Defendant was convicted in a bench trial of involuntary manslaughter, MCL 750.321; MSA 28.553, and was subsequently sentenced to five years probation, with the first nine months to be spent in the Wayne County Jail on a work-release program. Defendant now appeals as of right.
The charge against defendant arose out of the February 3, 1980, death of Fred Warren, a prisoner at the Detroit Police Department Second Precinct lock-up where defendant was employed. Warren died as a result of being struck with a blackjack on the left side by defendant. The blow was the culmination of an argument between Warren and defendant, an argument that defendant claimed was the result of Warren’s refusal to turn over his belt to defendant upon being placed in a cell. Warren apparently was a severe alcoholic whose liver and spleen were so enlarged that they were in contact. The sudden impact of the black*588jack caused Warren’s spleen to rupture against his hardened liver, resulting in substantial internal bleeding.
Defendant raises two issues on appeal. First, that the information charging manslaughter by an unlawful act not naturally tending to cause death or great bodily harm failed to state a crime. Second, that the trial court’s verdict was based upon an erroneous standard that deprived defendant, as a police officer, of his lawful discretion to use reasonable force.
In his first argument, defendant contends that the crime of involuntary manslaughter cannot exist unless the act committed was inherently dangerous so that the resulting death was foreseeable. The Supreme Court has defined the crime of involuntary manslaughter as one not requiring intent or foreseeability of harm. People v Townes, 391 Mich 578, 591; 218 NW2d 136 (1974). The information charging defendant was consistent with this definition, alleging that defendant killed Warren "unintentionally and without malice, by doing an unlawful act, to wit: assaulting [Warren] with a slapjack or blackjack, an act not naturally tending to cause death or great bodily harm”. We do not believe that the principle that criminal liability must reflect a culpable mental state is violated by the Townes definition of involuntary manslaughter. Cf. People v Aaron, 409 Mich 672, 708; 299 NW2d 304 (1980).
In his second argument, defendant misapplies the doctrine that a police officer has the right in making an arrest to use that force reasonable under the circumstances. People v Doss, 406 Mich 90, 101-103; 276 NW2d 9 (1979). The events that resulted in Fred Warren’s death did not involve his arrest. Mr. Warren was already arrested, had *589been placed in a holding cell and, presumably, was without means of escape. Under these circumstances, the severe force that was apparently utilized by defendant was unjustified. Indeed, a police department memorandum applicable to persons already arrested and imprisoned mandates that no measure of severity is justified when there is no reason to fear the prisoner’s escape. Further, even if the incident had occurred during the decedent’s arrest, a question of fact nevertheless would have existed as to whether the force used was reasonable under the circumstances.
Defendant does not specifically argue that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. Nevertheless, because defendant has alluded to such a claim in his first argument, we agree with the dissenting opinion that such an argument bears addressing. In determining the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, we view the trial evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Hampton, 407 Mich 354, 368; 285 NW2d 284 (1979); People v Johnson, 112 Mich App 483, 489; 316 NW2d 247 (1982); People v Delongchamps, 103 Mich App 151, 159; 302 NW2d 626 (1981). Involuntary manslaughter has been defined as "the killing of another without malice and unintentionally, but in doing some unlawful act not amounting to a felony nor naturally tending to cause death or great bodily harm, or in negligently doing some act lawful in itself, or by the negligent omission to perform a legal duty”. People v Townes, 391 Mich 578, 590; 218 NW2d 136 (1974); quoting People v Ryczek, 224 Mich 106, 110; 194 NW 609 (1923). We believe that when the evidence *590adduced at trial is viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, it is more than sufficient to allow a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant killed Fred Warren in the commission of an unlawful act.
Three prisoners in the Second Precinct lock-up were eyewitnesses to the alleged assault. Timothy Washington testified that he was processed by defendant at the same time that Warren was processed. He indicated that Warren and defendant argued about some medicine that was taken from Warren and over whether Warren was a "junkie”. According to Washington, the arguing continued after defendant had placed Warren within a cell. He stated that defendant reopened the cell door, stepped inside and spit at Warren. When Warren spit back, defendant took out his blackjack, ran toward the retreating Warren and struck him on the left side with the blackjack. Washington also stated that defendant kicked Warren around the knee and told him, "If he said anything else he would crack his skull”. Washington indicated that Warren slid down the wall after being struck. He also testified that while Warren was belligerent and ready to fight, he threw no punches.
Chuckie Williams, who was in the cell adjacent to Warren’s cell, testified that defendant and Warren were "passing words” as Warden was led to the cell. Williams stated that defendant taunted Warren after locking him in the cell, and then reopened the cell door and spit at Warren. Williams testified that he saw defendant pull out a blackjack, raise it over his shoulder and run into the cell. Williams lost sight of defendant but heard a hitting sound and then something hitting the wall. Williams stated that he heard defendant *591warn Warren that if he moved defendant would split his skull.
Claude Langston, who was in a cell diagonally across from Warren, testified that Warren staggered and spoke profanely to defendant as he was placed in the cell. Langston indicated that defendant stood outside the cell listening to Warren curse at him when Warren spit at defendant. Defendant spit back as he re-entered the cell and drew out his blackjack. Langston stated that defendant cornered Warren and that Warren attempted unsuccessfully to throw punches. According to Langston, defendant hit Warren once with the blackjack and then kicked him in the stomach.
Defendant testified on his own behalf. He stated that he suspected Warren of ingesting drugs in a bathroom and that the two exchanged words as Warren was registered. Defendant claimed that after he closed the cell door, he noticed that Warren still had his belt. When he requested the item, Warren refused and cursed him. He testified that when Warren spit at him, he spit back and entered the cell to retrieve the belt. Defendant contended that Warren began to throw punches, so he struck Warren once in the side with his blackjack. He státed that he then grabbed the belt and left the cell.
A glaring difference between the testimony of the defendant and that of the three witnesses to the incident is that none of the prisoners observed a dispute over Mr. Warren’s belt. Each of those witnesses indicated that the blow from the blackjack was the culmination of an argument and spitting contest between defendant and Warren that had begun before Warren was even placed in the cell. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of *592fact could have concluded that defendant re-entered the cell not to retrieve Warren’s belt but because he was angry at Warren and wanted to physically retaliate for Warren’s cursing and spitting. A rational trier of fact could have thus viewed defendant’s conduct as a felonious assault or an assault with intent to do great bodily harm. Moreover, even if a trier of fact accepted as true, as the trial court did, defendant’s claim that he reentered the cell to retrieve Warren’s belt, a guilty verdict could nevertheless be supported. As the trial court observed, it should have been plainly evident from the arguing that preceded the entry into the cell that Warren was not going to be cooperative and that force would be necessary to remove his belt. Thus, although defendant had a responsibility to retrieve the item, it is manifest that the task should have been accomplished with the aid of other officers to avoid the need to use severe force. As noted above, police department policy prohibited measures of severity absent a reason to fear the prisoner’s escape. A rational trier of fact could have concluded that defendant had no justification for using the force that he did, and, therefore, committed an unlawful act — at minimum a simple assault and battery — in doing so. Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s definition of involuntary manslaughter in People v Townes, supra, the offense could have been deemed proven beyond a reasonable doubt. For these reasons, we affirm defendant’s conviction and sentence.
Affirmed.