(dissenting).
A fair jury trial was held and a verdict was entered for the Liens and against McGladrey & Pullen. McGladrey filed a Motion for Judgment NOV or, alternatively, a new trial, which motion was denied. Full proceedings were had at the trial court level.
It is the function of the jury to determine credibility of witnesses. Mash v. Cutler, 488 N.W.2d 642 (S.D.1992). A jury is entitled to accept the version of facts as testified to by one of the parties and reject the other side’s testimony. Farmers State Bank v. Westrum, 341 N.W.2d 631 (S.D.1983). This Court should not seek reasons to reverse. Lytle v. Morgan, 270 N.W.2d 359 (S.D.1978). These are not platitudes; they are sound and time-honored appellate rules of review observed by this Court for decades. As the reviewing court, we are required to view evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict winner. Al*428berts v. Mutual Serv. Cas. Ins. Co., 80 S.D. 303, 123 N.W.2d 96 (1963).
There is no injustice in the result of this case. Therefore, I cannot vote for the conference opinion which reverses the proceedings and judgment entered by the trial court, based upon the jury’s verdict.
There was an extensive trial. Note that the tendered majority opinion confines and distills the facts to two short paragraphs. This is, essentially, faulty for it fails to adequately address the scenario upon which the jury acted. Without the facts addressed properly, the issues cannot be dissected and applied to settled law. Infused in some of the issues are a smattering of facts, all skewed to a conclusion of reversal.
In the end, the tendered majority writing affirms all — but the damages. Bottomed on the exclusion of evidence by the trial court (the abuse of discretion test), the tendered writing reverses the damage award. Nowhere in said writing is it expressed that Judge Fitzgerald abused his discretion. Majority opinion argues that McGladrey was denied the opportunity to present evidence on “appropriate credit” from 1985 based upon sustained objections concerning a “constructive dividend problem in 1982.” McGla-drey also fails to cite in his brief where such restrictions occurred during trial. He has failed to make the record, thus no error has been shown. See Farm Credit Bank of St. Paul v. Brakke, 483 N.W.2d 167 (N.D.1992).
Liens’ expert testified to damages in the amount of $95,392.00. Further, the expert described how he arrived at his conclusion. No objection was made. McGladrey did not properly protect the record. Weaver v. Boortz, 301 N.W.2d 673 (S.D.1981). McGladrey’s counsel argued before the jury that Liens’ taxes could have been avoided and described (plus explained) McGladrey’s witnesses’ testimony. Jury chose not to accept appellant’s version. Rather, the jury accepted Liens’ testimony and exhibits. The computation of the verdict award is within the sound discretion of the jury as triers of fact. Kent v. Allied Oil & Supply, Inc., 264 N.W.2d 512 (S.D.1978).
Supposedly, a reversal is based upon a preclusion of cross-examination of Liens’ witness. True, cross-examination should not be precluded. However, we do not have such a shortcoming before us. Rather, an offer of proof was spread on the record but was denied by the trial court. When the trial court denied the offer of proof, the trial court called to the attention of counsel that his ruling was based upon the fact that he and the jury listened to such testimony previously in the trial when there was no strenuous objection (see trial transcript at 312). Furthermore, concerning the same subject, McGladrey’s counsel was permitted to cross-examine a witness of Liens concerning the same matters pertaining to the offer of proof.
In short, McGladrey failed to protect the record and should not be heard to set aside this verdict. Smolnikar v. Robinson, 479 N.W.2d 516, 518-19 (S.D.1992).
The vitality of this jury verdict has been purloined by appellate decision and has destroyed the jury’s calling. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.