(dissenting).
The result in this case is extremely harsh and, more than that, counterproductive to the achievement of certain stated purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines, such as equity in sentencing and the use of the least restrictive sanction necessary to achieve the purposes of a sentence. State v. Garcia, 302 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Minn.1981).
Defendant, a 40-year-old woman with a husband and two children, wrote unauthorized checks on her attorney-employer’s account over an apparently unaudited 4-year period and obtained $39,596 before the theft was discovered. While her own family lived in a rented house in humble circumstances, she sent the money she wrongfully took to two brothers who terrified her. These brothers, who were harassing and pressuring her for money, had followed her and her family from Ohio to California, had beaten her badly in the past, and now threatened to come to New Ulm. Her irrational fear led to the criminal course of conduct, “to remorse, regret and sorrow,” as she expressed it to the court, and to incarceration.
There are two victims in this case, the attorney, who doubtless had insurance to cover such a loss, and the defendant. With no prior criminal record, with no prior contact with the criminal justice system, Mary Moore was treated as a repeat offender, as a hardened criminal. In the exercise of his discretion, the prosecutor charged each of eight check forgeries within a 3-month period as a single behavioral incident of aggravated forgery, aggregating her criminal history score from zero to 7 in a single prosecution. He might have aggregated those eight checks into a single charge of theft over $2500, a severity level IV offense, with a single sentence. See State v. Lalli, 338 N.W.2d 419 (Minn.1983).
The trial court, even using the Hernandez method to arrive at a criminal history score of 6 or more, as the majority finds proper, could have departed dispositionally, under the facts and circumstances here involved and stayed imposition of sentence, equaliz*675ing somewhat the disparity in charging. This the court refused to do, even though he noted, “This is not to say but what it’s true you have no prior record. It’s not to say but what you felt you were under duress. It’s not to say but what, as your lawyer points out, you did not personally get the money.” The court imposed a sentence of 27 months in prison, to be followed by 30 years on probation conditioned on total restitution of $39,596 at $110 per month.
We have held that the commission of a major economic offense justifies increasing the length of the prison term on conviction. State v. Rott, 313 N.W.2d 574, 575 (Minn.1981). Mary Moore did commit a major economic offense. Even so, she should not be sentenced more harshly than others committing similar major economic offenses. Janet Bowley, a bookkeeper, stole over $28,-000 by entering false totals in the daily cash register over a period of 19 months. State v. Bowley, 322 N.W.2d 610 (Minn.1982). She was convicted on one count of theft over $2500 and placed on straight probation for 10 years, with the requirement that she make restitution. Mary Moore was convicted of eight aggravated forgeries and sentenced to two concurrent executed sentences of 27 months and up to 30 years probation conditioned on full restitution of $39,596 at $110 per month.1 Jacqueline Rott, with three prior misdemeanor theft-by-check convictions, stole between $1600 and $20,000, using false identifications in a check-writing scheme over a 5-month period. State v. Rott. Pleading guilty to five counts of theft by check over $150, she was sentenced to five concurrent 3-year prison terms, a departure from the 1 year and a day stayed presumptive sentence. We held that execution of sentence was justified because of the defendant’s prior failure on probation but reduced the 3-year concurrent sentences durationally to 2 years or 24 months, a doubling of the presumptive sentence. Mary Moore, with no prior criminal history and no prior failures on probation, was sentenced to prison for 27 months. There is no equity in sentencing here, nor is there any indication that incarceration is necessary to achieve the purpose of the sentence. Rather, the record demonstrates that Mary Moore, remorseful, working two jobs at the time of sentencing, will bend every effort to make restitution as she has agreed, although it appears that full restitution is more than she should be required to make in light of her slim resources, even though she is willing. If punishment is deemed necessary, she has been punished more than enough.
As we stated in State v. Kraft, 326 N.W.2d 840, 842 (Minn.1982), “We have the power, if circumstances warrant, to modify a sentence given by the trial court, even if the sentence is within the presumptive sentence range.” We should exercise that power in this case by modifying the sentence given by the trial court to a probated sentence, give Mary Moore credit for time served and release her from prison.
. The majority opinion strikes down the 30 years deferred probation but upholds full restitution.