This case concerns the extent of power that may be exercised by the juvenile division of probate court in dealing with abused or neglected minors who are wards of a circuit court by virtue of a custody award rendered as part of a divorce decree..
The trial court held that a waiver of circuit court jurisdiction was not required. The Court of Appeals reversed. Krajewski v Krajewski, 125 Mich App 407; 335 NW2d 923 (1983). We are persuaded the Court of Appeals erred.
The facts giving rise to this, controversy are not complicated. Theresa Krajewski, a minor, was under the continuous jurisdiction of the Berrien Circuit Court by virtue of a custody order entered in connection with her parents’ divorce in 1974. In 1979, a petition was filed in the Berrien Probate Court, Juvenile Division, asserting that Theresa came within the appropriate provisions, MCL 712A.2(b); MSA 27.3178(598.2)(b), of the Juvénile Code and praying the court to take jurisdiction. A temporary order granting the petition was entered.
At a hearing in April, 1981, to determine if parental rights should be terminated, the question was raised whether, in light of Rozelle v Dora, 103 Mich App 607; 303 NW2d 43 (1981), a waiver of circuit court jurisdiction was necessary. The juvenile court judge took the matter under advisement pending determination of that issue.
The juvenile division of probate court has:
"(b) Jurisdiction in proceedings concerning any child under 17 years of age found within the county
"(1) Whose parent or other person legally responsible for the care and maintenance of such child, when able to do so, neglects or refuses to provide proper or necessary support, education as required by law, medical, *733surgical or other care necessary for his health, morals, or who is deprived of emotional well-being, or who is abandoned by his parents, guardian or other custodian, or who is otherwise without proper custody or guardianship; or
"(2) Whose home or environment, by reason of neglect, cruelty, drunkenness, criminality or depravity on the part of a parent, guardian or other custodian, is an unfit place for such child to live in, or whose mother is unmarried and without adequate provision for care and support.
"If a petition is filed in any probate court alleging that a child is within the provisions of paragraphs (1) or (2) of subdivision (b), and the custody of such child shall be subject to the prior or continuing order of another court of record of this state, the court in which such petition is filed shall forthwith cause notice of the filing of such petition to be served upon the prosecuting attorney for the county in which such other court is situated, personally or by registered mail. Immediately upon receiving such notice, the prosecuting attorney shall prepare and file such pleadings, petitions, notices or orders as may be necessary to bring the matter before such other court for hearing and such disposition, consistent with the powers of such court, as may be for the best interests of such child. Pending action by such other court in regard to the matter, the probate court with which such petition has been filed shall have jurisdiction to make any temporary orders pertaining to care or custody which may be deemed advisable or necessary for the protection of such child.” MCL 712A.2(b); MSA 27.3178(598.2)(b).
The Court of Appeals concluded that under the circumstances described by the foregoing statute the probate court has jurisdiction to enter only temporary orders. Until the circuit court waives its jurisdiction, said the Court of Appeals, the probate court cannot exercise its full jurisdiction.
We do not read that statute so narrowly. Once having given concurrent jurisdiction to the probate court, the Legislature intended the act’s other *734provisions, such as for notice, to operate as procedural rules calculated to accomplish efficiently the act’s purpose. Such provisions prescribe the manner in which the conferred jurisdiction should be exercised, but do not purport to limit jurisdiction. The authorization of temporary orders should not be read as a proscription of permanent orders.
Waiver by circuit court confers no jurisdiction on the probate court. The statute confers the jurisdiction.
To obviate questions over which court should first attend to the child’s needs, we adopted GCR 1963, 724.1(5) and PCR 111.2, which for the most part adopted the procedures suggested by the Legislature.
The relevant provisions of GCR 1963, 724.1 read:
"Each and every provision of any prior order of any court of record shall continue in full force and effect for so long as or until, such provision or provisions are superseded, changed, or terminated by subsequent order of a court of record.
"The subsequent court shall give due consideration to prior continuing orders of other courts of record and refrain from entering orders contrary or inconsistent with such prior orders unless appropriate to the welfare of the child and in the best interests of justice.”
The observation in GCR 1963, 724.1(5) that "no waiver or transfer of jurisdiction is required for the full and valid exercise of jurisdiction of the subsequent court” evinces our conviction that the children intended to be protected by the constitution and the Juvenile Code can best be served by a procedure which, having provided for appropriate notice and opportunity for the prior court to exercise its responsibility under its jurisdiction to further the child’s best interests, nonetheless gives *735unrestricted freedom to the juvenile court to carry out its mandate.
For the foregoing reasons, we set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the order of the Berrien Circuit Court.
Williams, C.J., and Levin and Boyle, JJ., concurred with Kavanagh, J.