(dissenting).
I dissent because I believe the trustees had a duty to render the premises safe from foreseeable risk of harm. This court has clearly defined that duty:
The duty required of a landowner (or the person charged with responsibility for the condition of the land) as to licensees and invitees is no more and no less than that of any other alleged tort-feasor, and that duty is to use reasonable care for the safety of all such persons invited upon the premises, regardless of the status of the individuals.
Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 174, 199 N.W.2d 639, 647 (1972) (emphasis added). The trust agreement charges the trustees with responsibility for the condition of Glensheen. The fact that their power to control was shared with any surviving children of Chester Congdon does not mitigate the fact that they were charged with responsibility for the condition of the land and had a duty to exercise reasonable care for Mrs. Pietila while she worked on the premises.
Exclusive control over the premises is not, as the majority seems to suggest, a prerequisite for a duty to arise. Indeed, in Isler v. Burman, 305 Minn. 288, 232 N.W.2d 818 (1975),1 a church was found to be a “possessor” of property it not only did not own, but only used once for a snowmo*335bile outing. If the church is a possessor” of land it borrowed for an evening, the trustees should also be “possessors” of •Glensheen since they hold title to it and have a specific, albeit shared, responsibility for its upkeep.
Being possessors of the land, they had the duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the safety of those in Glensheen. It is for the jury to decide how much care would be reasonable care. The evidence presented showed that the trustees knew that Elisabeth Congdon might be in danger. Marjorie Caldwell had influenced her mother, Mrs. Congdon, to co-sign notes for $126,000 and $325,000 upon which Marjorie defaulted. It subsequently developed that Marjorie Caldwell owed over $1,000,000 to various creditors.
Marjorie Caldwell’s home in Marine on St. Croix burned down under suspicious circumstances, allegedly for insurance. When Marjorie subsequently moved to Colorado, she sought loans at several banks. Having been denied loans, small fires occurred in the bank. One of Marjorie’s daughters, Rebecca LeRoy, testified that her mother had tried to kill her by strangulation.
Several years prior to the murder, Marjorie brought some prepared marmalade sandwiches, which Elisabeth Congdon ate and which resulted in Elisabeth’s falling asleep and being sleepy for 2 days thereafter. Her personal friend and doctor was convinced that the sandwiches were drugged.
In March 1977, the trustees were informed by the Colorado Bureau of Investigation that Marjorie was looking for a hit man to murder Elisabeth Congdon. In May 1977, a lawyer representing Marjorie Caldwell contacted the trustees and their attorney, bringing a request for funds for Marjorie to the trustees.
Knowing all this, the trustees did nothing to secure Glensheen. The jury determined that something more than nothing was required and that the trustees’ inaction was a negligent cause of the murder. Considering the great deference given to jury findings, Bray v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 305 Minn. 31, 232 N.W.2d 97 (1975), this jury’s findings should be upheld. I would affirm.
. The fact situation in Isler arose before this court abolished the distinction between licensees and invitees in Peterson. The higher invitee standard was used in Isler. Isler v. Burman, 305 Minn. 288, 232 N.W.2d 818 (1975). This, however, does not affect the analysis of whether the church was a “possessor” of land since that is a preliminary question to the fixing of the actual standard of care.