(dissenting).
1. Probable Cause to Search as Affected by Omissions From the Affidavit
Probable cause to search the Johnson residence is affected by material omissions from the affidavit submitted in support of the warrant. See State v. Brings Plenty, 459 N.W.2d 390, 401 (S.D.1990). A review of pertinent facts and omissions is in order.
On Saturday, November 9, 1991, law enforcement officials did not have a search warrant for the Johnson’s residence in Beresford, nor had they attempted to obtain one. Nevertheless, on November 9, the DCI agents attempted two controlled deliveries of the Express Mail package holding two “doctored” bindles, one containing an unknown amount of the methamphetamine found in the original Express Mail package intercept*688ed via the Citibank mailroom. Both attempts at delivery failed. Daiziel left a notice indicating the package would be delivered shortly before 10:00 a.m. on Tuesday, November 12, 1991. In the interim, a decision was made to obtain a search warrant. On Monday evening, November 11, 1991, Daiziel typed a search warrant for the Beres-ford residence. At about 8:30 a.m. on Tuesday, November 12, Daiziel went to Magistrate Mary Dell Cody in Vermillion to obtain a signature for the warrant. Daiziel testified that Magistrate Cody said she “would not sign it until after the delivery was made.” At 9:50 a.m. on the same day, Daiziel made the third attempt to deliver the Express Mail package to the Johnson residence, did hand it to Christine outside the residence, and immediately arrested her for possession of methamphetamine. Daiziel took the package back from Christine, placed it in the locked trunk of his car, and returned to Vermillion to obtain a search warrant from Magistrate Cody. Daiziel testified that upon his arrival in Vermillion, he “just drove to the court, went in, she signed it, and came back out.” Dalziel’s affidavit stated that Christine “did receive” the Express Mail package and that it was “delivered to her residence” by the DCI. The affidavit omitted certain facts, i.e., that the package was never opened or taken into the residence by Christine, and that it was presently locked in the trunk of Dalziel’s car. Magistrate Cody was not told that Christine had already been arrested and taken to the Beresford police station. Nor was Magistrate Cody told that as Daiziel stood before her, a DCI agent and Beresford police were inside the Johnson home, guarding Brent and securing the premises due to “exigent circumstances.” Basically, the affidavit alleged that because Christine had been sent an Express Mail package containing 2.1 grams of a white, powdery substance consisting of some unknown quantity of methamphetamine, there must be other controlled substances and marijuana in her residence. No facts were contained in the affidavit to show that law enforcement officials possessed other evidence indicative of probable cause that a crime had been committed.1
“A search warrant is only valid if probable cause has been shown to the magistrate.” State v. Robinette, 270 N.W.2d 573, 578 (S.D.1978).
Probable cause is generally defined as the existence of facts and circumstances as would warrant an honest belief in the mind of a reasonable, prudent man acting on all the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the magistrate that the offense has been, or is being committed and that the property sought exists at the place designated.
Id. at 577.
This court has previously reviewed the existence of probable cause in conjunction with a controlled delivery of a package containing cocaine. State v. Engel, 465 N.W.2d 787 (S.D.1991). See also State v. Baysinger, 470 N.W.2d 840, 842 (S.D.1991) (detailing the procedure used for a controlled delivery of a package of cocaine). In Engel, an anticipatory search warrant was issued, ordering the officers to search not only for the cocaine, but also for other illegal drugs, paraphernalia, or other evidence.2 465 N.W.2d at 789. *689The judge that signed the anticipatory search warrant orally admonished the officer not to execute the warrant until after the package was delivered. Id. at 788. An officer made a controlled delivery of a package, dressed as a UPS agent. After waiting thirty minutes, the warrant was executed. This court stated:
Reading this affidavit in context and looking at the circumstances realistically with a view toward upholding the probable cause determination if possible, it is apparent that once [the defendant] had possession of the cocaine for half an hour, officers had probable cause not only to believe that the delivered cocaine was on the premises, but also to believe that the delivery was no mistake and that other items associated with drug use might be found there as well.
Id. at 790 (emphasis added). We also noted that, “Probable cause to search the entire premises for other drug-related items cannot be artificially separated from probable cause to search for the cocaine which was the subject of the controlled delivery.” Id.
The facts of Engel are materially distinguishable from the present case. In Engel, the delivered package was still on the premises at the time the search warrant was executed. Under the facts presented here, the delivered package was never opened by Christine, was held by her only momentarily, and was taken into and removed from the residence by Dalziel. The package was not on the premises either when the search warrant was obtained, or when it was executed. Since the subject of the controlled delivery was not present on the premises, the probable cause to search the entire premises for other drug-related items must be separated from the probable cause to search for the package — which was safely in Dalziel’s trunk.
Whether an omission from an affidavit is material to a finding of probable cause is a mixed question of law and fact and is reviewed de novo. United States v. Condo, 782 F.2d 1502, 1506 (9th Cir.1986) (citing United States v. Ippolito, 774 F.2d 1482, 1485 (9th Cir.1985)). It is my opinion that the omission of the above-mentioned facts from Dalziel’s affidavit casts “doubt on the existence of probable cause.” Brings Plenty, 459 N.W.2d at 401. Clearly, it was important to the magistrate that the package be delivered and on the premises before a search of the Johnson residence took place. If it were not, she would have signed the warrant when it was first presented to her.
Note should be taken of the statements of the high courts of other states in regard to omissions from affidavits as this affects the existence of probable cause:
[T]he constitutional protection against war-rantless invasions of privacy is endangered by the concealment of relevant facts from the district court issuing the warrant. Warrants issue ex parte and the issuing court must rely upon the trustworthiness of the affidavit before it. We believe the court must have all the pertinent facts before it in order to determine whether there is sufficient, properly obtained evidence providing probable cause for a warrant to issue. Police and prosecutors owe a duty of candor to the court, particularly in light of the ex parte nature of these proceedings, and must not withhold information which may taint the source of the probable cause they put forth.
Cruse v. Alaska, 584 P.2d 1141, 1146 (Alaska 1978) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Likewise, the Colorado Supreme Court stated:
[T]he fact that an officer-affiant’s statements in a warrant affidavit are not false does not necessarily end judicial scrutiny of the contents of the affidavit_ Because the decision of a judicial officer asked to issue a warrant is the cornerstone of our constitutional protections against unlawful governmental invasions of privacy, it is of paramount importance that the decision be based on a complete factual predicate. Probable cause determinations are invariably based on inferences drawn from the language appearing in warrant affidavits_ It has, therefore, been recognized that in some circumstances statements of officer-affiants may be so misleading because of the omission of material *690facts known to the affiant at the time the affidavit was executed that a finding of probable cause based on such statements may be deemed erroneous.
Colorado v. Winden, 689 P.2d 578, 582-83 (Colo.1984) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). See also California v. Kurland, 28 Cal.3d 376, 168 Cal.Rptr. 667, 671-72, 618 P.2d 213, 217-18 (1980) (stating that the “crucial, inference-drawing powers of the magistrate” are hindered as much by omissions as by outright misstatements in an affidavit).
The affidavit presented to the magistrate in this case withheld the fact that the package was no longer on the premises. The magistrate, when told that the package had been “delivered,” could reasonably infer from that language that the package was on the premises. In light of her earlier refusal to sign the warrant, it is likely that is exactly what she did infer. Complete candor on the part of law enforcement officials would direct that the magistrate should have been provided with the whole set of facts regarding the morning’s events. The omission of these facts from the affidavit affects the finding of probable cause to search the residence. For this reason, I dissent on the probable cause determination.
2. Securing the Premises — “Exigent Circumstances”
The majority opinion quotes language in support of the proposition that the securing of the Johnson residence by officers, while waiting for a search warrant, was legal. Segura v. U.S., 468 U.S. 796, 810, 812, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 3388-89, 82 L.Ed.2d 599, 612-13 (1984). In fact, this language was not a part of the majority holding of Segura. Part IV of the opinion, from which these quotations are taken, was written by Chief Justice Burger, and only Justice O’Connor joined this writing. Thus, this is not persuasive authority for the legality of securing the premises in this instance. See also State v. Habbena, 372 N.W.2d 450, 455 (S.D.1985) (“We find the decision to be of little precedental [sic] value.”)
Although the police did not proceed with a warrantless search, the warrantless entry and securing of the premises is nearly as repugnant.
[T]he mere fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment. The investigation of crime would always be simplified if warrants were unnecessary. But the Fourth Amendment reflects the view of those who wrote the Bill of Rights that the privacy of a person’s home and property may not be totally sacrificed in the name of maximum simplicity in enforcement of the criminal law.
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2414, 57 L.Ed.2d 290, 301 (1978). The Supreme Court has also stated that, “The Fourth Amendment is designed to prevent, not simply to redress, unlawful police action.” Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 766 n. 12, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2042 n. 12, 23 L.Ed.2d 685, 696 n. 12 (1969).
In any event, no “exigent circumstances” existed in this case. The Express Mail package — which the magistrate reasonably contemplated would be the focus of the search— was safely locked in the trunk of Dalziel’s car. In regard to exigent circumstances, this court has noted that the fact that “there may be some delay or inconvenience in getting a search warrant is not a valid reason for averting the constitutional requirements.” State v. Heumiller, 317 N.W.2d 126, 129 (S.D.1982). And, as stated by an Iowa appeals court, when “the creation of [the] exigency was the officer’s announcement to. the [defendant] that he wished to search ... the appropriate rule to be applied in such a situation is that the State may not profit by an officer’s choice to forego the constitutional process by attempting to create an exigency by his own actions.” Latham v. Sullivan, 295 N.W.2d 472, 478 (Iowa App.1980).
Rather than attempt to follow an accepted procedure for a controlled delivery as outlined in Engel, 465 N.W.2d 787, the officers in the present case chose to follow a different course. The State should not profit from that choice by pleading exigent circumstances — where none existed — to justify the illegal securing of the Johnson residence. Thus, I dissent from the majority opinion’s *691determination that the securing of the premises was legal.
Additionally, I agree with Justice Henderson’s writing on the issue of joinder. Under these facts, separate trials should have been granted to these defendants.
. The North Dakota Supreme Court has stated that "[I]n view of the special protection given to the home” by the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and a similar state constitutional provision, "something additional and more objective than the facile conclusion that contraband is ordinarily kept in the home should be required to establish probable cause to search the home.... [S]uspicion, without anything more specific, does not amount to probable cause to search [a home].” State v. Mische, 448 N.W.2d 415, 422 (N.D.1989).
. The affidavit in Engel also contained a paragraph providing the probable cause for the wider search, apart from the controlled delivery. That paragraph stated:
The affiant, having learned from other law enforcement officers, experience in controlled mail deliveiy, believes that the residence will contain other drugs or evidence of other drugs, as well as narcotics paraphernalia, notes and papers that will help identify the sender of the package, possible evidence of other crimes and identities of other drug violators, as well as the cocaine in the above described package.
Engel, 465 N.W.2d at 789-90 (emphasis added). Such additional information or statements of the affiant were absent from the affidavit in the present case. Further, in Engel, the officers were to search for the drugs that were delivered to the residence. In the present case, there was no need to search for the drugs “delivered” to the Johnson residence, since Daiziel knew that the *689Express Mail package was in the trunk of his car. Magistrate Cody was without that knowledge.