(dissenting).
I regretfully dissent.
This is the first opportunity we have had to construe a statute which gives teachers the right to bargain collectively. I fear that the construction placed upon it by the majority will make that important statute meaningless.
I agree that we should construe statutes which appear to be in conflict so as to make them meaningful and reconcile them, if possible.
I believe that Section 15-47-27 and Chapter 15-38.1, N.D.C.C., are readily reconciled without conflict. Section 15 — 47-27 provides, in essence, that a school board contemplating nonrenewal of a teacher’s contract must so notify her or him by April 15. If such notice is not given, the school board has thereby made an implicit offer to continue the contract on the same terms for another year. An offer of a contract, whether explicit or implicit, must be accepted by the teacher by May 15. If a notice of nonrenewal is given and adhered to, no offer of employment is made. If it is given and the contract is later offered and accepted, or if it is not given and the implicit offer is accepted, a contract results. Pollock v. McKenzie County School District, 221 N.W.2d 521 (N.D.1974); Huso v. Bismarck Public School Board, 219 N.W.2d 100 (N.D.1974). Beyond this — and beyond May 15, unless that date is extended by the parties — Section 15-47-27 has no effect at all.
What has this to do with the collective-bargaining law, Chapter 15-38.1, N.D.C.C.? Very little or nothing, in my opinion.
The collective-bargaining law contains these principal requirements:
1. Teachers and administrators have the right to form organizations to represent them (Sec. 15-38.1-07, subsec. 1).
2. Such organizations have the right to represent the negotiating unit in negotia*835tions with the school board (Sec. 15-38.1-08).
3. The representation shall include terms and conditions of employment, including salary (Sec. 15-38.1-09).
4. The school board and the negotiating unit have a duty to negotiate in good faith with regard to terms and conditions of employment (Sec. 15-38.1-12, subsec. 1, par. a).
(I pass over the provisions as to selection of bargaining units, since both parties here agree that the plaintiff is the bargaining unit for Edgeley teachers, and the provisions as to impasse procedures, since they are not binding and have not been invoked by either side.)
So far as the provisions summarized above are concerned, it seems clear to me that there is a duty to negotiate in good faith, and that the duty is unrelated to the provisions of Section 15-47-27. Particularly is this true if the negotiations continue' after May 15, as they did in Edgeley, since Section 15-47-27 becomes irrelevant after that date.
The collective-bargaining statute differs from some other similar statutes in some respects: (1) there is a no-strike provision (Sec. 15-38.1-14, subsec. 1); (2) teachers and administrators have the right to refuse to join or participate in the activities of the organization (Sec. 15-38.1-07, subsec. 2); (3) a teacher or administrator has the right to present his views directly to the school board;1 (4) there is a general provision, quoted in the majority opinion, that “nothing contained herein is intended to or shall conflict with, contravene, abrogate, or diminish the powers, authority, duties, and responsibilities vested in boards of education by the statutes and laws of the state of North Dakota.” Sec. 15-38.1-14, subsec. 2, N.D.C.C.
Without the provision last cited, the entirety of Chapter 15-38.1 is consistent, clear, and comprehensible. With the provision last cited, it is either a nullity or incomprehensible. It is impossible for a statute relating to collective bargaining to be effective if it cannot diminish or conflict with the prior powers or authority of one of the parties to the bargaining. The new law either is effective, in which case it must affect the prior rights and authority of the parties to the bargaining, or the new law is a nullity. The majority opinion chooses to give overriding effect to the provision which makes it a nullity. I would prefer to interpret the Act in such a way as to make the entire Act effective, rather than ineffective.
I would read the provision last quoted in the sense in which it must have been intended: so as to provide that nothing contained in the chapter “shall conflict with, contravene, abrogate, or diminish the powers, authority, duties, and responsibilities vested in boards of education by the statutes and laws of the state of North Dakota” except to the extent specifically provided therein.
Such a reading is required in order to make sense of the statute, and to give effect to every part of it.
When so read, we have a comprehensible statute providing a method of collective bargaining. Under general principles of collective bargaining, “good faith” bargaining has a specific meaning. One thing that cannot be done in good-faith bargaining is to deal individually with members of bargaining units. This is, under general case law, an unfair labor practice [Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 64 S.Ct. 830, 88 L.Ed. 1007 (1944)], even in the absence of bad faith [NLRB v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. of Miami, 449 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied 407 U.S. 910, 92 S.Ct. 2434, 32 L.Ed.2d 683].
*836In this case, not only did the employer deal individually with the employees represented by the bargaining unit, but the employer issued ultimatums to each of them. To make matters worse, the trial court, by ordering the employees to sign contracts by a certain date or lose their rights, put the weight of the courts on one side of the scale while bargaining was still proceeding.
I would redress the balance by reversing and remanding with instruction to grant the injunction prayed for by the plaintiff association.
*837vides an opportunity to screen out false and groundless accusations. SDCL 23-27-16.
. Note that there is no reciprocal right of the school board to present its views to. individual teachers. N.D.C.C. § 15-38.1-08.