(concurring specialty)-
Although I agree with the majority’s ultimate conclusion, I write to emphasize that the claim should more appropriately be made against the insurance of the Scott Ohm’s vehicle, not Benike’s insurance, as the district court suggested.
An injury that occurs while going to the aid of a motor vehicle accident victim, as Benike did in this case, is a cost of motoring. Such an injury should therefore be compen-sable under the philosophy of the no-fault law. See Marklund v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins., 400 N.W.2d 337, 341 (Minn.App.1987) (goal of no-fault system is to allocate the costs of injuries resulting from motoring activities).
“Danger invites rescue” is a well-settled doctrine which developed for the benefit of an injured rescuer. The original wrongdoer, whose negligent conduct threatened harm to another, may be liable to the rescuer who was injured as a result of an attempt to avoid the threatened harm. Shafer v. Gaylord, 287 *468Minn. 1, 4, 176 N.W.2d 745, 747 (1970). The doctrine recognizes that where an attempt is being made to save human life or property, a reasonably prudent person will take greater risks than might ordinarily be justified. Henjum v. Bok, 261 Minn. 74, 77, 110 N.W.2d 461, 463 (1961). More succinctly, “danger invites rescue” and the wrong that imperils the victim is a wrong to the rescuer. Krause v. U.S. Truck Co., 787 S.W.2d 708, 711 (Mo.1990). What appellant asks us to hold is the reverse: rescue invites danger.
The rescue doctrine has corollary application here. The facts of this case are nearly identical to Arnold v. Northern States Power Co., 209 Minn. 551, 297 N.W. 182 (1941). In Arnold, the driver of an automobile collided with a utility pole causing live power lines to hang near the ground. The plaintiffs decedent came upon the accident scene and observed that a passenger had been thrown from the car. While attempting to go under the power lines to reach the victim, the plaintiffs decedent came in contact with one of the wires and was electrocuted. The supreme court held that the trial court properly instructed the jury on the “eminent peril rule” which allowed the jury to find that the plaintiffs decedent was not contributorily negligent. Id. at 558-59, 297 N.W. at 186-87. Thus, the plaintiffs decedent could recover against the vehicle driver.
Although the determination of fault is not at issue in the present case, the rescue doctrine lends support for the proposition that a person who is injured while rescuing a motor vehicle accident victim should recover against the insurance of the vehicle that necessitated the rescue effort, i.e. Ohm’s vehicle in the present case. There is sufficient causal connection between Ohm’s vehicle and Benike’s injury to apply the no-fault act. A contrary determination would leave a good Samaritan without any recourse and would disfavor the commendable human instinct of rendering aid to those in need. See id. at 559, 297 N.W.2d at 186.
Additionally, there was no intervening act in this case to break the causal connection. The issue is not whether the use of Benike’s ear ended when he exited the vehicle to enter the ditch. Rather, the question is whether the use of Ohm’s vehicle ended. An intervening act refers to later events; conditions existing and forces already in operation at the time of an actor’s conduct are not included within that term. Id. at 561-62, 297 N.W. at 188. In this ease, Benike’s actions were part of one continuous course of conduct to aid the victim. Thus, there was no act of independent significance to break the causal link between the use of Ohm’s automobile and Benike’s injury. Thus, Benike’s injuries arose out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle.
Accordingly, we should acknowledge the application of our time honored rule: danger invites rescue. To do otherwise would dishonor the doctrine and unnecessarily imperil anyone motivated by the angels of their better nature.