(dissenting).
I believe the laundry list of allowable advertising content is unnecessarily restrictive because it prohibits dissemination of basic information necessary for an informed judgment about the selection of an attorney and the protection of basic legal rights. As to the restrictions on technique, these are in fact a prescription for dullness, prohibiting all background music, dramatization, and other methods of stimulating viewer interest. It is undisputed that the effect of these limitations on technique is to substantially diminish the effectiveness of any television advertising. The combined effect of the rules is to inhibit dissemination of relevant information without a showing of a substantial state interest. This violates the free speech clause of the first amendment.
At the outset, we as lawyers must accept the reality that despite this perceived assault on the “professionalism” of the bar, and despite the exemption of commercial speech previously existing, lawyer advertising is here, and it is here in constitutional dimensions. It is here because of the Supreme Court interpretation of the free speech clause of the first amendment of the United States Constitution in both Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 97 S.Ct. 2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977) and In re R.M.J. 455 U.S. 191, 102 S.Ct. 929, 71 L.Ed.2d 64 (1982).
First amendment protection of commercial speech, while not as extensive as that accorded other forms of speech, is nevertheless broad in its reach, and the principles to be applied are quite straightforward. Central Hudson sets forth the four-part test we must apply:
(1) Do the ads concern an unlawful activity, or are they misleading? If the answer to either question is in the affirmative, first amendment protection is not allowed. If the answers to both questions are in the negative, the following tests apply:
(2) Is the governmental interest, asserted through these disciplinary rules, substantial?
(3) Does this regulation directly advance that governmental interest?
(4) Is the regulation more extensive than necessary to serve that interest?
See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557, 566, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 2351, 65 L.Ed.2d 341, 351 (1980).
Although the majority recognizes the Central Hudson test, the opinion does not make it clear whether first amendment protection is unavailable for the defendant’s advertisements because they are “misleading” under the first segment of the test or whether there is a substantial state interest which is directly advanced by those regulations under steps two and three of the Central Hudson test. I believe the majority is on shaky ground under either approach.
I. Are the Advertisements “Misleading. ”
It is interesting to note that the Committee’s own expert, Dr. Haynes, testified the ads were not in fact misleading, and that his survey group, which had actually viewed the ads, agreed. The Committee’s argument that they are deceitful is, in fact, an argument that they might mislead the viewer with respect to possible responsibility for court costs and with respect to the extent of the experience of Humphrey and Haas, which the Committee argues is minimal.
The majority specifically concludes that the chance of deceit is sufficient to deny first amendment protection “[wjithout suggesting that the advertisements here were deceitful” because “in the medium defendants chose [television] the public could well be misled by them.” It improvises on the four-prong test of Central Hudson by saying that because television is the medium, a mere chance of deceit is sufficient. That theory, however, is not suggested in Central Hudson nor in any other case.
The majority draws support for this theory solely from language taken from Bates which, the majority says “seems to clearly *573have recognized the electronic use of [sound, visual displays, and dramatization] as potentially misleading.” Bates, however, did not say there was more potential for abuse in electronic advertising, only that “the special problems of advertising on the electronic media will warrant special consideration.” Bates, 433 U.S. at 384, 97 S.Ct. at 2709, 53 L.Ed.2d at 836. Neither Bates nor the case it cited on this issue even mentioned any increased potential of the electronic media for misleading the public. See Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F.Supp. 582 (D.C.1971), aff'd sub nom, Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Kleindiest, 405 U.S. 1000, 92 S.Ct. 1289, 31 L.Ed.2d 472 (1972). Capital Broadcasting illustrates the sort of “special problems” referred to in Bates in connection with television advertising. Capital Broadcasting justified a different rule for television advertising, not because it was likely to be misleading, but because it was nonselec-tive. In effect, television was thought to be reaching too large an audience; children, who were being exposed to intensive cigarette advertising, were considered likely to be adversely affected by it.
Television advertising by lawyers, on the other hand, cannot be considered objectionable merely because television is nonselec-tive, and the rationale of Capital Broadcasting is inapposite. Yet, the majority seizes on Bates’ “special problems” language used in connection with the Court’s reference to Capital Broadcasting as authority for its broad assertion of power in restricting television advertising. I do not think this language of Bates was intended to grant such a broad exercise of state power.
I believe the Supreme Court has actually made it clear that regardless of the medium used, advertising must be more than “possibly” misleading in order to be denied first amendment protection. In In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 102 S.Ct. 929, 71 L.Ed.2d 64 (1982), the Court addressed the matter of untruthful advertising:
[T]he Court has made clear in Bates and subsequent cases that regulation — and imposition of discipline — are permissible where the particular advertising is inherently likely to deceive or where the record indicates that a particular form or method of advertising has in fact been deceptive.
Id. at 202, 102 S.Ct. at 937, 71 L.Ed.2d at 73-74 (Emphasis added.)
A further indication that more than a possibility of deceit would be required is found in R.M.J.’s discussion of two prior cases in which first amendment protection was denied for professional advertising or solicitation. In discussing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, 436 U.S. 447, 98 S.Ct. 1912, 56 L.Ed.2d 444 (1978), the R.M.J. Court said “the possibility of ‘fraud, undue influence, intimidation, overreaching, and other forms of vexatious conduct’ was so likely in the context of in-person solicitation” that such solicitation could be prohibited. R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 202, 102 S.Ct. at 937, 71 L.Ed.2d at 74. (Emphasis added.) Similarly, in discussing Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 99 S.Ct. 887, 59 L.Ed.2d 100 (1979), the Court noted that first amendment protection on the use of trade names by Texas optometrists could be prohibited “in view of the considerable history in Texas of deception and abuse worked upon the consuming public through the use of trade names.” R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 202, 102 S.Ct. at 937, 71 L.Ed.2d at 74. (Emphasis added.)
The Court in R.M.J., after discussing Oh-ralik and Friedman, summarized the rule: “[W]hen the particular content or method of the advertising suggests that it is inherently misleading or when experience has proven that in fact such advertising is subject to abuse, the states may impose appropriate restrictions.” R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203, 102 S.Ct. at 937, 71 L.Ed.2d at 74. R.M.J. involved printed advertising. There is no indication that a different rule would apply to television advertising, yet the Committee does not even attempt to meet the test.
Even if I were to accept the plaintiff’s possibility-of-deceit argument, which I do not, I believe the record here still falls *574short of establishing any reasonable likelihood that this would happen.
The majority points to two aspects of the advertisements which it claims “might well be” misleading: (1) the statement that certain cases will be handled “on a percentage” basis without mention of court costs might be construed as an offer of “cost-free” services according to the majority; and (2) the advertisements could be construed as a claim of expertise by Humphrey and Haas which in fact is belied by their lack of actual experience.
As to the cost issue, it is true the advertisements state that fees will be assessed on “a percentage basis” (without stating a percentage rate) but do not mention court costs. To require a statement concerning costs, however, would go beyond our own advertising rules, which merely require it in the event the ad specifies a contingent fee rate. Even then the advertisement is merely required to disclose “whether percentages are computed before or after deduction of costs.” See DR2-101(C). Here, the defendants represent no contingency rate at all, only that the fee would be “a percentage.” Significantly, also, DR2-101(C) allows a lawyer to advertise “[fjixed fees or range of fees for specific legal services” without a caveat about costs, despite the fact that many of the “specific legal services” listed, such as dissolutions, bankruptcies, and several real estate services, would necessarily involve either court costs or recording fees.
The Supreme Court, moreover, has apparently not considered a cost caveat to be necessary for a full disclosure on fees. See, e.g., In re R.M.J. 455 U.S. at 194, n. 3, 102 S.Ct. at 933, n. 3, 71 L.Ed.2d at 68, n. 3 (fees for “routine” legal services may be advertised; no mention of court costs).
As a practical matter, the subject of court costs, affected by the extent of discovery and a myriad of other factors, is so complex as to make it impractical to explain in a thirty-second advertisement. (Testimony showed a thirty-second ad to consist of only about sixty words). Furthermore, any lack of understanding about this matter, or any other matter relevant to the terms of a lawyer's employment, would logically be resolved at the initial conference, which, in this case, was advertised as being free of cost. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 373, n. 28, 97 S.Ct. at 2704, n. 28, 53 L.Ed.2d at 829, n. 28 (1977).
I believe the majority’s conclusion that the advertisements overstated the lawyers’ qualifications is also without support in the evidence. While the record revealed that these were young lawyers just developing a law practice, there is no evidence, nor even a claim, that they were in fact not qualified. While they lacked the experience of many older lawyers, they did have some experience in each of the areas listed, and the evidence showed they possessed above average academic qualifications. The Committee and the majority seem to equate qualification with experience, and there is simply no direct correlation. I believe the claim that this could “well be” false and misleading is plainly without support.
II. The Public Interest Argument.
If advertising concerns a lawful activity and is not misleading under the Central Hudson test, a state may restrict only if (1) the governmental interest is substantial; (2) the regulation directly advances that governmental interest; and (3) the restriction is no more extensive than necessary to serve that interest. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566, 100 S.Ct. at 2350, 65 L.Ed.2d at 351. I believe the restrictions imposed in this case fail that test because the Committee has not made the necessary showing of a substantial state interest.
The majority concludes that the state-interest issue is only secondary, stating “[i]t is perhaps unnecessary, under our analysis, to explore the state interests involved.” The “analysis” which the majority says makes it unnecessary to address the issue is apparently that the advertisements are actually misleading under the first prong of the Central Hudson test, therefore not subject to any first amendment protection regardless of a supporting state interest. *575See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563, 100 S.Ct. at 2350, 65 L.Ed.2d at 349.
As I have already noted, however, the ads are not even claimed to be actually misleading, and any risk of possible misleading is minimal — certainly not sufficient to justify denial of first amendment protection without even considering the state interest. I believe, in fact, analysis of the state interest is the pivotal issue in this case.
What is that interest? The majority identifies only one in support of the restrictive rules: “fostering rational, intelligent, and voluntary decision making in determining the need for legal services and selecting a lawyer,” citing Bates and R.M.J.
It is interesting, however, that both Bates and R.M.J. used this language to expand the scope of lawyer advertising, not to throttle it.
Moreover, there is a strong state interest in what is essentially a by-product of attorney advertising. This is the need for members of the public to be informed about the nature of their legal rights and the means of pursuing them. As the Supreme Court has said, it would be unusual to meet the need for more informed judgments by reducing the scope of available information:
Advertising does not provide a complete foundation on which to select an attorney. But it seems peculiar to deny the consumer, on the ground that the information is incomplete, at least some of the relevant information needed to reach an informed decision_ Moreover, the argument assumes that the public is not sophisticated enough to realize the limitations of advertising, and that the public is better kept in ignorance than trusted with correct but incomplete information. We suspect the argument rests on an underestimation of the public. In any event, we view as dubious any justification that is based on the benefits of public ignorance.
Bates, 433 U.S. at 374-75, 97 S.Ct. at 2704, 53 L.Ed.2d at 829-30. In providing information for the formation of an informed judgment, it seems to me that it is preferable to provide an excess of information, rather than too little. Viewers are sophisticated enough to accept or reject it as they see fit.
Broad areas of information necessary to an informed judgment are prohibited by our rules. In the present case, the advertisements inform the viewer that, if one is hurt through the negligence of others, he should see a lawyer and imply that recovery for losses might be obtained. One advertisement points out that legal rights may be lost by failure to talk to a lawyer. These and many other types of information including, most obviously, such matters as statutes of limitation, the early filing requirements of our tort claims act, and the problems of uninformed releases of claims are all of great importance to an informed decision of the viewer. Yet these, and all other items of general information on the rights of litigants are prohibited by the rules, because they are not included in the “laundry list” of contents.
I believe the state interest served by this type of information far outweighs any interest in denying it. Bates and R.M.J. make it clear that present methods of delivering legal services are ineffective. In Bates, the court said:
The absence of advertising may be seen to reflect the profession’s failure to reach out and serve the community: Studies reveal that many persons do not obtain counsel even when they perceive a need because of the feared price of services or because of an inability to locate a competent attorney. Indeed, cynicism with regard to the profession may be created by the fact that it long has publicly eschewed advertising, while condoning the actions of the attorney who structures his social or civic associations so as to provide contacts with potential clients.
Id. at 370-71, 97 S.Ct. at 2702, 53 L.Ed.2d at 827-28.
American Bar Association statistics cited in Bates show that the “middle 70% of our population is not being reached or served *576adequately by the [legal] profession.” Id. at 376, 97 S.Ct. at 2705, 53 L.Ed.2d at 831.
In Iowa, a recent study shows that there is only one Legal Services Corporation lawyer for each 8700 eligible recipients. Equal Access to Services Study, Legal Services Corporation of Iowa (1984). Moreover, many of the traditional points of contact between lawyers and potential clients, such as the country club or Rotary Club are simply not viable sources of preliminary legal information for a great segment of our population.
I believe the thrust of the Rule 2-101 laundry list largely misses the point of public information. What difference does it make to potential litigants when the lawyer was born, the legal fraternities, societies or bar association of which the lawyer is a member (especially since membership usually is not based on any required level of professional competency) or whether the lawyer has had military service? This is relatively unimportant information, in view of the possibility that litigants might lose their claims, through lack of information, to a statute of limitation or other legal impediment as to which they remain ignorant.
I believe our rules, insofar as they ban advertising which is false or misleading, are valid. This is basically the model rule of the American Bar Association1 and the rule of most states. Beyond that, I believe the additional restrictions of our rules fail the state interest test and are therefore invalid.
I believe, moreover, that the model rule illustrates the “less restrictive” means of control alluded to in Central Hudson, and that the Committee has failed to show that they would not be effective here. For that
additional reason, I believe the restrictions imposed here fail the test of constitutionality.
I would dissolve the injunction and grant judgment for the defendants on their counterclaim.
McCORMICK, J., joins this dissent.
. RULE 7.1 Communications Concerning a Lawyer’s Services
A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer’s services. A communication is false or misleading if it:
(a)contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading;
(b) is likely to create an unjustified expectation about results the lawyer can achieve, or states or implies that the lawyer can achieve, or states or implies that the lawyer can achieve results by means that violate the rules of professional conduct or other law; or
(c) compares the lawyer's services with other lawyers' services, unless the comparison can be factually substantiated.