(dissenting). I respectfully dissent from the reasoning employed and result reached by the majority in its deterioration of the “zone of danger” requirement in negligent infliction of emotional distress cases as established in Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935), and modified in Klassa v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 273 Wis. 176, 77 N.W.2d 397 (1956). I would uphold the “zone of danger” requirement as it stood prior to today’s decision.
First, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Waube is inapposite to the facts in this case. The majority concludes that Waube is inapplicable because Connie Garrett “was an object of the police officer’s activities since she was a member of the group of children he was pursuing.” At 232. This statement implies that Connie fled from the scene of the accident with her friends and that she was pursued by the police officer. That implication is incorrect. The police officer shined a spotlight in the area where several children were standing. Connie remained still with one friend, while the others fled. The officer then pursued only those children who were running. Contrary to what the majority concludes, I believe that Connie was a mere observer of the accident.
Additionally, the test established in Waube is not whether the plaintiff was an observer of the accident or an object of the defendant’s negligent activities, but, rather, whether the plaintiff was in peril of physical impact. We explained in Waube,
“It is one thing to say that as to those who are put in peril of physical impact, impact is immaterial if physical injury is caused by shock arising from the peril. ... It is quite another thing to say that those who are *244out of the field of physical danger through impact shall have a legally protected right to be free from emotional distress occasioned by the peril of others, when that distress results in physical impairment. ... It is our conclusion that [social interests] can neither justly nor expediently be extended to any recovery for physical injuries sustained by one out of the range of ordinary physical peril as a result of the shock of witnessing another’s danger.” Id. at 612-13.
In this case, it is undisputed that Connie Garrett was never closer than fifteen to twenty feet from the squad car that ran over her brother and was never in danger of being injured herself. Connie was never in the path of the squad car prior to or after the accident. I conclude that Waube is controlling and would limit liability in this case because Connie Garrett, like the deceased mother in Waube, was never in peril of physical impact and, therefore, outside the “zone of danger.” In essence, the majority is rejecting Waube by allowing this cause of action to stand when the plaintiff was never within the range of physical peril.
Second, recovery should be limited in this case because it is undisputed that Connie Garrett never feared for her own safety. At 227. The majority cites Klassa, 273 Wis. 176, and acknowledges that in order to recover for emotional distress, a plaintiff must not only be within the field of danger, but also must actually be in fear for his or her own safety. At 230. However, the majority then fails to apply Klassa to the facts of this case and allows Connie’s cause of action to stand despite the fact that she never feared for her own safety.
Finally, the majority discusses some of the public policy reasons used by courts to preclude liability despite a finding of negligence. At 233, 234. The “zone of danger” rule for limiting liability in negligent infliction of emotional distress cases was founded on these same concerns. In Waube, we maintained,
*245“The answer must be reached by balancing the social interests involved in order to ascertain how far defendant’s duty and plaintiff’s right may justly and expediently be extended. It is our conclusion that they can neither justly nor expediently be extended to any recovery for physical injuries sustained by one out of the range of ordinary physical peril as a result of the shock of witnessing another’s danger. Such consequences are so unusual and extraordinary, viewed after the event, that a user of the highway may be said not to subject others to an unreasonable risk of them by the careless management of his vehicle. Furthermore, the liability imposed by such a doctrine is wholly out of proportion to the culpability of the negligent tort-feasor, would put an unreasonable burden upon users of the highway, open the way to fraudulent claims, and enter a field that has no sensible or just stopping point.” Id., 216 Wis. at 613.
I believe that these public policy considerations behind the “zone of danger” rule remain valid today.
The majority bases its decision to allow Connie’s cause of action to stand on the following facts:
“Connie observed the traumatic injuries suffered by Raymond from a distance of 15 or 20 feet. She was close enough to see the squad car run over Raymond and to witness his resulting injuries and severe pain. Connie was Raymond’s older sister.” P. 234.
Similarly, in Waube, the decedent, Susie Waube, was looking out a window and observed an automobile hit her daughter “immediately in front of the home of said Susie Waube and in her presence . . . .” Id., 216 Wis. at 604. Susie Waube was also close enough to witness the accident and the resulting death of her daughter. Because the facts in this case are undistinguishable from those in Waube, I believe that the public policy considerations espoused in Waube are applicable and preclude liability for any emotional distress suffered as a cause of the defendant’s alleged negligence. In conclusion, I would *246affirm the summary judgment granted by the trial court in this case because Connie Garrett was never within the field of danger, as is required by Waube, and never feared for her own safety, as is required by Klassa. Contrary to what the majority contends, I believe that the court’s deterioration of these requirements will open the way for fraudulent claims and will enter a field with no sensible stopping point.