This is an original action in the nature of a quo warranto proceeding. We conclude that a judgment should be entered removing the defendants from their positions as school board members of the Brookings School District 5-1 and declaring that the plaintiff is entitled to be seated as school board member of that district.
Prior to the May 14,1982, deadline, plaintiff, Burns, and defendants, Kurtenbach and Scholten, as well as another individual, filed their nominating petitions for school board member with the business manager of Brookings School District 5-1. The school board election was scheduled for June 15, 1982. Burns was the only candidate who signed the circulator’s verification as required by SDCL 13-7-6. The other candidates relied on the advice of the business manager, who informed them that the circulator’s verification need not be signed if the nominating petition had been circulated by a candidate or a member of his family.
The business manager died on May 17, 1982. Burns became aware that the other candidates had not executed the circulator’s verifications. Pursuant to the advice of the school district’s attorney, the other candidates executed the circulator’s verifications and backdated them to the date when each had originally submitted his petition to the school district’s business manager.
Burns commenced an action in circuit court challenging the validity of the other candidates’ nominating petitions. The circuit court refused to invalidate the petitions. On June 15, 1982, Kurtenbach and Scholten were elected to fill the two vacancies on the school board. Over Burns’ objections, the oath of office was administered to Kurtenbach and Scholten.
Kurtenbach and Scholten contend that this court does not have original jurisdiction in quo warranto in a case such as this. We disagree.
Article V, Section 5, of the South Dakota Constitution, which was amended in 1972, provides:
The Supreme Court shall have such appellate jurisdiction as may be provided by the legislature, and the Supreme Court or any justice thereof may issue any original or remedial writ which shall then be heard and determined by that court.
The circuit courts have original jurisdiction in all cases except as to any limited original jurisdiction granted to other courts by the legislature....
Prior to the 1972 amendment, Article V, Sections 2 and 3 provided:
§ 2. The Supreme Court, except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, shall have appellate jurisdiction only, which shall be coextensive with the state, and shall have a general superintending control over' all inferior courts under such regulations and limitations as may be prescribed by law.
§ 3. The Supreme Court and the judges thereof shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court shall also have power to issue writs of mandamus, quo warranto, certiorari, injunction and other original and remedial writs, with authority to hear and determine the same in such cases and under such regulations as may be prescribed by law: provided, however, that no jury trials shall be allowed in said Supreme Court, but in proper cases questions of fact may be sent by said court to a circuit court for trial before a jury.
SDCL 15-25-1, which apparently was not amended subsequent to 1972, provides:
The exercise of the original jurisdiction granted the Supreme Court by sections 2 and 3, article V of the Constitution, is reserved for the consideration of matters of prerogative, extraordinary, and general concern.
Although the 1972 amendment deleted language specifying the types of cases over which the Supreme Court may exercise *638jurisdiction, we construe the amendment as in no way limiting the powers granted by the prior provisions with regard to the original jurisdiction of this court. In addition, we have held that quo warranto is the proper proceeding to determine title to and possession of a public office.1 State ex rel. Pryor v. Axness, 31 S.D. 125, 139 N.W. 791 (1913); State ex rel. Walklin v. Shanks, 25 S.D. 55, 125 N.W. 122 (1910); SDCL 21-28.
Defendants contend that the election contest statutes of SDCL ch. 12-22 provide an alternative remedy that precludes relief by way of quo warranto. We disagree. The remedies of quo warranto and election contest are cumulative, and therefore the existence of the latter does not preclude relief under quo warranto proceedings. Hurley v. Coursey, 64 S.D. 131, 265 N.W. 4 (1936); see generally Warren v. Brown, 57 S.D. 528, 234 N.W. 38 (1930); see also State Ex Inf. Ryan v. Bond, 546 S.W.2d 1 (Mo.1977); Williams v. Cates, 235 Ga. 651, 221 S.E.2d 422 (1975).
Turning to the merits of the proceeding, Burns contends that Kurtenbach and Scholten are ineligible to serve as board members because their nominating petitions failed to contain an executed circulator’s verification prior to the statutory filing deadline. SDCL 13-7-6 provides:
No candidate for elective school board membership may be nominated unless he is a resident voter of the school district and unless a nominating petition has been filed on his behalf with the business manager of the school district no earlier than the third Monday in April and no later than the second Friday in May at five p.m. prior to the date of the election.... The petition shall be verified under oath by the person circulating the same. The filing of the nominating petition shall constitute nomination and will entitle the candidate to have his name placed on the ballot for the term he desires only upon verification signed by the business manager that the nominating petition contains the minimum number of signatures and that the candidate is a resident voter. (Emphasis added).
We conclude that the statute clearly and unambiguously requires that the circulator’s verification be executed pri- or to the filing deadline. When a nominating statute plainly states its requirements, those wishing to benefit from the statute must substantially comply with its requirements. Jacobs v. Pyle, 52 S.D. 537, 219 N.W. 247 (1928); Harris v. King, 21 S.D. 47, 109 N.W. 644 (1906); Lucas v. Ringsrud, 3 S.D. 355, 53 N.W. 426 (1892). However attractive it might be to liberally construe a statute to avoid a result that may appear harsh, we will not so act when such action would do violence to the plain language of the statute. Johnson v. Herseth, 246 N.W.2d 102 (S.D.1976).
We have held that the absence of a properly completed circulator’s verification renders a referendum petition invalid. Corbly v. City of Colton, 278 N.W.2d 459 (S.D.1979); Nist v. Herseth, 270 N.W.2d 565 (S.D.1978). The purpose of the verification is to insure that the persons whose names appear on the petition did, in fact, sign such petition. Corbiy, supra; Nist, supra. We see no reason why the same analysis should not apply to the petitions in the case before us.
Signing a circulator's verification after the deadline and backdating it to the date when it was originally submitted does not cure the defect. As this court stated in O’Brien v. Pyle, 51 S.D. 385, 393, 214 N.W. 623, 626 (1927), “No one is authorized by law to doctor up a sick petition.” Also, the receipt of erroneous advice from the school district’s business manager did not excuse the candidates from following the clear and explicit directions of the legislature.2 See *639Corbly v. City of Colton, supra; State v. Till, 50 S.D. 346, 210 N.W. 157 (1926). A judgment in quo warranto shall be rendered upon the right of the defendant, or both upon the right of the defendant and upon the right of the party alleged to be entitled to office, as justice shall require. SDCL 21-28-8. See, e.g., Burke v. Schmidt, 86 S.D. 71, 191 N.W.2d 281 (1971) (plaintiffs held to be entitled to office). SDCL 12-6-9 provides that if only one nominating petition is filed for a board vacancy, the person filing such is entitled to a certificate of election in the same manner as if he were a successful candidate after election. Since Burns was the only candidate who filed a valid nominating petition, he is the only party entitled to the office of school board member.
A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.
POSHEIM, C.J., and DUNN and MORGAN, JJ., concur. HENDERSON, J., concurs specially.. The nature of this action, therefore, is different from the action commenced in circuit court prior to the election. Consequently, the defendants’ claim of res judicata is without merit.
. Kurtenbach and Scholten place much reliance on Wingert v. Urban, 250 N.W.2d 731 (Iowa 1977), for the proposition that statutory noncompliance will be excused because of exceptional circumstances. As in the case at hand, a *639candidate in the Wingert case relied on erroneous information given by an official. This court, however, has not recognized the “exceptional circumstances” rule. In addition, unlike the candidate in Wingert, the candidates in this case were able to receive all the necessary information from the plain language of the relevant statute.