I respectfully dissent for several reasons. First and foremost, there exists binding authority for the proposition that changes in the method of tax collection that alter the nature of collection from an in rem to an in personam action are unconstitutional to the extent that they apply retroactively, i.e., to taxes previously assessed. Second, statutes governing the collection of taxes are to be strictly construed with all doubts to be construed in favor of the taxpayer. Contrary to the majority’s assertions, the 1974 charter provisions at issue are far from clear on the issue whether the charter provides for, or even preserves the right to utilize, methods of tax collection other than the judicial sale method provided in charter § 8-403. In fact, I am persuaded that the clear intent of the charter’s ratifiers was to limit the method of tax collection to the judicial sale set forth in § 8-403. Third, careful analysis of the historical backdrop provides, if implicitly, a strong policy reason for limiting plaintiff’s tax collection powers. Although this Court’s inquiry could more appropriately be decided without resort to policy arguments, I offer a plausible reason for the ratifiers’ intent to limit plaintiff’s tax collection powers. Thus, the language at issue is ambiguous at best. In turn, resort to a construction in favor of the taxpayer is in order.
i
A
It is important to understand the history and the mechanics of the tax lien in the area of real property law. The first step is to distinguish real and personal property taxes from other forms of taxation such as the excise tax. Property taxes are assessments on real and personal property within a specific territory, measured in proportion to its *707value, and whose obligation for payment is absolute.1 In contrast, an excise tax is a "privilege” tax that is not imposed directly upon persons or property,2 but that is instead levied on activities that are voluntarily assumed to the degree to which the privilege is exercised.3 Accordingly, it has generally been said that property taxes burden the property assessed, but do not constitute personal debts of an individual in the ordinary sense.4
A taxpayer’s proportionate share of debt for the general revenue is secured only by property owned at the time a lien attaches and only on property located within the taxing district.5 6To be sure, the taxing legislature may secure the payment of de*708linquent taxes with real or personal property.6 However, a line of demarcation has been drawn between the right of seizure and sale of real or personal property and a personal obligation for taxes that permits a lawsuit for the collection of delinquent taxes, i.e., an in personam action.7 While some states permit in personam actions for the collection of delinquent tax liability,8 the general rule indicates that no personal action will lie against a delinquent taxpayer at law or in equity.9 As one author has stated:
Generally, . . . the rule developed that in the absence of an explicit statutory provision, no personal action will lie to recover property taxes. These holdings are grounded on the theory that taxes are not debts, or in the view that since the statute provides only for proceedings in rem, personal liability is not imposed. [Hellerstein, State and Local Taxation (3d ed), p 702. Emphasis added.]
Another source provide:
*709In the absence of constitutional restrictions, the legislature has plenary power to make any change in the method of collecting taxes, but the amendment ... of a statute providing for the levy and collection of taxes will not operate retrospectively so as to affect unpaid taxes already due or pending proceedings for their collection .... [84 CJS, Taxation, § 642, p 1318. Emphasis added.]
Before turning to specific state law on the issues involved, it is instructive to review certain other general propositions that arise in this context. First, laws on taxation must be strictly construed, with any ambiguities to be decided in favor of the taxpayer.10 Second, statutes creating tax liens are not to be enlarged by construction.11 Finally, the method of collection that is prescribed by statute (or charter) is generally the exclusive method.12
B
This Court had the opportunity to address a similar issue nearly a century ago. In Grand Rapids v Lake Shore & M S R Co, 130 Mich 238; 89 NW 932 (1902), the Court was called on to determine whether an amendment of a city charter providing for personal liability could be applied to taxes for improvements to real property that had already been assessed. Six justices agreed that a change in collection methods from in rem to in personam could not apply retroactively. See also Weber v Detroit, 158 Mich 149; 122 NW 570 (1909) (a property owner could not be made personally liable for a special assessment tax created at a *710time when the city charter provided for enforcement only against real property).13
The majority attempts to avoid this precedent although it is dispositive.14 Whether plaintiff reserved the right to seize personal property in the applicable sections of the 1974 charter is the subject of later argument, but it cannot be gainsaid *711that the procedure described in § 8-403 is in the nature of an in rem proceeding.15
The Legislature amended MCL 211.47; MSA 7.91 to permit the filing of in personam actions against delinquent taxpayers by way of 1987 PA 177 and 1988 PA 202. Because the legislators did not create a specific provision for retroactive application of this new procedure, we may assume for purposes of this case that its application is prospective.16 *712While I agree that municipalities operating under the home rule cities act, MCL 117.1 et seq.; MSA 5.2071 et seq. and its predecessors17 are empowered to develop tax collection procedures that vary from those contained in MCL 211.47; MSA 7.91, I cannot agree that this discretion permits retroactive, in personam collection of delinquent taxes where it appears that all other municipalities would not have such power until 1987 and thereafter.18 More*713over, early cases that address a virtually identical issue mandate against retroactive application of a tax collection method that changes the nature of the liability from in rem to in personam. Grand Rapids and Weber, supra.
For all the foregoing reasons, I conclude that plaintiif is precluded from bringing an in personam action against property owners for the payment of delinquent property taxes for the time periods at issue under the doctrine of stare decisis.19
ii
The majority asserts that the relevant language contained in the 1974 charter clearly and unambiguously reserves the right to utilize any taxing authority permitted by the Legislature. While I agree that the language is clear, I disagree with the majority’s interpretation of that language.
The charter does contain several broad reservation-of-rights clauses.20 One of these clauses is found in the first provision of § 8-403.21 However, *714the reservation-of-rights clause that immediately precedes the judicial sale provision uses the term "[ejxcept as otherwise provided by this charter . . . In my opinion, the recitation of a single judicial sale mechanism, and the exclusion of other methods of tax collection permitted by state law, constitutes the type of provision contemplated by the language of § 8-403(1). In other words, § 8-403(6) "specifically provides otherwise” so that the reservation-of-rights clauses are nullified.
In addition, review of the charter comments regarding the provisions at issue is highly instructive. The comments provide, in pertinent part, as follows:
In two important respects, however, Detroit’s law and procedure is different from, and preferable to, the law and procedure of the state.
First, there is no counterpart in state law for the right granted Detroit property taxpayers to pay in 2 installments. Second, state law permits the sale of liens for delinquent property taxes to private tax title speculators, often to the great prejudice of the owner whose taxes are delinquent. Because of the abuses that can result, the Detroit treasurer, for some years, has not sold to private persons the City’s lien for delinquent City real property taxes but has collected those taxes himself. [Final Report of the Detroit Charter Revision Commission, Commentary to article 8, § 8-403, p 37. Emphasis added.][22]
*715In this quotation, the charter’s revisers made clear the intent to limit plaintiff’s tax collecting powers by specifically rejecting one method that was permitted under MCL 211.47; MSA 7.91. This language, which is the only source of concrete evidence of intent specifically relating to the tax collection provisions, manifests a singular intent: the limitation of powers otherwise permitted under state law. In light of the fact that the only evidence of intent specifically dealing with the collection of delinquent taxes evinces the desire to limit its power, I cannot agree with the majority that the broad reservation-of-rights clauses permit retroactive application of the in personam action.23
The most basic rule of statutory construction24 is that the intent of the Legislature is to be followed. Town & Country Dodge, Inc v Treasury Dep’t, 420 Mich 226, 240; 362 NW2d 618 (1984). Of equal importance to this case is the rule that a state may impose a tax only if it is expressly authorized by law. The authority to tax may not be inferred or extended by implication. Molter v Treasury Dep’t, 443 Mich 537, 543; 505 NW2d 244 (1993); Michigan Allied Dairy Ass’n v State Bd of Tax Administration, 302 Mich 643, 650; 5 NW2d 516 *716(1942); In re Dodge Bros, 241 Mich 665, 669; 217 NW 777 (1928); Triangle Land Co v Detroit, 204 Mich 442, 455; 170 NW 549 (1919); 3A Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction (5th ed), § 66.01, p l.25 In addition, ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of the taxpayer. Dodge Bros, supra.26 A specific remedy provided as the proper method of tax collection precludes the use of any other collection method unless specifically provided for. Bankers Trust Co of Detroit v Russell, 270 Mich 568, 571-572; 259 NW 328 (1935).27 Changing the nature of tax collection from in rem to in personam affects substantive rights. See ante, pp 707-709. Furthermore, tax collection provisions are to be strictly construed against the taxing authority.28
In my opinion, the language of the charter is clear on the point that plaintiff advocated a single method of tax collection and requires affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals. See Town & Country Dodge, supra. Even if the intent of the drafters and ratifiers is ambiguous, the great weight of authority requires a construction that favors the taxpayer. See Molter, Michigan Allied Dairy Ass’n, In re Dodge Bros, Triangle Land Co, and 3A Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction, supra. Despite the existence of several reservation-of-rights clauses, the charter provides for a single *717method collection and obligates courts to construe it as the exclusive method. Bankers Trust Co of Detroit, supra.29
III
A final question that the majority fails to address is why plaintiff would forgo the method of judicial sale provided in charter provision § 8-403 for nearly two decades and at a time when the real property subject to taxation was worth significantly more than the escalating delinquent tax liability.30 The fact that the instant lawsuits were filed after the 1987 and 1988 amendments of MCL 211.47; MSA 7.91 appears to indicate that plaintiff gave no thought to the possibility of an in personam action pursuant to its discretionary powers under the home rule cities act31 until § 47 of the General Property Tax Act was amended.
*718I am unaware of any evidence, outside the language of the charter itself, that explains the intent either of the charter’s drafters or its ratifiers on the issue whether plaintiff was entitled to utilize in personam methods of tax collection until this option was specifically adopted in the 1991 amendments of the charter. The majority presumes that the broad reservation-of-rights language in the preamble and in other areas of the charter, together with latent policy arguments that are not well defined in the majority’s opinion, entitles plaintiff to a judgment in its favor. In contrast, I am aware of another possibility that may explain why the drafters and the ratifiers of the 1974 charter failed to provide for in personam liability.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, large urban areas experienced an alarming exodus of residents and businesses32 that eroded their tax bases. Moreover, abandonment of property located within the city limits, and the inherent social evils that are thought to naturally follow, reached crisis levels.33 The City of Detroit was no exception.34 It is not outside the realm of possibility that the drafters and ratifiers of the 1974 charter had this in mind when the charter was enacted. The imposition of in personam liability for delinquent taxes, which would allow plaintiff to attach a new set of assets *719that includes intangibles such as bank accounts and even wage garnishment for the first time, may be an attractive method of tax collection today.35 However, the hint of this form of liability at the time when the 1974 charter was enacted could have had a disastrous effect on continued investment in real property located within city limits, which would have taken the form of even more widespread abandonment than actually occurred.
In the least, the foregoing analysis constitutes a plausible formulation of the drafters’ and ratifiers’ intent where there is little else to guide us. The fact that the ratifiers specifically abdicated one state right to protect real property owners, i.e., the right to sell land to title speculators, underscores the validity of this point. Thus, it is not possible to validly claim that the ratifiers’ intent on this narrow question, as evidenced by the language of § 8-403, only permits a single conclusion: that plaintiff had not only the authority to reserve such a right, but also that it clearly did so. At best, the intent that the majority attributes to the charter provision is ambiguous. Accordingly, construction against the taxing authority is in order pursuant to longstanding precedent. See In re Dodge Bros, supra; note 10 and accompanying text, ante, p 709.
iv
In conclusion, I cannot agree with the majority that plaintiff somehow preserved its right to retroactively assert in personam liability for delinquent taxes. I am convinced that the home rule cities act does not afford this degree of discretion, which would flout established constitutional principles *720and rules of construction. Moreover, I believe that the majority is allowing present concerns and policies to guide its conclusion when the appropriate form of inquiry demands attention to the political and economic climate at the time of the charter’s ratification. Accordingly, I conclude that plaintiff is entitled to collect delinquent taxes through a personal action only for taxes assessed after the 1991 amendment of the city charter.
Levin and Griffin, JJ., concurred with Riley, J.71 Am Jur 2d, State and Local Taxation, § 24, p 358.
Id., §28, pp 360-361.
Id., §§ 28-29, pp 360-362. See also Dooley v Detroit, 370 Mich 194, 204-206; 121 NW2d 724 (1963) (upholding Detroit’s income tax ordinance as an excise tax); Continental Motors Corp v Muskegon Twp, 376 Mich 170, 180; 135 NW2d 908 (1965) ("A basic distinction between an ad valorem property tax and an excise tax is that the former is regarded as primarily in rem in nature while the latter is regarded as in personam in nature”).
See, generally, 71 Am Jur 2d, State and Local Taxation, § 5, pp 345-346; 72 Am Jur 2d, State and Local Taxation, § 836, pp 142-143, § 869, pp 170-171. See also Rockwell, Easement, servitude, or covenant as affected by sale for taxes, 7 ALR5th 187, §2, p 202; 1 Cooley, Taxation (4th ed), § 22, p 88.
In his landmark treatise on taxation, Justice Cooley defined the relationship between taxpayer, tax, and the taxpayer’s property as follows:
The individual, and not his property, pays the tax. The property is resorted to for the purpose of ascertaining the amount of the tax with which the owner must be charged, and for the purpose of enforcing payment when the owner shall be legally in default in paying at the time stipulated by law. [Id., § 24, p 93. Emphasis added.]
In other words, property provides a basis for assessment of a particular taxpayer’s share of the tax burden, and it also provides security for the payment thereof. With this form of enforcement in place, the questions arise whether and when other methods of enforcement are permissible or even necessary.
3 Cooley, n 4 supra, § 1235, pp 2458-2459.
See id., § 39, pp 118-122. However, Justice Cooley notes inherent problems with the taxation of personal property. Review of these reasons makes clear some of the likely reasons why plaintiff has not engaged in proceedings to collect back taxes by seizing and selling personal property and why it now prefers an in personam remedy rather than the procedure for distress clearly permitted under state law.
See also id., § 1327, p 2624 ("the power of the legislature to make taxes assessed against real or personal property is unquestioned”); § 1323, pp 2612-2613 ("So far as personal property is concerned, nearly every kind is subject to compulsory process, so far as found within the tax district, provided it is within the terms of the tax statute providing what personalty shall be subject and provided it is not expressly exempted”) (emphasis added). Cf. 72 Am Jur 2d, n 4 supra, § 868, p 169 ("nothing can be taken under a distress [action] but tangible property capable of seizure and sale, and . . . intangible property, such as shares of stock in corporations, . . . cannot lawfully be taken on distress”).
3 Cooley, n 4 supra, § 1327, pp 2624-2625.
Id., p 2625.
Id., § 1329, pp 2626-2627.
2 Cooley, n 4 supra, § 503, pp 1113-1119. But see id., § 504, pp 1120-1122, collecting cases for the opposite proposition. See also 72 Am Jur 2d, n 4 supra, § 866, p 168 (tax collection provisions are also to be strictly construed against the taxing authority).
3 Cooley, n 4 supra, § 1230, p 2452.
Id., § 1326, p 2621; 72 Am Jur 2d, n 4 supra, § 870, pp 171-172.
Cf. Lucking v Ballantyne, 132 Mich 584; 94 NW 8 (1903), superseded by statute as stated in Michigan Nat’l Bank v Auburn Hills, 193 Mich App 109; 483 NW2d 436 (1992) (taxes assessed on tangible personal property could not be enforced retroactively, but rather could only be applied prospectively under the terms of the existing Detroit City Charter). See, also, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel Martin v Stone, 279 Ky 243; 130 SW2d 750 (1939) (real estate taxes are not collectible by suit unless a personal action is expressly authorized, and the statute finally imposing personal liability was not given retroactive effect).
Careful review of the authorities cited in the majority opinion makes clear their inapplicability to the issue at hand. In Hansen-Snyder Co v General Motors Corp, 371 Mich 480; 124 NW2d 286 (1963), ante, p 698, this Court treated the extension of a lien filing date as procedural. However, the nature of the remedy, i.e., a mechanic’s lien to secure payment for materials and services supplied, was unchanged. Stott v Stott Realty Co, 288 Mich 35; 284 NW 635 (1939), ante, p 699, involved a corporate privilege tax rather than a real property tax, which, as provided earlier, varies with the level of prescribed activity. See also Taxpayers United v Detroit, 196 Mich App 463, 466; 493 NW2d 463 (1992), ante, p 702 (utility tax), and Ludka v Treasury Dep’t, 155 Mich App 250; 399 NW2d 490 (1986), ante, p 703 (income tax). Hanes & Co v Wadey, 73 Mich 178, 181; 41 NW 222 (1889), ante, p 703, concerned a lienholder’s inability to use the previously mandated form of lien collection, i.e., the amendment of a statute did not retroactively preserve the old method of collection that was more favorable to the lienholder. It had nothing to do with the retroactive application of a new form of tax collection. In Webster v Auditor General, 121 Mich 668; 80 NW 705 (1899), ante, p 703, this Court unanimously agreed that a change in the interest rate charged for delinquent taxes as a condition to redemption before judicial sale could be applied retroactively. Because the choice to redeem was discretionary, property owners were not obligated to pay the interest charge or the increase. Moreover, it is clear that the purpose of the increase was to defray the costs incurred by seizing real property for delinquent taxes only to have the property redeemed before sale. Id. at 671. Thus, the purpose was to ensure recoupment of costs incurred in the judicial sale process rather than secure payment of the delinquent tax liability through the use of a new form of collection.
See Detroit v O’Connor, 302 Mich 531, 535; 5 NW2d 453 (1942) (tax foreclosure proceedings under the existing city charter were in rem actions); Thompson v Auditor General, 261 Mich 624, 649, 657; 247 NW 360 (1933). See also United States v Michigan, 346 F Supp 1277, 1280 (ED Mich, 1972) ("The law in Michigan is explicit in stating that the enforcement of an ad valorem tax is an in rem proceeding against the property rather than the owner”). There are cases that may be cited for the proposition that city taxes are personal to the landowner. While this is true, it does not support the proposition that actions to collect delinquent taxes are in personam in nature. For example, in Gulf Refining Co v Perry, 303 Mich 487; 6 NW2d 756 (1942), this Court stated that a tax assessment was a debt due to the City of Lansing for which the defendants were responsible. However, the Court went on to indicate that collection was to be had under a state law permitting seizure and sale of personal property. Clearly, the case involves an action for distress and sale of personal property, which is not the same as an in personam action.
In Gilken Corp v Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 176 F2d 141, 143 (CA 6, 1949), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit noted that the existing Detroit City Charter " 'makes the tax a debt of the owner . . . .’” However, that case involved the question who is entitled to an exemption for the payment of state taxes under federal tax law. In other words, the case had nothing to do with the nature of the debt or the assets securing it. Cf. United States v Michigan, supra.
Finally, the majority’s attempt to distinguish this line of authority by interpreting Mogg v Hall, 83 Mich 576; 47 NW 553 (1890), is unavailing. While an 1885 amendment of the relevant statute may have "cured” the defect, even a casual reading of Mogg only permits a single conclusion: the "cure” could not be applied retroactively. In the Court’s own words,
This act [the 1885 amendment creating personal liability] could not have the retrospective action contemplated .... Taxes levied after the act went into effect may properly be made a personal claim, but the rejected taxes of 1884, reassessed under the act of 1885, cannot, in our opinion, be made a personal claim against the owner of the land. [83 Mich 582.]
See Selk v Detroit Plastic Products, 419 Mich 1, 9; 345 NW2d 184 (1984).
*712In Municipal Investors Ass’n v Birmingham, 298 Mich 314, 325; 299 NW 90 (1941), this Court had the following to say about the intent behind amendments to the statutes providing for judicial sale of real property for delinquent taxes:
The clear import of the language of the foregoing amendatory enactments, and the obvious intent and purpose of the legislature to relieve owners from the weight of accumulated obligation . . . must lead one to the conclusion that when title to [real property] became absolute in the State of Michigan upon expiration of the period of redemption provided by the tax law free of all taxes and other liens and incumbrances of whatever kind or nature, and future and deficiency as well as past assessments and taxes were cancelled. To hold otherwise would defeat the purpose of this remedial legislation .... [Citation omitted.]
The remedial purpose alluded to by the Municipal Investors majority had two important facets. The first was to ensure a method of payment of property taxes assessed to support the general welfare. The second was to protect landowners from the accumulation of significant tax liability through the mechanism of judicial sale.
“The primary and inducing purpose of the legislation was to secure a portion of the unpaid taxes, rather than nothing, and to restore lands to a taxpaying basis, instead of supinely allowing them to accumulate tax delinquencies . . . .” [Id. at 321, quoting Baker v State Land Office Bd, 294 Mich 587, 606; 293 NW 763 (1940).]
In light of the pronouncement of legislative intent by this Court, together with the complete lack of any language on retroactivity in 1987 PA 177 and 1988 PA 202, I am convinced that the novel in personam action was intended to have prospective effect.
See ante, pp 689-690.
Cf. Schaefer v Woodmere Cemetery Ass’n, 256 Mich 332, 333; 239 NW 300 (1931) (courts are without jurisdiction to entertain personal lawsuits for the collection of general property taxes and special *713assessments in the absence of statutory authority); Boekeloo v Hodel, 828 F2d 727, 732 and ns 4-5 (CA Fed, 1987) ("All authorities agree that the tax 'debt’ is not enforceable against a former property owner except as explicitly provided by statute. Michigan provides only for enforcement of real property taxes against the taxed property or the 'debtor’s’ personal property”); In re Diamond Reo Trucks, Inc, 1 Bankr 57, 58 (WD Mich, 1979) (a county could not collect tax deficiencies on real property from a bankrupt lessor that remained after judicial sale); OAG, 1928-1930, pp 426-431 (June 7, 1929).
See People v Jamieson, 436 Mich 61, 79; 461 NW2d 884 (1990) ("principles of law deliberately examined and decided by a court of competent jurisdiction become precedent which should not be lightly departed”) (opinion of Brickley, J.).
See ante, p 691, n 9.
See ante, p 686, n 3. The majority states that there is no express limitation contained in § 8-403 that would limit plaintiff’s tax collecting powers to the judicial sale method found in § 8-403(6). However, tax collection statutes are to be construed against the taxing authority, and they are not to be enlarged by judicial construction. See ns 10 *714and 11 and accompanying text. Thus, an express limitation is not required to find in favor of defendants.
In Detroit v Safety Investment Corp, 288 Mich 511; 285 NW 42 (1939), this Court upheld the plaintiff’s authority to create the mechanism of judicial sale to the city under the home rule act. In so ruling, our brothers noted that the procedure for foreclosure and sale to the city for unpaid taxes was no different than the provisions of the General Property Tax Act but for the party initiating the foreclosure proceedings. Id. at 517. Because there was no substantive change in *715the nature of the tax or its collection (except for the authority initiating the action), the provision in the city charter was afforded retroactive application.
The majority quotes from Safety Investment, supra, p 516, to highlight the evils of the old taxation system wherein " 'the careless and dishonest did not [pay their taxes].’ ” See ante, p 701. The new system simply secured the payment of taxes with real and personal property. It did not address the possibility of in personam liability. Thus, the evils considered therein and the liberal construction our brothers advocated have no bearing on the issue before us today.
Furthermore, I am disturbed by the majority’s failure to adequately explain how the discretion afforded under the home rule cities act permits plaintiff to avoid the general rule that statutes and amendments thereto are to be applied prospectively unless the Legislature provides otherwise.
As the majority properly notes, the rules of statutory construction apply to home rule charters. See ante, pp 690-691.
See ns 10-12 and accompanying text.
For a comprehensive discussion of the due process implications underlying the lien foreclosure process and the need for strict construction of statutes divesting citizens of property to satisfy tax debts, see Thompson v Auditor General, n 15 supra.
Before amendment, the rule regarding collection for taxes assessed on personal property was identical. See Detroit v Jepp, 52 Mich 458, 459; 18 NW 217 (1884) ("It has always been recognized as the law of this State, that where such a specific remedy is provided in the tax law as the proper method of collection, no suit will lie unless specifically provided for, and then only as so provided”).
See n 10.
In Bankers Trust Co, supra, p 572, a majority of this Court recognized only two methods of tax collection provided under the Detroit City Charter that existed in 1935. These two procedures were the judicial sale to the city treasurer and the distress and sale of goods and chattels as provided in 1929 CL 3431, 3438 (distant predecessors to the provisions of the General Property Tax Act that are involved in this case).
The tone of earlier cases indicates that the tax sale method adopted by the plaintiff in the earlier part of this century was intended to be the exclusive method. See, e.g., O’Connor, n 15 supra, p 533. In fact, our Court of Appeals concluded that the judicial sale method of collecting delinquent taxes was the sole method permitted by the 1974 charter and did not permit seizure of fire insurance proceeds even under a lien theory. Joy Management Co v Detroit, 176 Mich App 722, 736; 440 NW2d 654 (1989). I believe that the Joy Management decision indicates the proper resolution of this issue, and therefore I do not join in the majority’s conclusion that the decision was incorrect with regard to the analysis of the charter language.
See n 16.
In Joy Management Co, n 29 supra, the City of Detroit brought a claim to collect delinquent taxes against the plaintiff for fire insurance proceeds payable to the plaintiff for the destruction of its property. Although proceedings were filed before the amendment of MCL 211.47; MSA 7.91, the city claimed a lien on the proceeds to secure the payment of delinquent taxes. There is no indication that the city asserted in personam liability of the plaintiff in Joy Management.
See, generally, Cisneros, Interwoven Destinies: Cities and the Nation, in Interwoven Destinies: Cities and the Nation (New York: Norton & Co, 1993) (Cisneros, ed), pp 20, 25; Ginzberg, The Changing Urban Scene: 1960-1990 and Beyond, pp 33-44; Kasarda, Cities as places where people live and work: Urban change and neighborhood distress, pp 81-83, 87, 90-91, and the tables that follow.
See, generally, comment, Property abandonment in Detroit, 20 Wayne L R 845 (1974), and authorities cited therein. See also Hamilton, Homesteading urban America after Moore v Detroit: The constitutionality of Detroit’s nuisance abatement plan and its implications for urban homesteading legislation, 34 Wayne L R 1609, 1612-1615 (1988).
Id.
A ruling in favor of plaintiff under a personal liability theory would entitle it to collect judgments using any methods available to the public generally under the laws governing satisfaction of judgments. See MCL 600.6001 et seq.; MSA 27A.6001 et seq.