(concurring specially).
Because the children’s right to recover against the corporation clearly existed prior to the corporation’s dissolution and during the two years thereafter, I cannot accept the majority opinion’s rationale that the children’s right to recover never arose and therefore, there was no jurisdiction. This is not a matter of jurisdiction.
A much better basis for the reversal of the trial court’s opinion appears in the majority opinion itself at footnote 1, which states:
We note that this action was against the Dinkytown corporate entity only. The parents made a motion on April 10,1991 to amend the pleadings to include Kenneth and Clarine Black as individual defendants. This motion was never addressed by the trial court. The trial court directed judgment on the pleadings in favor of Dinky-town on April 18, 1991.
Footnote 1 makes it clear that the initial action was against the “Dinkytown corporate entity only.” Neither Kenneth nor Clarine Black were ever joined as individual defendants. Therefore, the present defendants, Kenneth and Clarine Black, cannot claim the benefit of the doctrine of res judicata under these circumstances. Although the causes of action may be similar, the parties are completely different. The Blacks have not yet been subjected once, much less twice, to this lawsuit. Therefore, factor (3) is missing. Additionally, factors (1) and (4) do not apply either because the issue decided in the former adjudication is not identical to the present issue and there was not a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in the prior adjudication, at least on the merits. Guardianship of Janke, 500 N.W.2d at 208-09; Black Hills Jewelry, 336 N.W.2d at 157.
HENDERSON, J., joins this special writing.