concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in that part of the majority opinion holding that medical services and supplies are not subject to the apportionment act. My reasons for that conclusion are somewhat different from those stated in the majority opinion, and will be outlined subsequently.
However, the holding that temporary disability benefits are not apportionable under the statute represents, in my opinion, a substantial departure from the clearly stated legislative intent. The rather unusual grounds for denying apportionment of temporary benefits, assigned by the controlling opinion for writing that limitation into the statute, are that (1) it would be difficult for doctors to estimate the contribution of a preexisting *366disease to temporary disability; (2) “results following injury” cannot be temporary; and (3) the purpose of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as recited in its original preamble (enacted twelve years before the act in question), was to promote restoration and rehabilitation of the injured worker. The latter is socially desirable, but it is not this Court’s job to determine whether an unambiguous statute is wise.
As to the first reason, difficulty of proof is not a basis for reading an exception into the statute. Moreover, here the commission was amply warranted on the medical evidence in finding a fifty percent contribution by Sanders’ preexisting disease. The statute requires the commission to make the apportionment on the best available evidence. That duty cannot be shirked because it is difficult. Southeastern Construction Co. v. Dodson, 247 Miss. 1, 153 So. 2d 276 (1963), decided that by a Unanimous court. As to the second reason, an industrial injury may have two types of results following the injury, temporary and permanent. No amount of sentiment or explanation can change that plain fact.
In short, and with deference, the controlling opinion reads into the apportionment act, I suggest, an exception which is not only not present, but which the statute in terms denies.
The apportionment statute was passed in 1960, as an amendment to section 4 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Miss. Code Ann. § 6998-04 (Supp. 1962); Miss. Laws 1960, ch. 277. It provides:
‘ ‘ Compensation shall be payable for disability or death of an employee from injury arising out of and in the course of employment, without regard to fault as to the cause of the injury, subject to the following:
“Where a preexisting physical handicap, disease or lesion is shown by medical findings to be a material contributing factor in the results following injury, the compensation which, but for this paragraph, would be *367payable shall be reduced by that proportion which such preexisting physical handicap, disease or lesion contributed to the production of the results following the injury.”
The Workmen’s Compensation Commission (affirming its attorney referee) found that Ollie Sanders, claimant and appellant, suffered a heart attack which arose out of and in the course of his employment. However, he had a preexisting atherosclerosis, which materially contributed to the heart attack, in the proportion of fifty percent. Claimant had been temporarily, totally disabled since his injury, which occurred about ten months before the commission’s order, and had not reached maximum medical recovery. Hence the commission awarded Sanders temporary total disability benefits at the rate of $17.50 per week, one-half of the maximum in the absence of contribution by a preexisting disease. The Circuit Court of Hinds County affirmed that order.
Both of the doctors who treated Sanders diagnosed his condition as a myocardial infarction. Both agreed that his work contributed to the onset of the heart attack, and his preexisting coronary artery disease contributed substantially to the incident. One of the doctors testified that in his opinion Sanders had recovered from the heart attack, and had no disability remaining from it, but that any residuary disability was from his preexisting condition.
APPORTIONMENT OP TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY BENEFITS
On his direct appeal, Sanders asserts and the controlling opinion holds that it was error for the commission to apportion temporary total disability benefits. The statute provides that where a preexisting disease is “a material contributing factor in the results following injury,” compensation otherwise payable should *368be reduced by the proportion by which the preexisting disease “contributed to the production of the results following the injury.” (Emphasis added.)-
The word “result” means a consequence, effect, or something brought about or achieved. Webster, International Dictionary 2126 (2d ed. 1950). The majority say that “the results following injury” cannot be known or determined until an injured worker has attained maximum medical recovery.
However, following an injury, there are under the act two kinds of results, temporary and permanent. Section 4 makes no distinction between them. Both are “results following injury.”
The problem is to ascertain the legislative intent as reflected in the statute. It includes both temporary and permanent “results,” since that word is in the plural, and is not restricted to those which are permanent only. If the legislature had intended to exclude from the apportionment act temporary benefits, it could have done so easily by expressly so stating, or by adding the word “permanent” before the word “results.” No such limitation was made, and I am not willing to amend the statute to accomplish a limitation which is contrary to its express terms.
Moreover, section 4 states that the “compensation” otherwise payable will be reduced by the amount of contribution of the preexisting disease. That word is defined as “the money allowable (allowance) payable to an injured worker or his dependents ...” Miss. Laws 1960, ch. 276, § 1; Miss. Code Ann. § 6998-02 (10) (Supp. 1962). The “money allowance payable” to the injured worker for a disability, either temporary or permanent, is a maximum of $35 per week. Code § § 6998-07, 6998-09. Apportionment reduces the “compensation” payable to the worker. Accordingly, the word “compensation,” as thus defined in the statute, would include the money allowances payable to the injured worker, the weekly *369benefits, for both temporary and permanent disability. Here again, a holding that apportionment does not apply to temporary benefits requires an insertion into the act of a limitation upon the word “compensation,” contrary to the definition in the act itself.
The purpose of the legislature in enacting the apportionment statute are also strong factors in considering whether it applies to temporary benefits. The underlying reasons for apportionment are well summarized in Comment, 32 Miss. L. J. 284 (1961):
“The purpose of such legislation which relieves the individual employer of liability for preexisting infirmities is two-fold: (1) it tends to lessen discrimination in hiring handicapped workers, and (2) it eliminates an injustice to the employer who would, without the apportionment rule, be required to pay more compensation for injury to a handicapped worker because of the preexisting infirmity or injury.”
Students of this question and at least one attorney member of the House of Representatives which passed both the 1958 and 1960 apportionment statutes are apparently of the opinion the latter applies to temporary as well as permanent disability benefits. Comment, 32 Miss. L. J. 284 (1961); Shanahan, Amendments to Workmen’s Compensation Act 1956-1958, 30 Miss. L. J. 105 (1959); Comment, 30 Miss. L. J. 312 (1959).
Apparently the legislature concluded it was not fair and equitable to require an employer to make compensation payments for that part of a disability attributable to a preexisting physical handicap or disease. Apportionment holds him liable only for that portion of the disability caused by his employment of claimant. With this purpose in mind, it is not carried out by declining to apply the apportionment act .to temporary total disability benefits, where (as here) the undisputed evidence by claimant’s own doctors is that a substantial part of his temporary disability represents the material *370contribution of Ms preexisting coronary artery disease. Section 4 apportions the contribution of the preexisting disease to all “results following the injury.” To say it does not apply to temporary, but only permanent, results constitutes an insertion into the act of that limitation. It also frustrates this essential purpose of section 4.
In the present case, all prerequisites to apportionment exist. Southeastern Construction Co. v. Dodson, 247 Miss. 1, 153 So. 2d 276 (1963); Federal Compress & Warehouse Co. v. Clark, 246 Miss. 868, 152 So. 2d 921 (1963); Cuevas v. Sutter Well Works, 245 Miss. 478, 150 So. 2d 524 (1963).
Eight other states have apportionment statutes, but their terminology varies. None are exactly similar in the respect to the Mississippi act. Only one of these states, Maryland, restricts apportionment to permanent disability. This is by a provision expressly excluding temporary disability. Md. Ann. Code art. 101, § 36 (7) (Supp. 1962). Others apportion temporary benefits. Lindskog v. Rosebud Mines, Inc., 84 Idaho 160, 369 P. 2d 580 (1962); Harris v. Bechtel Corp., 74 Idaho 308, 261 P. 2d 818 (1953); Hanson v. Independent School Dist., 50 Idaho 81, 294 P. 513 (1930). See also Dunn, Mississippi Workmen’s Compensation Law § 94.8 (Supp. 1963). These statutes are reviewed in the appendix to this opinion. The fact that other states apportion temporary benefits demonstrates that it is feasible and no more difficult than apportioning permanent compensation, assuming that is pertinent, as the majority opinion indicates.
In summary, I think the apportionment act applies to both temporary and permanent disability benefits. Its terms are plain and unambiguous. It indicates no contrary legislative intent. Both “the results following injury” and “compensation,” as used in section 4, reflect an intent to apply. the act to temporary benefits. *371Moreover, this is consistent with the purpose of apportionment, namely, requiring the employer to pay compensation only for that proportion of claimant’s disability attributable to his employment, and not for disability attributable to a preexisting disease or handicap. The wisdom and equality of that legislative decision is not a judicial question.
APPORTIONMENT OP MEDICAL SERVICES AND SUPPLIES
The commission correctly ordered appellees to pay the entire cost of medical services and supplies under section 7 of the act. Miss. Laws 1948, ch. 354, § 7; Miss. Laws 1950, ch. 412, § 5; Miss. Code Ann. § 6998-08 (1952). Agreeing with the majority on this point, I would suggest several other factors supporting that conclusion.
Section 4 states that where a preexisting disease is shown to be a material contributing factor “in the results following injury, the compensation which, but for this paragraph, would be payable shall be reduced by that proportion . . . .” (Emphasis added.)
The question is, what is meant by “compensation” which “would be payable”?
Code section 6998-02 (10) contains this definition: “ ‘Compensation’ means the money allowable (allowance) payable to an injured worker or his dependents as provided for in this act, and includes funeral benefits provided therein.” The last amendment of this section uses the word “allowable” in place of “allowance,” which latter word was in the definition prior to the 1960 amendment. Miss. Laws 1960, ch. 276, § 1. “Allowable” appears to be an erroneous transcription of the correct “allowance,” and even if not, does not affect the meaning of the definition.
Section 4 applies only to “compensation” which otherwise would be payable. That is defined as “the money allowance payable to an injured worker.” This rather *372unusual phrase evidences a legislative intent of a particular type: Apportionable compensation refers to the specific weekly money payments, which are paid directly to the worker or his dependents, being a maximum of $35 per week. Miss. Code Ann. §§ 6998-09, 6998-11, 6998-12, 6998-13 (1952). These payments are made directly to the worker, or, as stated in section 6998-19, “directly to the person entitled thereto, without an award,” except where controverted. They are in contrast to “medical services and supplies” under section 7. It does not provide for any money allowance payable to the worker, but requires the employer to furnish medical, surgical and other treatment “for such period as the nature of the injury or the process of recovery may require.”
The word “compensation” is used only twice in section 7, where it is stated that, if the employee unreasonably refuses to submit to medical treatment, the commission must suspend payment of “further compensation” during such time as the refusal continues, and no “compensation” shall be paid during such suspension. Section 7 thus contrasts compensation with medical treatment, and considers them separate and distinct factors. Moreover, under section 7 payments of medical bills are directed to the doctor and the hospital, but cannot be paid “until all forms required by the commission have been filed.”
In short, the apportionment act applies to the regular weekly payments of compensation payable to the injured worker or his dependents. Such weekly payments, and the furnishing of medical services and supplies, are in different categories, and are distinguishable. When these several provisions are considered together and then contrasted, they reflect a legislative intent to exclude the furnishing of medical services and supplies from the apportionment act. See Shanahan, Amendments to the Workmen’s Compensation Act 1956-58, 30 Miss. L. J. 105, 109 (1959).
*373Cross-appellants rely upon Graeber Bros. v. Taylor, 237 Miss. 691, 115 So. 2d 735, suggestion of error overruled, 237 Miss. 691, 117 So. 2d 469 (1959), and two related cases. Gibbs v. Bass, 237 Miss. 823, 116 So. 2d 542 (1959); Trehern v. Grafe Auto Co., 232 Miss. 854, 100 So. 2d 687 (1958). In Graeber payment of medical expenses by the insurance carrier and employer was held to toll the one-year statute of limitations, which provides for reopening a claim at any time within one year after date of “the last payment of compensation.” Miss. Code Ann. § 6998-27 (1952). This is the general rule on this particular point. 2 Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law § 78.43 (b) (1961). Graeber stated that furnishing medical treatment constitutes the “equivalent” of payment of compensation, and is indicative of “the recognition of liability.” The opinion on suggestion of error carefully limited the holding to that point. The payment of medical benefits was sufficiently analogous or “equivalent” to compensation as to result in tolling the statute. Graeber recognized the plain fact that a contrary rule would mislead many injured employees, and would not accomplish the legislative purpose to bar any further claim after no benefits of any kind have been actually received for one year. That limited holding does not answer or control the present question.
Idaho cases apportioning medical benefits are based upon statutes of different terminology and application. Lindskog v. Rosebud Mines, Inc., 84 Idaho 160, 369 P. 2d 580 (1962); Harris v. Bechtel Corp., 74 Idaho 308, 261 P. 2d 818 (1953).
Gillespie, Jones, and Brady, JJ., concur in this opinion.*374APPENDIX
In addition to Mississippi, eight states have statutes providing for the apportionment of compensation when a preexisting disease is aggravated by a compensable injury.
Cal. Lab. Code § 4663 (1955): “In case of aggravation of any disease existing prior to a compensable injury, compensation shall be allowed for the proportion of the disability due to aggravation of such prior disease which is reasonably attributed to the injury.”
Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 31-139 (1961) : “In the case of aggravation of a preexisting disease compensation shall be allowed only for such proportion of the disability or death due to the aggravation of such preexisting disease as may be reasonably attributed to the injury on which the claim is based.” This statute has been held to apply to occupational disease only. Cashman v. McTerman School, 130 Conn. 401, 34 A. 2d 874 (1943).
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 440.02(19) (Supp. 1963): “Where a preexisting disease is accelerated or aggravated by an accident arising out of and in the course of employment, only acceleration of death or the acceleration or aggravation of disability reasonably attributable to the accident shall be compensable.”
Idaho Code Ann. § 72-323 (Supp. 1963): “. . . If the degree or duration of disability resulting from an accident is increased or prolonged because of a preexisting injury or infirmity, the employer shall be liable only for the additional disability resulting from such accident. ...” This statute has been held to require apportionment of temporary disability benefits and medical expenses. Harris v. Bechtel Corp., 74 Idaho 308, 261 P. 2d 818 (1953).
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.005(2) (1962): “The board shall apportion the aggregate extent and duration of disability among the contributing causes including, but *375not limited to, the following: ... (b) preexisting disease previously disabling; (c) preexisting disease not previously disabling but aroused into disabling reality by the. injury for occupational disease. ’ ’
Md. Ann. Code art. 101, § 36(7) (Snpp. 1962) expressly provides that temporary benefits shall not be apportioned: “Whenever it shall appear that any permanent disability from which an employee is suffering-following an accidental injury, is due in part to such injury, and in part to a preexisting disease or infirmity, the Commission shall determine the proportion of such disability which is reasonably attributable to the injury and the proportion thereof which is reasonably attributable to the preexisting disease or infirmity, and such employee shall be entitled to compensation for that proportion of his disability which is reasonably attributable solely to the accident and shall not be entitled to compensation for that proportion of his disability which is reasonably attributable to the preexisting disease or infirmity. This subsection shall not apply to temporary total and temporary partial disability. ...”
N.D. Code Ann. § 65-05-15 (1960): “In case of aggravation of injury or disease existing prior tó a compensable injury, compensation, medical, hospital or funeral expenses, or death benefits, shall be allowed . . . only for such proportion of the disability, death benefit, or expense arising from the aggravation of such prior disease or injury as reasonably may be attributable to such compensable injury.”
Wash. Rev. Code § 51.32.100 (1951): “If it is determined by the department that an injured workman had, at the time of his injury, a preexisting- disease and that such disease delays or prevents recovery from such injury, the said department shall ascertain, as nearly as possible, the period over which the injury would have caused disability were it'not for .the .diseased condition and the extent of permanent partial. disability which *376tlie injury would have caused were it not for the disease, and award compensation only therefor.” This section has been held to provide for reduction of compensation where the preexisting disease affects the injury adversely, but allowing full compensation where the injury adversely affects the disease. McArthur v. Department of Labor & Industry, 168 Wash. 405, 12 P. 2d 418 (1932).