressed the question of the governor's use of the partial veto power following adjournment by the legislature, but within the time limits set by the constitution. More important than the holding that the governor's partial veto was timely and authorized was the court's discussion concerning the purpose of the 1930 amendment to sec. 10:
Its purpose was to prevent, if possible, the adoption of omnibus appropriation bills, log-rolling, the practice of jumbling together in one act inconsistent subjects in order to force a passage by uniting minorities with different interests when the particular provisions could not pass on their separate merits, with riders of objectionable legislation attached to general appropriation bills in order to force the governor to veto the entire bill and thus stop the wheels of government or approve the obnoxious act. Very definite evils were inherent in the law-making processes in connection with appropriation measures.
Id. at 447-48, 289 N.W. at 664.
*496Thirty-six years passed before the court was again called on to consider the partial veto power of the governor. In State ex rel. Sundby v. Adamany, 71 Wis. 2d 118, 237 N.W.2d 910 (1976), Governor Patrick Lucey vetoed parts of nonappropriation language from an appropriation bill providing for local referenda. Id. at 121-24, 237 N.W.2d at 911-12. "In substance, the governor's veto made mandatory the local referendums which the bill, as passed by the legislature, made optional." Id. at 124, 237 N.W.2d at 912. Before deciding the narrow issue of severability presented, the Sundby court summarized Henry, Martin, and Finnegan. Id. at 128-31, 237 N.W.2d at 915-16. The court then noted that the governor has a distinct and constitutionally recognized role in the legislative process as prescribed by Art. V, sec. 4 of the Wisconsin Constitution. Id. at 131-134, 237 N.W.2d at 916-918. Finally, the Sundby court rejected the argument that the governor may negate what the legislature creates but may not affirmatively change the result intended by the legislature. The court was unimpressed with this subjective distinction, explaining that "[e]very veto has both a negative and affirmative ring about it. There is always a change in policy involved." Id. at 134, 237 N.W.2d at 918.
In State ex rel. Kleczka v. Conta, 82 Wis. 2d 679, 264 N.W.2d 539 (1978), the court upheld the governor's power to strike words and clauses from an appropriation bill, thereby significantly altering the legislative intent of the appropriation bill. As originally proposed by the legislature, the bill required taxpayers to add one dollar to their tax liabilities if they wished that sum to be used for the state campaign fund. Id. at 685, 264 N.W.2d at 541. Using the partial veto, Acting Governor Martin Schreiber changed the section to enable *497the taxpayer to direct that $1 of their existing tax liability be allocated to the fund. Id.
The KLeczka court identified severability as the test of partial veto validity and reasoned that sever-ability must be determined as a matter of substance rather than form. Id. at 705, 264 N.W.2d at 550. Further, harkening back to the language in Henry, the test for severability is met upon a determination that a complete, entire, and workable law remains after the governor's partial veto exercise. Id. at 706-07, 264 N.W.2d at 550-51. "The power of the Governor to disassemble the law is coextensive with the power of the Legislature to assemble its provisions initially." Id. at 707-08, 264 N.W.2d at 551. Finally, the court abandoned an intimation in Henry and Sundby that parts constituting conditions, contingencies or provisos imposed by the legislature could not be vetoed: "Under the Wisconsin Constitution, the governor may exercise his partial-veto power by removing provisos and conditions to an appropriation so long as the net result of the partial veto is a complete, entire, and workable bill which the legislature itself could have passed in the first instance." Id. at 715, 264 N.W.2d at 555.
Justice Connor T. Hansen, dissenting in KLeczka, argued that the court should adopt a more limited interpretation of the governor's partial veto power. Hansen first noted that because our constitution provides for three branches of government, separate and co-ordinate, "[n]one may perform the functions or exercise the powers of another." Id. at 718, 264 N.W.2d at 556 (Hansen, J., dissenting). Hansen sought "some palpable limit to the power of the governor to rewrite" because "[o]nly the limitations on one's imagination fix the outer limits of the exercise of the partial veto power _" Id. at 719, 264 N.W.2d at 557. Looking back to the *498original purpose underlying the amendment to sec. 10 of the constitution, Hansen contended that the partial veto power should be exercised only with regard "to the individual components, capable of separate enactment, which have been joined together by . the legislature in an appropriation bill." Id. at 726, 264 N.W.2d at 560. The portions stricken must be capable of standing as a complete and workable bill. Id. In sum, Hansen suggested that the partial veto power should be limited to grammatically and structurally distinct portions of legislation, thereby creating an objective test which could be predictably applied. Id.
Finally, in State ex rel. Wisconsin Senate v. Thompson, 144 Wis. 2d 429, 424 N.W.2d 385 (1988), as predicted by Justice Hansen in his Kleczka dissent, the court concluded that the governor may exercise the partial veto power in an appropriation bill by vetoing phrases, words, word fragments, letters, and digits. In reaching this conclusion, the court also answered "the question of whether the governor may reduce a legislatively enacted appropriation." Id. at 456, 424 N.W.2d at 396. The court noted that this question had never been addressed or answered by our prior decisions interpreting the governor's partial veto authority over appropriation bills. Id. In answering the question, the court concluded:
[Consistent with the broad constitutional power we have recognized the governor possesses with respect to vetoing single letters, words and parts of words in an appropriation bill, that the governor has similar broad powers to reduce or eliminate numbers and amounts of appropriations in the budget bill. The governor has been authorized by the legislature and the people in art. V, sec. 10 of our constitution to approve appropriation bills "in part." *499Again, the test in the veto of parts is simply whether what remains after the governor's veto is a complete and workable law.9
Id. at 457, 424 N.W.2d at 396 (emphasis added). The court also refused to accept an Attorney General opinion declaring that the governor acted inappropriately by striking a digit:
[ W]e reject the Attorney General's conclusion that the governor may not exercise his partial veto authority to reduce and thereby alter appropriation bills. Instead, we agree with the New Jersey court in Karcher v. Karcher, [479 A.2d 403 (1984)]. We hold that a partial veto resulting in a reduction in an appropriation is precisely the sort of partial veto measure the governor of this state is authorized to take pursuant to art. V, sec. 10 Wis. Const.
Id. at 461, 424 N.W.2d at 397 (emphasis added). Thus, for the first time, this court set forth a dichotomy between a governor's partial veto power over appropriation figures and over non-appropriation parts of an appropriation bill: a governor has the power to reduce an appropriation, whereas he may only strike out letters, digits or words in regard to non-appropriation concepts in the appropriation bill.10 Consequently, any *500concerns that the dissent has with the "exception" set forth in Wisconsin Senate, are better addressed to a reconsideration of the underlying rationale of that case.
Although not addressing the precise issue of whether the governor may reduce appropriations by writing in different and smaller numbers than those passed by the legislature, the Wisconsin Senate presaged the issue in a footnote. The court stated:
Because the question is not raised by the facts of this case or any of the vetoes specifically challenged, we do not decide the issue of whether the governor may reduce appropriations by writing in a different and smaller number than that passed by the legislature, rather than by adjusting the figures that the legislature had originally provided.
See id. at 461 n.17, 424 N.W.2d at 397 n.17. The court, however, quoted favorably from the Karcher case, wherein the governor of New Jersey changed a legislatively prescribed percentage and reduced an appropriation of aid limits from $140 million to $125 million, both of which were upheld by the New Jersey Supreme Court. Id.
The Wisconsin Senate case drew a vigorous dissent drafted by Justice William Bablitch and joined by Jus*501tices Shirley Abrahamson and Donald Steinmetz. The dissent argued that an interpretation of Art. V, sec. 10 that allows the governor to delete individual letters could not have been the intent of the drafters of the provision or the voters who approved it. Id. at 466, 424 N.W.2d at 400 (Bablitch, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). The dissent, however, did not quarrel with "that portion of the majority's holding which permits the veto of individual digits to effect a reduction in an appropriation. This power is properly subsumed within the governor's power to veto 'in part.’ " Id. at 474, 424 N.W.2d at 403.
In response to the Wisconsin Senate case, the Wisconsin legislature proposed a constitutional amendment to Art. V, sec. 10. The amendment, subsequently approved in a 1990 referendum, prohibits the governor from "creat[ing] a new word by rejecting individual letters in the words of the enrolled bill." See Art. V, sec. 10(l)(c), Wis. Const. Thus, the amendment as ratified by the citizenry only limits the governor's veto of letters and keeps intact the Wisconsin Senate conclusion that the governor has the authority to "reduce or eliminate numbers and amounts of appropriations" and exercise a "partial veto resulting in a reduction in an appropriation."11
*502As is evidenced by the above review of case law on the partial veto power of the governor, this court has, for better or for worse, broadly interpreted that power.12 Article V, sec. 10 has been interpreted by this court as allowing the governor the following: (1) the power to veto words and phrases; (2) the power to veto letters to create new words (subsequently limited by the 1990 amendment); (3) the power to veto digits; and (4) the power to reduce appropriations. See Wisconsin Senate, 144 Wis. 2d at 457, 424 N.W.2d at 396. This court recognizes that the doctrine of stare decisis is fundamental to the decision-making process. Thus, our interpretation of the governor's powers deriving from Art. V, sec. 10, and put into focus by the facts in this proceeding, although involving an issue of first impression in this court, will likely come as a surprise to few. *503Further, this case, as the logical extension of Wisconsin Senate, does not infringe on the prior case law regarding the governor's partial veto authority.
There is no dispute that an appropriation is at issue in the present case. The parties also agree, and the cases make clear, that Art. V, sec. 10 authorizes the governor to decrease ah appropriation by striking any or all of the digits in "$350,000." See Wisconsin Senate, 144 Wis. 2d at 457, 424 N.W.2d at 396. The parties disagree, however, as to whether the governor may, in effect, authorize a smaller appropriation not only by striking numbers but also by writing in a smaller number for the appropriation.
Petitioners' argue that Art. V., sec. 10 of the Wisconsin Constitution, while allowing the governor to approve an appropriation bill in whole or in part, only authorizes action as to those numbers that are physically part of an appropriation. Looking to the Henry definition of "part," they assert that part can only refer to material that is "included in" an appropriation. Their brief provides the following example: "If the governor strikes a $100 appropriation and writes in $80, the amount the governor attempts to veto is $20. However, '$20' does not appear anywhere in the bill. '$20' is not physically part of the bill. It is part of the bill only conceptually." Petitioner's brief at 5. Respondents counter that striking numerals in an appropriation and writing in other numerals to create a smaller dollar figure is no different than striking out individual digits to create a smaller dollar figure. As argued by Respondents, the $100,000 which Governor Thompson excised is clearly a part of $350,000 and, therefore, the governor properly exercised his partial veto power. Respondents also maintain that because the governor's power to disassemble is coextensive with the legisla*504ture's power to assemble, the governor necessarily has the authority to write in a smaller number that is part of the larger number originally appropriated by the legislature.
We conclude that the governor, acting within the scope of his powers derived from Art. V., sec. 10 of the Wisconsin Constitution, may strike a numerical sum set forth in an appropriation and insert a different, smaller number as the appropriated sum. We reach this conclusion based on a common sense reading of the word "part" as well as the teachings of prior case law, most notably Henry and Wisconsin Senate.
As an initial matter, it is important to recognize that the partial veto exercised by the governor in this case only encompasses reduction of monetary sums appropriated in an appropriation bill. The partial veto at issue does not involve an assertion by the governor that he can partially reduce word concepts in an appropriation bill. Thus, there is no allegation that the governor may, for instance, partially veto the word "year" and write in "ten days." The governor concedes in his brief that he does not have such authority. However, because this concern is raised in the Petitioner's brief and in the dissent, we feel compelled also to explain why it is not a valid concern for the future.
As noted above, Art. V, sec. 10(l)(b) of the Wiscon-. sin Constitution provides, in relevant part: "Appropriation bills may be approved in whole or in part by the governor, and the part approved shall become law." In considering whether this provision allows the governor to act as he did in the present case, this court must be satisfied that the partial veto has the effect of leaving intact a law that is complete, *505entire, and workable. Here, the governor's partial veto had the effect of reducing the $350,000 appropriation by $100,000. This reduction, although substantial, and certainly of great concern to the interests of CUB, did not alter the bill in such a way that it is no longer complete, entire, and workable. On the contrary, other than the monetary reduction, the bill is exactly as the legislature approved it.
There also can be no dispute that sec. 15 of 1993 Senate Bill 44, as partially vetoed by the governor, survives the "topicality" or "germaneness" requirement as set forth in Wisconsin Senate. The new provision approved by the governor — "$250,000"—relates to the same subject matter as the original legislative enactment, viz., a money appropriation to be utilized by CUB as a public interest advocacy entity.
The more difficult consideration as to the appropriateness of the governor's partial veto is a determination as to whether $250,000 is "part" of $350,000 so as to fall within the purview of powers authorized by Art. V., sec. 10(l)(b). As noted above, this court has recognized that the word "part" as used in sec. 10(l)(b) should be given its ordinary and accepted meaning. See Henry, 218 Wis. at 313, 260 N.W. at 491. As relevant here, the court quoted the following dictionary definition of the word: "something less than a whole; a number, quantity, mass, or the like, regarded as going to make up, with others or another, a larger number, quantity, mass, etc." Id. (quoting Webster's New International Dictionary 1781 (2 ed.)). Applying this definition to the situation at hand, it is readily apparent that $250,000 is "part" of $350,000, because $250,000 is "something less than" $350,000, and *506$250,000 goes "to make up, with others ... a larger number," i.e., $350,000. This "common sense" reading of the word part, in terms of appropriation amounts, is what we believe is intended in sec. I0(l)(b).13
We are cognizant of the allure of Petitioners' form argument. A conclusion that the governor can partially veto only that which is specifically written or "physically present" as an appropriation amount has superficial appeal. However, as noted by this court in Kleczka the test as to whether a part of an appropriation bill is severable from the rest of the bill "must be determined, not as a matter of form, but as a matter of substance." Kleczka, 82 Wis. 2d at 704, 264 N.W.2d at 550. Guided by Wisconsin Senate, Petitioners recognize that the governor has the authority to reduce appropriations. Further, they concede that the governor could, by striking digits, reduce the $350,000 to a variety of lesser amounts including $50,000, $35,000, $30,000, $5,000, $3,500, $3,000, $500, $350, $300, $50, $35, $30, $5, $3, or even $0. If the governor has it within his authority to reduce the $350,000 appropriation as recognized above, it seems absurd that he could not also reduce the sum to $250,000, which, as noted above, is *507clearly a "part" of $350,000.14 Simply put, to accept the conclusion that the governor has the authority to strike digits from an appropriation bill, but not the authority to write in smaller digits, elevates form over substance in contravention of common sense and prior case law.15
*508Petitioners form argument would also result in the governor's power to disassemble legislation not being coextensive with the legislature's power to assemble it, contrary to both Henry and Kleczka. As noted in Wisconsin Senate, that which is struck by the governor does not have to be separable as an item; instead, "what the legislature has assembled, the governor can disassemble "part" by "part." Wisconsin Senate, 144 Wis. 2d at 441, 424 N.W.2d at 389. Because the governor's power to disassemble legislation through approval in part is as broad as the legislature's power to originally assemble the legislation, and because the legislature itself had the authority to appropriate $250,000 rather than $350,000 for the CUB appropriation, the governor's partial veto in this case must be upheld.
The Petitioners contend that "if numbers can be written in so can words .... The governor might veto the words, 'State of Wisconsin' and write in 'City of Milwaukee,' because Milwaukee is part of Wisconsin." Petitioners' brief at 5-6. This contention can be addressed on several levels. First, both sides recognize that the governor never has written in a word and does not claim the authority to do so. Second, this court has already implicitly limited the governor's power in this area in Wisconsin Senate to reductions of amounts of appropriations. Wisconsin Senate, 144 Wis. 2d at 457, 461, 424 N.W.2d at 396, 397 ("consistent with the broad constitutional power we have recognized the governor possesses with respect to vetoing single letters, words and parts of words16 in an appropriation bill, that the *509governor has similar broad powers to reduce or eliminate numbers and amounts of appropriations"; holding that "a partial veto resulting in a reduction in an appropriation is precisely the sort of partial veto measure the governor of this state is authorized to take pursuant to art. V, sec. 10"). We now make explicit the fact that a governor may only reduce an appropriation by a number contained within the original appropriation allotment. Third, while our prior cases have consistently recognized that a component of the governor's power to partially veto includes the power to reduce the monetary amount of an appropriation, see Wisconsin Senate 144 Wis. 2d at 461, 424 N.W.2d at 397, this court has never discussed the conceptual "reduction" of any other elements of an appropriation bill (i.e., dates, times, counties, cities, groups, etc.). This recognition points up the fact that the an important rationale of the partial veto is clearly linked to expenditure reduction and fiscal balance.
The dissent takes us to task for "contravening the language of Art. V, sec. 10(l)(b), Wis. Const., and over 60 years of case law interpreting that provision." Dissenting op. at 512-13. The protests of the dissent notwithstanding, our decision today in no way infringes on the language of sec. 10(l)(b) or overrules any prior opinions interpreting that provision. Rather, the decision is the logical conclusion based specifically on the constitutional provision and the case law interpreting it. After all, it was this court, in Wisconsin Senate, that stated: "We hold that a partial veto resulting in a reduction in an appropriation is precisely the sort of partial veto measure the governor of this state is authorized to take pursuant to art. V, sec. 10." Wisconsin Senate, 144 Wis. 2d at 461, 424 N.W.2d at 397.
*510In sum, we hold that the governor's exercise of his partial veto authority in this case is exactly the kind of partial veto authority intended by Art. V, sec. 10 of the Wisconsin Constitution.17 The striking of the "3" in $350,000 and replacing it with a "2" to reduce the appropriation to $250,000 should be considered an authorized exercise of the governor's power to "approve in part" an appropriation. Accepting the common sense rationale of this opinion in no way expands the governor's power; rather, the approach espoused today simply makes the prescribed power of sec. 10(l)(b) more logical. Succinctly stated, the governor has the power to approve part of an appropriation bill by reducing the amount of money appropriated so long as the number is part of the original appropriation. This power stems from the right to reduce appropriations recognized in Wisconsin Senate and extends only to monetary figures and is not applicable in the context of any other aspect of an appropriation.18
*511By the Court. — It is declared and adjudged:
(1) The part of sec. 153 of the 1993 Executive Budget Bill passed by the legislature but partially vetoed by the Governor by writing in a smaller number properly was vetoed pursuant to Art. V, sec. 10(l)(b) of the Wisconsin Constitution.
(2) By virtue of the passage by the legislature and the Governor's partial veto of sec. 153 in accordance with the Wisconsin Constitution, we conclude that sec. 153 as partially vetoed has the force and effect oflaw.
(3) We further conclude that no questions concerning the validity of other provisions of the 1993 Executive Budget Bill which were vetoed by the Governor are now determined.
Relief denied.
Article VII, sec. 3(2) of the Wisconsin Constitution provides: "The supreme court has appellate jurisdiction over all courts and may hear original actions and proceedings. The supreme court may issue all writs necessary in aid of its jurisdiction." Section 809.70(1), Stats., provides, in relevant part: "A person may request the supreme court to take jurisdiction of an original action by filing a petition which may be supported by a memorandum."
We granted the petition in this case on September 20,1994, because the matter is publici juris and requires a prompt and authoritative determination by this court. Further, because the material facts are agreed to by the parties, the action is appropriate for disposition as a matter of law in an original proceeding. While recognizing a reluctance to take these cases as a matter of course, nonetheless, we have on several occasions taken original jurisdiction of actions concerning the governor's partial veto authority. See, e.g., Wisconsin Senate v. Thompson, 144 Wis. 2d 429, 434 n.3, 424 N.W.2d 385, 387 n.3 (1987); State ex rel. Kleczka v. Conta, 82 Wis. 2d 679, 683, 264 N.W.2d 539, 540 (1978).
At the initiation of this action, petitioner Citizens Utility Board (CUB) was a public interest advocacy body which frequently intervenes in cases before the Public Service Commission. Petitioner Risser was the Assistant Minority Leader of the Wisconsin State Senate and petitioner Travis was the Majority Leader of the Wisconsin State Assembly.
According to the petition for leave to commence an original action, the Citizens Utility Board "relies heavily on intervenor financing."
Article V, sec. 10(2)(b) of the Wisconsin Constitution, provides:
The rejected part of an appropriation bill, together with the governor's objections in. writing, shall be returned to the house in which the bill originated. The house of origin shall enter the objections at large upon the journal and proceed to reconsider the rejected part of the appropriation bill. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of the members present agree to approve the rejected part notwithstanding the objections of the governor, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other house, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of the members present the rejected part shall become law.
Presently, forty-three of the fifty states have a constitutional provision allowing the governor to exercise a veto in an appropriation bill. See The BOOK OF THE STATES, 141 — 42 (1994). Of those forty-three, approximately ten allow the governor to reduce amounts jn appropriation bills. Id.
The text of the constitution does not use the word "veto." The word veto appearing in the title to sec. 10 is not part of the constitution but was added in reprints of the constitution after the constitution was adopted. This court, however, has referred to a governor's objection to or disapproval of part of an appropriation bill as a veto and, more specifically, as a partial veto. In the interests of consistency, we continue to use this terminology.
It is the function of this court to develop and clarify the law. See State v. McConnohie, 113 Wis. 2d 362, 334 N.W.2d 903 (1983). As noted in Wisconsin Senate v. Thompson, 144 Wis. 2d 429, 436-37, 424 N.W.2d 385, 387 (1988):
Since Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed.60 (1803), it has been recognized that it is peculiarly the province of the judiciary to interpret the constitution and say what the law is. We deem it to be this court's duty to resolve disputes regarding the constitutional functions of different branches of state government; we may not avoid this duty simply because one or both parties are coordinate branches of govemment.See Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1984). It is the responsibility of the judiciary to act, *493notwithstanding the fact that the case involves political considerations or that final judgment may have practical consequences.
The court later stated that the Henry case "does not hold that the governor cannot disapprove a condition placed upon an appropriation by the legislature." State ex rel. Kleczka v. Conta, 82 Wis. 2d 679, 713, 264 N.W.2d 539, 554 (1978). The court concluded that a governor may exercise the partial veto power by removing provisos and conditions to an appropriation so long as the net result of the partial veto is a complete, entire and workable bill which the legislature itself could have passed in the first instance. Id. at 715, 264 N.W.2d at 555.
In addition to reaffirming the "workable law" standard, the court gave "explicit judicial recognition to the long-standing practical and administrative interpretation or modus vivendi between governors and legislatures, that the consequences of any.partial veto must be a law that is germane to the topic or subject matter of the vetoed provisions." Id. at 437, 424 N.W.2d at 388.
This determination in the Wisconsin Senate case points out that, contrary to the assertions of the dissent, Wisconsin Senate did indeed "make new law." As noted specifically by this court:
*500With the exception of our conclusion upholding the exercise of the governor's partial veto powers resulting in the reduction of appropriations and our making explicit what was implicit, — i.e., the germaneness requirement — this case makes no new law. Instead, we simply reaffirm our prior- opinions which have placed Wisconsin in the singular position of having the most liberal and elastic constitutional provision — adopted almost 60 years ago — regarding the governor's partial veto authority over appropriation bills.
Wisconsin Senate, 144 Wis. 2d at 463, 424 N.W.2d at 398 (emphasis added).
Several different amendments were put forth by legislative leaders prior to the 1990 referendum. One of the amendments would have allowed the governor to reject individual digits in any appropriation number but.would have prohibited the governor from: (1) increasing the amount of any appropriation; (2) writing in new appropriation amounts; and (3) vetoing individual letters. See S.J.R. 75,1987-88 Wis. Legis. (1988). The Wisconsin Senate Committee on Judiciary and Consumer Affairs reported 1987 Senate Joint Resolution 75 to the hill senate without recommendation on whether to approve the *502amendment. See 1 Bulletin of the Proceedings of the Wisconsin LEGISLATURE, 1987-88 Sess. 181 (1988). The amendment was not approved by the senate and was never put to a vote of the public.
Several commentators have noted that this court has, in the past, broadly interpreted Art. V, sec. 10 of the Wisconsin Constitution, thus conferring broad powers to the governor. See Richard Briffault, Emerging Issues in State Constitutional Law, 66 TEMP. L. Rev. 1171,1197 (1993) (Wisconsin governor has the broadest item veto power in the country); John S. Wietzer, Comment, The Wisconsin Partial Veto: Where Are We and How Did We Get Here? Definition of "Part" and the Test of Severability, 76 Marq. L. Rev. 625, 649 (1993) (stating that by choosing the "complete and workable" objective test for the partial veto authority, supreme court has bestowed great power on the governor); Mary E. Burke, Comment, The Wisconsin Partial Veto: Past, Present and Future, 1989 Wis. L. Rev. 1395,1431 (1989) (noting that judiciary has broadly interpreted partial veto authority of governor).
We point out thát this conclusion, of course, is the same regardless of whether the legislature chooses to write out the amount of the appropriation in word form. This is so because the underlying conceptual framework is the same — a "part" of a larger appropriation sum is any sum, whether written out in words or specified with numerals, that is smaller than the original larger appropriation sum. Contrary to the statement of the dissent on this issue, it is not "the underlying conceptual framework [that] ... matters," see dissenting op. at 517, rather, what matters is the distinction between an appropriation sum and a non-appropriation sum.
The choices present under Petitioner's scenario, adopted whole-heartedly by the dissent, point out the complete arbitrariness of their reasoning. Under Petitioner's scenario, the governor cannot write in $250,000. Thus, if the governor believes that the original allotment of $350,000 simply cannot in any way be expended, but believes that the CUB activities are necessary and worthwhile, he must allot $50,000 because that is the highest number he can attain by striking a digit. It is likely that CUB would have serious difficulties operating under such a reduction in money. Nonetheless, because the governor would have no authority to reduce the number other than by striking a digit, his hands would be tied, and $50,000 would be the highest amount that could be appropriated. This arbitrariness becomes even more pronounced when the appropriation sum includes a number of zeros. For instance, assume that $10,000,000 has been appropriated for the renovation of the Capitol. The governor decides that the project is an excellent idea but determines that it can be accomplished with an appropriation of $9,500,000. Using the Petitioner's rationale, the governor could not make such a reduction. His only reducing option would be to strike a zero from the appropriation, resulting in a $1,000,000 appropriation, a sum which would likely destroy the project before it even began.
Interestingly, the petitioners in the Wisconsin Senate case recognized the absurdity of allowing a governor to reduce an appropriation to a figure composed of the digits found in the original appropriation: "It is difficult to imagine what public purpose or policy might be served by permitting a governor to reduce appropriations but restricting the reductions to the limited subset of figures derivable from the digits in a particular appropriation." Petitioner's brief in Wisconsin Senate at 43.
As noted above, Art. V, sec. 10(l)(c) now prohibits a governor from vetoing letters, but a governor's power to veto whole words remains intact.
Should the legislature take umbrage at the interpretation of Art. V, sec. 10 of the Wisconsin Constitution set forth today, it is certainly free to set forth the process of amending the constitution in the manner that it deems appropriate. As noted by this court in Wisconsin Senate, "[a]ny claimed excesses on the part of the governor in the exercise of this broad partial veto authority are correctable not by this court, but by the people, either at the ballot box or by constitutional amendment." Wisconsin Senate, 144 Wis. 2d at 465, 424 N.W.2d at 399.
The dissent points out that in a future veto case a majority of this court may find today's opinion "unpersuasive" and thus allow a governor broader powers to "create new entities, dates, durations, percentages, distances and more." Dissenting op. at 524. There can be no dispute that this court can change course in the future. However, for the powers of the governor to be extended in the fashion suggested by the dissent, this court would have to overrule the present decision's limitation to *511reduce only monetary appropriations. Thus, the concern of the dissent that today's decision will somehow "wreak havoc" on the scope of a governor's partial veto is completely unfounded.