(concurring specially).
On original submission of the present case, S.C. 283, I concurred specially on procedural grounds to the effect that there should be an end to litigation, being of the conviction that we should not tolerate procedure which would permit a case to become a judicial football. In so concurring, however, I also expressed the view that I would have joined the dissent filed on deliverance of the original opinion had I been a member of this Court at that time. I am now convinced that the views expressed in my specially concurring opinion create a highly undesirable situation. While I voted with the majority to reverse and remand the case to the Court of Criminal Appeals with a mandate to affirm the conviction below, both bench and bar — including the Court of Criminal Appeals — by simple numerical count could determine that such result was in conflict with the expressed views of the majority of the members of the Supreme Court on the merits involved.
I am also convinced after further consideration that the Court of Criminal Appeals was in no wise acting in defiance, but rather its second opinion was a good faith effort to comply with the mandate of this Court.
For an excellent discussion of a trial court’s oral charge which was held not violative of Fifth Amendment rights in a possession of stolen property case, see Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 93 S.Ct. 2357, 37 L.Ed.2d 380 [1973].
Accordingly, I vote to grant the application for rehearing and concur with the opinion filed by Justice Bloodworth and affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals.