ON MOTIONS FOR REHEARING
BOYD, Justice.Both appellants and appellee have filed motions for rehearing. In their motion for rehearing, appellants contend that this court erred in failing to address their sixth point of error. We remain convinced that our disposition of appellants’ fifth point obviated the necessity for discussion of their sixth point. Consequently, appellants’ motion for rehearing is overruled.
In its motion for rehearing, appellee raises two points of error. In its first point, appel-lee challenges our consideration of the point raised by appellants in their supplemental brief concerning the effect of a reversal of the default judgment against Cathy but not against Andy. Appellee continues to argue that the point of error was waived because it was not raised prior to the original submission of this case before us. In support of that proposition, it relies upon Canales v. National Union Fire Insurance Company, 763 S.W.2d 20, 23 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied).
In Canales, the appellate court declined to consider sufficiency of the evidence points untimely raised by appellant in a post-submission brief. Id. at 23. In doing so, the court cited Rule 74(o) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, a local rule, and the case of Linan v. Linan, 632 S.W.2d 155 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1982, no writ).1
In pertinent part, Rule 74(o) provides:
Amendment or Supplementation. Briefs may be amended or supplemented at any time when justice requires upon such reasonable terms as the court may prescribe, and if the court shall strike or refuse to consider any part of a brief, the court shall on reasonable terms allow the same to be amended or supplemented.
In the Linan case, the appellate court commented that it was “authorized to permit the filing of amended briefs, including additional points of error not originally submitted, even after submission and the rendition of an opinion.” Linan, 632 S.W.2d at 156 (opinion on motion for rehearing). The court specifically *389noted, however, that it was not mandatory that it do so.
Suffice it to say, we think it is within the discretion of an appellate court to permit the filing of supplemental briefs “when justice requires.” Under the history of this case, which we set out in our original opinion on remand, we remain convinced that, after the remand to us, it was proper to consider the point appellants raised in their supplemental brief. Cf. Garrett v. State, 749 S.W.2d 784 (Tex.Crim.App.1986).
Without citation of relevant authority, ap-pellee additionally argues that “under the well established rules of appellate procedure,” the Texas Supreme Court’s remand of this ease for consideration of appellants’ unaddressed points of error limited our consideration to only those points presented on original submission. We do not agree. The high court remanded this case for the purpose of allowing this court to consider any matters pertinent to a proper disposition of the case which had not been discussed in our first opinion. Appellee’s first point is overruled.
In its second point, appellee contends that this court erred in finding that the subject insurance policy was not divisible between Andy and Cathy. Specifically, appellee argues that Andy and Cathy were each individual insureds under the policy and the fact that they jointly owned the policy was “irrelevant.” We do not agree that the fact that the insurance contract was jointly owned and intended to insure both Cathy and Andy is irrelevant. We remain convinced that changing a policy that protects two owners, to one that protects only one owner, is a material alteration of a policy which is not divisible between the joint owners. Appellee’s second point is overruled.
In its third point, appellee argues that we erred in holding that there was evidence at the hearing on the motion for new trial that Andy’s attorney was mistaken as to the legal adequacy of substitute service on Andy. Ap-pellee further argues that, even if there was such evidence, such a legal mistake is not, as a matter of law, sufficient to meet the first prong of the Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines2 test. Parenthetically, we overruled Andy’s point of error in which he argued he had established his right to a new trial pursuant to Craddock. Moreover, a careful reading of our original opinion reveals that our ruling was based on Andy’s failure to meet the second prong of the Craddock test.
Initially, in our original opinion, we did not say there was evidence at the hearing on the motion for new trial that Andy’s attorney was mistaken as to the legal adequacy of service upon his client. Rather, after noting that Andy’s attorney had argued in the motion that service upon Andy was inadequate, we commented that “it is not of consequence that appellant did not argue, in the motion for new trial, that his failure to answer was a mistake.” Indeed, it was not until after the opinion of the Texas Supreme Court that it was determined that Andy’s reliance upon inadequate service in failing to answer the suit was mistaken. We remain convinced that the record is sufficient to establish that Andy’s failure to file an answer was not deliberate, but was the result of a mistake of law.
Citing Bank One, Texas, N.A. v. Moody, 830 S.W.2d 81 (Tex.1992), appellee also argues that even if the record was sufficient to establish that Andy’s attorney received the citation and erroneously concluded that it was necessary to file an answer, that such error was not a mistake of law sufficient to satisfy the first prong of the Craddock test. However, we note that in Moody, the court held that the first prong of the test was met when Bank One failed to file an answer due to its mistaken belief that “freezing the accounts and submitting a check for the balance on the accounts was a sufficient answer.” Id. at 84. Bank One’s mistake of law is similar to the one here. We remain convinced that our original disposition of the appeal is correct and overrule all three of appellee’s points of error.
In summary, both appellants’ and appel-lee’s motions for rehearing are overruled.
. The court also noted that the additional points concerned evidence questions previously discussed in points raised in appellant's initial brief.
. 134 Tex. 388, 133 S.W.2d 124 (1939).