This is a suit for damages arising out of an automobile accident. Appellant John Meo brought this action in the Circuit Court of Lee County against appellee, Eugene Miller, and the jury returned a verdict for the defendant-appellee. We have concluded that the case must be reversed and remanded for a new trial, because the verdict is against the great weight of the evidence.
The events in question occurred on February 5, 1954. Meo with his wife and child in his Pontiac automobile was driving north in Lee County on U. S. Highway No. *1445. He had left his home in Pensacola, Florida, early that morning, and apparently was driving to Chicago. Highway 45 is a 20-foot paved highway running north and south. The Saltillo Road is a black-topped road which crosses Highway 45 diagonally from northeast to southwest. The accident occurred at this intersection. On Highway 45 about 800 to 1000 feet south of the intersection is a bridge. Meo was driving north in his Pontiac and was either on or immediately north of the bridge when he saw Miller’s Chevrolet pickup truck stop on the east side of the highway facing west.
Meo was driving around 45 to 50 miles an hour as he approached the intersection. The great weight of the evidence reflects that, when he got within 60 to 100 feet of it, Miller in his pickup truck abruptly pulled out in front of him to cross the highway and go southwest on the Saltillo Road. Just before Miller pulled out Meo blew his horn. When the pickup truck pulled in front of Meo at this short distance away, Meo immediately put on his brakes and turned to the right to avoid Miller’s truck. The Pontiac turned on to the gravel and dirt shoulder of the road. Miller’s truck occupied at least part of the east side of the highway as Meo’s car swerved to the rear of the pickup. There was no collision, but Meo’s Pontiac car ran off the shoulder and turned over in the ditch about 35 to 40 feet north of the Saltillo Road and east of Highway 45. As a result, plaintiff was injured.
The pertinent statute is Mississippi Code of 1942, Section 8197: “Vehicle entering through highway or stop intersection. — (a) The driver of a vehicle shall stop as required by this Act at the entrance to a through highway and shall yield the right of way to other vehicles which have entered the intersection from said through highway or which are approaching so closely on said through highway as to constitute an immediate hazard, but said driver having so yielded may proceed and the drivers of all other vehicles approaching the intersection *15on said through, highway shall yield the right of way to the vehicle so proceeding into or across the through highway.
“(b) The driver of a vehicle shall likewise stop in obedience to a stop sign as required herein at an intersection where a stop sign is erected at one or more entrances thereto although not a part of a through highway and shall proceed cautiously, yielding to vehicles no (not) so obliged to stop which are within the intersection or approaching so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard, but may then proceed.”
Although the defendant’s testimony warranted submitting the case to the jury, we think that the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Briefly stated, that evidence shows that Miller abruptly pulled out in front of Meo’s car at a time when Meo was “approaching so closely on said through highway as to constitute an immediate hazard”, as provided in Section 8197.
With reference to the time when Miller pulled out on the highway, plaintiff said that he was 30 to 40 feet from the intersection when Miller came out. His wife said that Miller drove out when they were 50 feet from the intersection. Three disinterested and unimpeached local witnesses for the plaintiff substantially corroborated their testimony. Frank Morrow, Bill Baines and Claude Baines all of Saltillo were standing at the south end of the gasoline pumps at Pyle’s filling station and store located on the southeast corner of this intersection. They saw what happened. Morrow said that when Meo was about 100 feet from the pickup he sounded his horn, and defendant started to move out on the highway when Meo’s car was about 100 feet away. Bill Baines said that the Pontiac was 60 to 80 feet down the highway from the intersection when the pickup started pulling out on the highway. Claude Baines testified that immediately after Meo blew his horn Miller pulled into the intersection and on the highway, when Meo’s car was 70 to *1680 feet away, Guy Hovis, a state highway patrolman, testified that he arrived at the scene shortly after the accident, and there was nothing there to indicate an excessive speed on the part of Meo; that he talked to Miller, who told him that “he started out on the highway and he saw this car coming and he thought he would have time to beat it across the road.”
As to the speed of Meo’s car, plaintiff testified that he was driving 45 miles an hour, his wife said 50 to 60 miles per hour, Morrow said 45 to 50, Bill Raines said 40 to 50, and Claude Raines said 45 to 50 miles per hour. Hovis, the highway patrolman, said that he examined the skidmarks of the Pontiac, and that there was nothing to indicate excessive speed on the part of Meo.
With reference to the location of Miller’s pickup truck on the highway at the time the Pontiac avoided the collision by driving to the east and rear of the pickup, plaintiff testified that Miller pulled out and stopped in the middle of the highway, covering part of both sides of the road. Mrs. Meo corroborated her husband’s testimony to this effect. Prank Morrow testified that part of the pickup was in the west lane and part was in the east lane of the highway when Meo went through the intersection; that the front wheels of the pickup were at the edge of the pavement on the west side, and the back of the pickup was across the centerline, manifestly on the east side. Bill Raines said that the pickup was on the highway when Meo came through the intersection, and since the highway was 20 feet in width, this necessarily means that the rear of the pickup was on part of the east or Meo’s side. Claude Raines said that Miller pulled on to the highway when Meo was 70 to 80 feet from him, and that the Miller car turned to the right on two wheels, necessarily to avoid the Miller pickup, which obviously means that Miller’s truck was blocking part of the east lane when Meo’s car came through the intersection.
*17A brief summary, therefore, of appellant’s evidence, not only by himself and his wife, but also by three disinterested local witnesses, who are the only ones to actually see all of the events, is that Miller pulled out on the highway directly in front of Meo’s car, which was traveling 40 to 50 miles an hour (his wife said 50 to 60), at a time when the Meo car was only 60 to 100 feet from the intersection; that when the Meo ear passed through the intersection the truck was occupying a part of the east or Meo’s right side of the highway, and Meo had to turn to the right quickly to avoid a collision. In other words, according to appellant’s evidence, Miller pulled out on the highway when Meo’s car was entirely too close to the intersection and when it constituted an immediate hazard within the meaning of Code Section 8197.
Appellee relies principally upon his testimony and that of Mrs. Lynette Sullivan. Miller said that he had been to Saltillo to buy some fertilizer; that he drove up to the highway, stopped, looked up and down the road,- and saw a car below the bridge, 800 to 1000 feet south; that he saw some ladies get out of a car parked near the filling station on the southeast corner; and that he went out in the road and “when I looked I saw the car was closer and I went in low and done all I could. ’ ’ He said that he pulled out on the road after he looked both north and south; and that he was in the road when he saw plaintiff’s car ‘ ‘ really flying looked to me like, ... looked like 75 or 80 miles to me. I just floor-boarded it in low to get out of the way.” After he crossed, he looked back and saw the Meo car off the road. He admitted that he could not estimate the plaintiff’s speed, but he could tell he was coming fast. He denied that he waved to the ladies getting out of their car, but indicated he spoke to them. He said that he heard the horn blow, and that he was “about the center of the highway” when the horn started, that “he was pretty darn close.” In other words, Miller himself admitted that plaintiff’s car was close on him when he reached the center part of the highway, *18and that when the horn started he was in the center. He did not know when plaintiff blew his horn, but the only three witnesses who observed that and the location of the cars at the time placed Meo only 60 to 100 feet from the intersection when he blew his horn, at which point Miller pulled out on the highway. Appellee’s evidence does not contradict that position of Meo’s car at that time. So defendant’s own testimony places him in the middle of the highway when plaintiff’s car was only 60 to 100 feet from him.
Mrs. Sullivan testified that she had stopped at the service station on the southeast corner, and she saw Miller drive up to the intersection and stop, and wave at them; that she did not know whether Miller looked to the south or to the north and did not know the speed of Meo’s car. Mrs. Sullivan said that Miller stopped at the intersection “a good bit”, and that then he started out on the highway. She stated that when the Meo car came by the truck was half way across the road, past the center line, when Meo’s car missed it. She did not see the Meo car coming “until he was missing the back of Miller’s truck.” Mrs. Sullivan therefore had no knowledge of the speed of Meo’s car, and did not know how far from the intersection Meo’s car was when the truck pulled out on the highway. So she does not contradict appellant’s witnesses in those respects. She does say that the truck was past the center line when the Meo car came by, but that is not consistent with appellee’s own testimony, and is contradicted by the great weight of the evidence, including the physical facts and the testimony not only of plaintiff and his wife, but of three disinterested local witnesses who testified for plaintiff.
Defendant also offered as a witness Tom McCarty. He did not see the accident, but was a quarter of a mile west of it driving east on the Saltillo Road. He said a horn blew “like it was stuck”, and that after he arrived he saw skidmarks of the Pontiac for 50 to 75 feet; that from what he saw the car went clear of the em*19bankment for 20 to 25 feet, and then struck the ground. However, his testimony is not directed to the crucial issue in this case, namely, whether Miller pulled out on the highway at a time when Meo’s car was so close to the intersection as to constitute an immediate hazard. The great weight of the evidence indicates that Miller did this at a time when Meo’s car, driving at a legal rate of speed, was only 60 to 100 feet from the intersection, and that when appellant’s car crossed the intersection appellee’s truck was occupying part of the east lane. Although appellee’s evidence was sufficient to prevent the granting of a peremptory instruction to the plaintiff on liability, for the above stated reasons we think that the overwhelming weight of the evidence is contrary to the verdict rendered, so the case must be reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Jones v. Carter, 192 Miss. 603, 7 So. 2d 519 (1942), is not controlling here, because the Court found in that case that “the defendant’s car had necessarily entered on the intersection to cross the same when the other car first came in sight 468 feet away.” In the instant case, the great weight of the evidence reflects that the defendant’s car entered the intersection when the plaintiff’s car was only 60 to 100 feet away, thereby constituting an immediate hazard under Section 8197. Compare in this respect Davidian v. Wendell, 37 So. 2d 570, 771 (Miss. 1948); Avent v. Tucker, 188 Miss. 207, 194 So. 596 (1940); see also Baird v. Harrington, 202 Miss. 112, 30 So. 2d 82 (1947); Jefferson v. Pinson, 69 So. 2d 234 (Miss. 1954).
We have considered carefully the other assignments of error, and find that there is no merit in them.
Beversed and remanded.
McGehee, G.J., and Boberds, Hall and Arrington, JJ., concur.