Defendant appeals as of right a conviction by a jury of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317; MSA 28.549. Charges of first-degree murder, MCL 750.316; MSA 28.548, were dismissed following defendant’s motion for a directed verdict. Defendant was sentenced to life in prison. We affirm, but remand for resentencing.
Defendant confessed to smothering her two-year-old child with a pillow. She said she did not mean to kill him and that she was just trying to get her husband’s attention. She had smothered and revived the child with cardiopulmonary resuscitation (cpr) on several previous occasions, pretending that he was having seizures. She had also once given the child an excessive dose of her mother-in-law’s heart medicine and, on a different occasion, had badly burned his hand, all allegedly because her husband spent all his time with his mother instead of with the defendant.
Defendant is a nineteen-year-old eighth-grade dropout who has an iq of eighty-three and, accord*452ing to psychologists, is immature, self-indulgent, passive, and extremely dependent on males. She stated that she first tried to get her husband’s attention by injuring herself, but he did not respond. She then turned to injuring her child.
Defendant first argues that evidence that she previously had burned the child and had given him an overdose of a drug was improperly admitted. We disagree.
Under MRE 404(b), evidence of other bad acts is not admissible to prove that the defendant is a bad person who acted accordingly. However, evidence of other bad acts is admissible to show "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident when the same is material.” To be admissible, however, there must be substantial evidence that the defendant committed the other bad act, and there must be a special quality of the bad act tending to prove motive, opportunity, and intent in committing the crime charged. Furthermore, the defendant’s motive, opportunity, and intent must be material to determining the defendant’s guilt, and the probative value of the evidence of other bad acts must not be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. People v Golochowicz, 413 Mich 298, 308-309; 319 NW2d 518 (1982). Defendant argues that the other bad acts are not probative of her intent and also that, even if they are, their probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. We disagree.
Other instances when defendant deliberately injured her child are probative of malice. That is, of defendant’s intent to kill or cause great bodily harm, or of her wilful and wanton disregard for the natural consequences of her actions. They are also probative of the absence of mistake or acci*453dent. Malice is an element of second-degree murder and is therefore material; lack of accident or mistake is also material because accident was defendant’s only defense. Further, given defendant’s confession and the unchallenged evidence of other instances of smothering, the danger of unfair prejudice flowing from the evidence of other bad acts does not substantially outweigh its probative value. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence that defendant previously had burned her child and had given him an overdose of a drug. See People v Vandervliet, 444 Mich 52; 508 NW2d 114 (1993).
Next, defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to send the case to the jury on a second-degree murder charge because there was no evidence of defendant’s intent. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we disagree.
To convict defendant of second-degree murder, the prosecutor had to prove that she intended to kill, or do great bodily harm, or that she acted with wilful and wanton disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of her actions would be to cause death or great bodily harm. People v Spearman, 195 Mich App 434, 438; 491 NW2d 606 (1992), overruled in part People v Veling, 443 Mich 23; 504 NW2d 456 (1993). Here, the evidence showed that defendant had repeatedly injured her child. It also showed that defendant had had cpr training, from which the jury could infer — as she claimed — that she did not want her child to die.
However, the defendant’s cpr training also allowed the jury to infer that she realized her son could die if she did not revive him. Further, the evidence showed that, on the day he died, she had smothered him twice. She delayed calling for help when, on the second occasion, she was unable to revive him. Viewed in the light most favorable to *454the prosecutor, this evidence shows that defendant intentionally set in motion forces that she knew were likely to cause death or great bodily harm. The evidence was therefore sufficient for the jury to infer that defendant acted with wilful and wanton disregard that death or great bodily harm would be the natural consequence of her actions. People v Flowers, 191 Mich App 169, 176-177; 477 NW2d 473 (1991). Therefore, there was sufficient evidence to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant acted with malice.
Defendant next argues that she was denied effective assistance of counsel when her attorney did not attempt to present a diminished capacity defense. We disagree because diminished capacity is not a defense to general intent crimes such as second-degree murder. People v England, 164 Mich App 370, 374-375; 416 NW2d 425 (1987).1 Defense counsel did not err in failing to pursue a nonmeritorious defense.
Next, defendant claims that her confession was admitted erroneously because the prosecutor did not independently establish the corpus delicti of the crime. We disagree.
The only elements of a murder charge that must be established independently of a defendant’s confession are the fact of death and the fact that the death was caused by some criminal agency. Spearman, supra at 441. Here, a pathologist testified that the child did not die of natural causes and specifically ruled out injury, disease, accident, suicide, and sudden infant death syndrome. He testified that suffocation was the most likely cause of death.
*455Additionally, the emergency room doctor testified that the child’s body was abnormally cool and that it was likely that he had been dead for a while before the call for help was placed. He also testified that death does not usually result from childhood seizures. Further, the child had a history of suspicious unexplained seizures and injuries. In our opinion, this evidence sufficiently established the corpus delicti. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting defendant’s confession to prove the remaining elements of the crime.
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor’s misconduct deprived her of a fair trial. We disagree.
The test of whether the prosecutor engaged in misconduct is whether defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial. People v Foster, 175 Mich App 311, 317; 437 NW2d 395 (1989). Defendant’s failure timely and specifically to object to the prosecutor’s argument necessarily results in our review of that matter for a miscarriage of justice. Absent manifest injustice, this Court will affirm. People v Wise, 134 Mich App 82, 105; 351 NW2d 255 (1984). Furthermore, a miscarriage of justice will not be found if the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor’s remarks could have been cured by a timely instruction. People v Gonzalez, 178 Mich App 526, 534-535; 444 NW2d 228 (1989).
In response to the prosecutor’s closing argument, the trial court properly instructed the jury that sympathy and prejudice could not be allowed to influence its decision. Furthermore, in light of defendant’s failure to object, we refuse to find manifest injustice because the evidence against the defendant was overwhelming and considerable. Wise, supra at 101-105, 106; see People v Swartz, 171 Mich App 364, 369-373, 374; 429 NW2d 905 (1988).
*456Next, defendant argues that questioning of her husband regarding privileged marital communications was improper. We disagree. The statute regarding privileged marital communications provides that neither spouse shall, "during the marriage or afterwards, without the consent of both, be examined as to any communication made by one to the other during the marriage.” MCL 600.2162; MSA 27A.2162 (last clause).2 The prosecution correctly notes that "[although the statute speaks of 'any communication,’ it is well-established . . . that only confidential communications are protected by the communication privilege.” People v Vermeulen, 432 Mich 32, 39; 438 NW2d 36 (1989). Here, the record shows that a police officer was present when defendant told her husband that she "did it.” Therefore, because the communication was not confidential, the privilege does not apply.
Lastly, defendant argues that her sentence was disproportionate. We note that, on appeal, the prosecution agrees that the trial court erred in imposing a life sentence under the erroneous belief that a life sentence would make defendant eligible for parole sooner than a long term of years. We agree, and remand for resentencing.
The conviction is affirmed. Remanded for resentencing.
R. J. Taylor, J., concurred.Contrary to defendant’s argument, there is no conflict in the case law regarding this point. The case cited by defendant dealt with the diminished capacity defense in the context of a first-degree murder charge. See People v Fields, 64 Mich App 166, 168, 172-173; 235 NW2d 95 (1975). Unlike second-degree murder, first-degree murder is a specific intent crime. People v Thomas, 126 Mich App 611, 623; 337 NW2d 598 (1983).
Because the parties were divorced at the time of trial, this case does not involve the spousal testimonial privilege. See MCL 600.2162; MSA 27A.2162 (first clause); see also People v Fisher, 442 Mich 560; 503 NW2d 50 (1993).