Daniel P. McDonald seeks review of a published decision of the court of appeals, State v. McDonald, 138 Wis. 2d 366, 405 N.W.2d 771 (Ct. App. 1987), dismissing an appeal from a judgment of conviction and an order denying a motion for abatement of the criminal proceedings ab initio by the circuit court for Lafayette county, Judge Ralph Adam Fine presiding.
There are two issues before us on review. First, should criminal proceedings against a defendant abate ab initio when the defendant commits suicide while pursuing postconviction relief? Second, if the doctrine of abatement does not apply when the defendant commits suicide while pursuing postconviction relief, does the failure to abate the proceedings violate the defendant’s right to equal protection? We conclude that when a defendant dies while pursuing postconviction relief, regardless of whether death is by suicide or by natural causes, the defendant’s right to bring an appeal continues. Contrary to the assertions of the parties, the defendant is neither entitled to abatement of the criminal proceedings ab initio nor barred from pursuing an appeal.
*533Accordingly, we affirm that part of the decision of the court of appeals which affirmed the circuit court’s denial of McDonald’s motion for abatement, we reverse that part of the decision which dismissed the appeal from the judgment of conviction, and we remand the cause with instructions for the original appeal of the conviction to continue. Because we conclude that a defendant who dies while pursuing postconviction relief, regardless of the cause of death, is not entitled to abatement ab initio, we do not reach the defendant’s claim that his right to equal protection has been violated.
The facts before us are not in dispute. On June 22, 1985, Daniel McDonald (McDonald) was charged with first-degree murder. McDonald entered pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. Following a bifurcated trial, McDonald was found guilty of first-degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment.
On October 21, 1985, McDonald filed a notice of intent to pursue postconviction relief. McDonald also filed a motion requesting a copy of the trial transcript. Prior to a final resolution of his appeal, McDonald committed suicide. Following McDonald’s death, his attorney filed a notice of motion and a motion requesting (1) an order vacating his judgment of conviction and sentence, and (2) dismissal of the information filed against him.
The circuit court denied McDonald’s motion for abatement of the criminal proceedings. According to the court, whether abatement of a criminal proceeding should be granted following a defendant’s death pending appeal is a policy question. After noting that there is a strong public policy against condoning suicide, the court concluded that it was inappropriate *534to adopt rules which sanction or encourage suicide or which appear to reward suicide. Because abatement in the case before it would appear to sanction suicide, the court concluded that the rule established in State v. Krysheski, 119 Wis. 2d 84, 349 N.W.2d 729 (Ct. App. 1984) — the death of a criminal defendant pending direct appeal abates all prior proceedings — should not apply to a case in which the defendant’s death is a result of suicide. Accordingly, the court denied McDonald’s motion for abatement.
McDonald, by his attorneys, appealed the order denying his motion for abatement and the judgment of conviction. The court of appeals refused to abate the proceedings, holding that it was inappropriate to vacate criminal proceedings when the defendant commits suicide while pursuing postconviction relief. The court also dismissed the appeal from the judgment of conviction, apparently on the grounds that the appeal was moot because there was no interest of the defendant to adjudicate. McDonald, 138 Wis. 2d at 370.
According to the court of appeals, the abatement rule adopted in Krysheski is inapplicable when the defendant’s death is by suicide. The court of appeals reasoned that, absent evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that an individual who commits suicide does so by choice. While recognizing that death pending appeal deprives the defendant of a final determination of an appeal and that justice normally requires abatement of a conviction where the appeal is unresolved, the court concluded that when the defendant prevents a final determination of the appeal by committing suicide, justice does not require abatement. The court of appeals further noted that to permit abatement would justify the public and the *535victim, or the victim’s family, in believing that the defendant succeeded in vacating the judgment of conviction through suicide when he would have lost the appeal on the merits. Id. at 368-69.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Sundby argued that the court should reexamine its holding in Kryshe-ski and that the court should not adopt a rule that the death of the defendant abates all proceedings ab initio, regardless of the manner in which the defendant died. Judge Sundby first noted that the historical legal rationale for abating criminal proceedings upon the death of a defendant was based upon the courts’ conclusions that, when a financial penalty is imposed upon a defendant, it is unfair to punish the defendant’s family by making the family pay the defendant’s fine by virtue of an assessment against the estate. He then argued that this rationale is inapplicable when the failure to abate affected only the family. Moreover, because the rule adopted by the majority would be likely to involve the court in exhaustive investigation and litigation concerning the voluntariness of the defendant’s death, Judge Sundby advocated instead that the court "adopt a very simple rule covering all deaths pending appeal, i.e., that the appeal is dismissed because the appellant is no longer subject to the jurisdiction of the court.” Id. at 373 (Sundby, J., concurring).
On September 15, 1987, we accepted McDonald’s petition for review.
Prior to this case, we have never addressed the question of whether criminal proceedings should abate ab initio when the defendant dies while pursuing postconviction relief. The court of appeals, however, in Krysheski, 119 Wis. 2d at 89, has addressed this issue in the context of a defendant who died of a *536heart attack while pursuing an appeal. In Krysheski, the court adopted the federal approach to a defendant’s death pending appeal and held that, when a defendant dies pending an appeal of right, all prior criminal proceedings are abated.
The court of appeals first noted that, because the issues surrounding a defendant’s conviction become moot if the defendant dies pending appeal, dismissal of the appeal was appropriate. The court continued, however, and stated that not only should the appeal be dismissed but also the criminal proceedings should be abated ab initio. According to the court:
"Abatement of all proceedings is based on the recognition that a defendant pursuing an appeal of right has not yet received all of the safeguards of the judicial system. Death prior to appeal works a deprivation of a final determination of the case’s merits. Because an appeal plays an integral part in our system for final adjudication of guilt or innocence, justice requires the abatement of a conviction where the merits of the appeal are left unresolved.” Id. at 88.
We agree with the Krysheski court that an appeal plays an integral part in the judicial system for a final adjudication of guilt or innocence and that a defendant who dies pending appeal should not be deprived of the safeguards that an appeal provides. We disagree, however, that the appropriate remedy is to abate the criminal proceedings ab initio. Instead, we conclude that, when a defendant dies pending appeal, regardless of the cause of death, the defendant’s right to an appeal continues.
This court has consistently recognized that a defendant has a constitutional as well as a statutory right to an appeal. Art. I, sec. 21, Wis. Const.; sec. *537808.03(1), Stats. This right to an appeal, as Krysheski notes, is an integral part of a defendant’s right to a final determination of the merits of the case. It serves as a safeguard to protect a defendant against errors in the criminal proceedings. A defendant who dies pending appeal, irrespective of the cause of death, is no less entitled to those safeguards.
Moreover, because collateral proceedings may be affected by criminal proceedings in which it is alleged that an individual took the life of another, it is in the interest of society to have a complete review of the merits of the criminal proceedings. For example, under sec. 852.01(2m)(b), Stats., a final judgment of conviction of felonious and intentional killing is conclusive evidence that the defendant has feloniously and intentionally killed the decedent, and thus the defendant may not: (1) receive money from the victim’s estate under the intestacy statute, sec. 852.01(2m)(a); (2) inherit under the victim’s will, sec. 853.11(3m); (3) receive any benefit from a contract in which the victim is the obligee and which names the defendant as the beneficiary, sec. 895.43; (4) receive any benefit, as a beneficiary, payable as a result of the death of the victim, sec. 895.435; (5) receive a benefit, as a beneficiary, from a life insurance policy on the life of the victim, sec. 632.485; and (6) receive the victim’s interest in property held in joint tenancy, sec. 700.17(2)(b).1 Because of these potential collateral consequences, it serves the interest of justice to continue the appeal. By continuing the appeal, the *538necessity of initiating separate civil proceedings will be eliminated if the judgment of conviction is affirmed. If the judgment of conviction is reversed, the collateral rights may be resolved in a civil proceeding.
Furthermore, if we adopted the reasoning of the court of appeals in the present case and distinguish between death by suicide and death by natural causes, future cases would require the court to examine the circumstances of the defendant’s death. Permitting an appeal to continue eliminates the myriad of problems which would arise from requiring courts to determine whether the defendant’s death was voluntary or involuntary.
Other jurisdictions, although a minority,2 have also held that when a defendant dies while pursuing postconviction relief, the appeal should continue. State v. Jones, 220 Kan. 136, 137, 551 P.2d 801 (1976); New Jersey State Parole Board v. Boulden, 156 N.J. Super 494, 497, 384 A.2d 167 (1978); Commonwealth v. Walker, 447 Pa. 146, 147-48 n. *, 288 A.2d 741 (1972). In Jones, the Kansas Supreme Court held that the interest of the family of the defendant and the public in the final determination of a criminal case and the fact that collateral rights are often affected by the criminal proceedings warranted the conclusion that the appeal should be adjudicated on its merits, despite the death of the defendant. Jones, 220 Kan. at 137.
Similarly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Walker rejected the defendant’s motion for abatement ab initio and the state’s motion for dismissal, conclud*539ing that "it is in the interest of both a defendant’s estate and society that any challenge initiated by a defendant to the regularity or constitutionality of a criminal proceeding be fully reviewed and decided by the appellate process.” Walker, 447 Pa. at 147-48 n. *. We conclude that these decisions articulate the correct rule.
We are not persuaded by the arguments of the parties and the court of appeals that the appeal from the judgment of conviction must be dismissed because the proceedings are moot. As we have noted, society and the deceased have a very real interest in a final determination of the defendant’s appeal from the criminal conviction. Under these circumstances, we conclude that McDonald’s appeal is not moot.
In summary, we hold that, when a defendant dies while pursuing postconviction relief, irrespective of the cause of death, that the defendant’s right to an appeal continues. The defendant is not, moreover, entitled to have the criminal proceedings abated ab initio. The holding of the court in Krysheski — that the death of a criminal defendant pending direct appeal abates all prior proceedings — is overruled.
Because McDonald properly initiated the appellate process prior to his death, he is entitled to a final determination of his appeal. We recognize that the defendant’s input into the appeal process is a significant factor, but this consideration is overcome by the fact that the appeal process reviews the appeal based upon the record and cannot be modified by a defendant’s action. Accordingly, we remand this cause to the court of appeals with directions to continue McDonald’s original appeal from the judgment of conviction.
*540By the Court. — The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the cause is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The legislature recently affirmed that individuals should not profit by their criminal conduct which causes death and expanded that declaration to include juveniles who are adjudicated delinquent on the basis of unlawfully and intentionally killing a person. 1987 Wisconsin Act 222.
The majority of the jurisdictions addressing this issue conclude that the criminal proceedings should abate ab initio. E.g., United States v. Moehlenkamp, 557 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1977); State v. Morris, 328 So. 2d 65, 67 (La. 1976); People v. Mazzone, 74 Ill. 2d 44, 48, 383 N.E.2d 947 (1978).