(dissenting).
The majority has jumped the gun in deciding this case. An appellate court may affirm a trial court’s sustaining of a defendant’s summary judgment motion only if there is no genuine issue of material fact and judgment can be granted as a matter of law. Here, there is a genuine issue of fact and the controlling legal principle may well be conditioned on the fact determination.
The borrower, Jackson, claims that P.C.A. in the past had allowed him to sell hogs and apply the proceeds to purchasing feed. The affidavit of Charles Celania states that sale of collateral grain and livestock was conditional on the borrower bringing all proceeds from these sales to the P.C.A. A clear issue of fact is presented as to what was the prior course of dealing. A trial is mandated to decide this issue.
In Lisbon Bank & Trust Co. v. Murray, 206 N.W.2d 96 (Iowa 1973), the supreme court carefully postponed until another day a determination of what would be the effect of a prohibition against sale of collater*804al without written consent. That day arrived with the decision in Hedrick Savings Bank v. Myers, 229 N.W.2d 252 (Iowa 1975), where the court held that a prior course of dealing may constitute authority to sell pledged collateral under the “otherwise” language of Section 554.9306(2). In He-drick, however, the court found the facts indicated that the prior course of dealing constituted authority to sell the collateral. The court carefully pointed out that it had not decided whether the lender had waived its rights to the proceeds of sales by failing to apply the proceeds of other collateral to satisfy the indebtedness. We should be equally careful here because it is evident that the facts to which the law must be applied have not even been determined.
The case should be remanded for trial.