¶ 128. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). I join the majority's holding with regard to the Solid Waste Law, and I concur in the mandate permitting remediation under the Spills Law. I dissent to that part of the majority opinion holding that the Spills Law is applicable to actions by the State to impose forfeitures for hazardous substance spills which were initially caused in part by actions preceding the statute's effective date, and which continue to discharge after that date. This holding allows the State to penalize actors for conduct that was legal at the time it occurred, and in my view violates, the Ex Post Facto clause of the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions.18
¶ 129. In 1969, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 144.43 (1967), the Solid Waste Law, the DNR promulgated *194standards for the disposal of hazardous substances. The DNR rules made owners and occupants of a premises responsible for the collection of all solid waste accumulated at the premises, and for the waste's proper disposal at a licensed facility. In the alternative, the owners and occupants could arrange with a licensed transporter to convey their solid wastes to a proper facility. See Wis. Admin. Code §§ RD 51.05-.06 (1969). Violators of the Solid Waste Law were subject to penalties, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 144.57 (1969).
¶ 130. For the first half of 1970, Chrysler contracted with Keller Transit to remove and dispose of drums containing manufacturing waste. Keller was not a licensed transporter. Keller dumped and buried the drums. Eight years later, the Spills Law, Wis. Stat. § 144.76, became effective, providing that persons having possession of or control over a hazardous substance being discharged, or who cause a hazardous discharge, shall take actions necessary to restore the environment and to minimize the harmful effects of any discharge. Persons violating the Spills Law were also subject to the penalty provisions of Wis. Stat. § 144.57. The drums buried by Keller were not discovered until late 1992, and were found to have leaked hazardous substances. The State seeks penalties against Chrysler for every day of violation of the Solid Waste Law in 1970,2 and for every day of violation of the Spills Law since May 21,1978.
*195¶ 131. The majority opinion holds that "[a]s to remediation, we conclude that the legislature intended to apply the Spills Law retroactively. As to penalties and forfeitures, we conclude that the imposition of penalties in this case does not constitute a retroactive application of the Spills Law." Majority op. at 161-62. These conclusions are inconsistent, at best. This is particularly true when both provisions apply to the same conduct.
¶ 132. I do not believe that the majority has adequately analyzed whether either the remedial or the punitive portion of the Spills Law can be applied retroactively under the retroactivity analysis test set out by the United States Supreme Court in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994), as clarified by Lindh v. Murphy, 117 S. Ct. 2059 (1997).3 I believe that such an analysis would result in the conclusion that the legislature intended the remedial portion of the Spills Law to apply retroactively, therefore I agree with the majority's ultimate conclusion on that point. I do not believe, however, that such an analysis would result in the conclusion that the legislature intended the penalty assessment portion of the Spills Law to apply to past conduct. Despite the assertions of the *196majority, the penalties it allows against Chrysler here are based on pre-Spills Law conduct, and are unconstitutional.
¶ 133. The Supreme Court recently described why our citizens and institutions disfavor retroactive application of laws, particularly those which impose penalties:
[T]he presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic. Elementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled expectations should not be lightly disrupted. . . .It is therefore not surprising that the antiretroactivity principle finds expression in several provisions of our [national] Constitution. . . . These provisions demonstrate that retroactive statutes raise particular concerns. The Legislature's unmatched powers allow it to sweep away settled expectations suddenly and without individualized consideration. Its responsivity to political pressures poses a risk that it may be tempted to use retroactive legislation as a means of retribution against unpopular groups or individuals....
Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265-67 (1994) (citations omitted).
¶ 134. The Landgraf analysis, as clarified by Lindh, involves three steps. First, the court must consider whether the legislature has clearly expressed an intention in the statutory text that the benefits of retroactivity outweigh the disadvantages, and that the statute should apply to conduct occurring before its enactment. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 257, 268. If there is no express statement of retroactivity in the statute, *197the court will employ traditional rules of statutory construction to determine whether application of the statute would have a retroactive effect. See Lindh, 117 S. Ct. at 2063. If after applying rules of construction and interpretation the court finds there would be a retroactive effect, Landgraf & default rule, or the presumption against retroactivity, applies. See id 4 In this *198case, the majority concedes that application of the Spills Law necessarily involves Chrysler's past affirmative conduct of surrendering its hazardous waste to an unlicensed hauler. See majority op. at 137,141.
¶ 135. As a first step, there is no dispute that the Wisconsin legislature did not clearly express an intent that the Spills Law be applied to pre-enactment conduct.5 Nor does the forfeitures provision applicable to Spills Law violations expressly address retroactivity.6
¶ 136. Thus, the next step in the Landgraf analysis is to determine whether application of the Spills Law will have-a retroactive effect. The majority denies *199that application of the forfeiture provision of the Spills Law to Chrysler will have a retroactive effect based on its interpretation of the verb "causes" in Wis. Stat. § 144.76(3). Because the verb "causes" is not defined in the Spills Law, the majority invokes rules of statutory construction to determine the common and ordinary meaning of "causes." In doing so, the majority first considers the purpose of Wis. Stat. § 144.76.
¶ 137. This court has said that the purpose of the Spills Law is to "prevent, minimize, and, if necessary, abate and remedy contamination of this state's environment. . .caused by discharges of hazardous substances." State v. Mauthe, 123 Wis. 2d 288, 299, 366 N.W.2d 871 (1985); also see Wis. Stat. § 144.025;7 144.76. The majority contends that this statement of purpose alone compels the conclusion that the legislature intended the verb "causes" to include both the commission and omission of an act which leads to a hazardous waste spill. See majority op. at 169. But identifying remediation as a statutory purpose does not, ipso facto, insert "failure to remediate" into Wis. Stat. § 144.76(3), the liability provision. Nor does a statement of legislative purpose necessarily absolve a statute of an ex post facto taint. "It will frequently be true. . .that retroactive application of a new statute would vindicate its purpose more fully. That consideration, however, is not sufficient to rebut the presumption against retroactivity." Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 285-86.
*200¶ 138. The majority consults a legal dictionary to ascertain the meaning of the verb "causes." Normally, our rules of statutory construction, which seek to ascertain the common and ordinary meaning of a term, look to general dictionaries of the English language. For instance, in the American Heritage Dictionary at 305, the verb "cause" is defined as
1. To be the cause of or reason for; result in. 2. To bring about or compel by authority or force: The moderator invoked a rule causing the debate to be ended.
The difference between an ordinary dictionary definition of the verb "cause," and the definition found in a legal dictionary may be minor. But the majority combines the law dictionary definitions of both the verb "cause" and the noun "cause" to reach its conclusion that Chrysler's failure to act, more than eight years after delivering its waste to Keller, can be a reason for the condition of discharge existing on the Bark River site today. Enhancing the definition of the verb with the definition of the noun enables the majority to put the verb "causes" as used in Wis. Stat. § 144.76(3) on a timeless continuum. In addition, the majority blends Mauthe's conclusion that conscious human conduct is not needed to comport with the definition of "discharge" into a conclusion that conscious human conduct is not needed to fit the liability provision "causes a discharge." See majority op. at 170.
¶ 139. Moreover, the majority's brief effort at statutory construction does not take up the canon that when determining the meaning of a single word or phrase, the word or phrase should be viewed in light of the entire statute. See State v. Sweat, 208 Wis. 2d 409, 416, 561 N.W.2d 695 (1997). The contemporaneous lan*201guage of various other Spills Law provisions are, like Wis. Stat. § 144.76(3), devoid of an intent to apply to past conduct.
¶ 140. For example, Wis. Stat. § 144.76(4) provides:
"PREVENTION OF DISCHARGE, (a) The department may require that preventive measures be taken by any person possessing or having control over hazardous substances when it finds:
. . .2. Past discharges by this person indicate that the existing control measures are inadequate in preventing discharges." (Emphasis added.)
In addition, Wis. Stat. § 144.76(7)(b) provides:
The person causing the discharge shall reimburse the department for actual and necessary expenses incurred in carrying out its duties under this subsection. (Emphasis added.)
Subsection (9)(c) of the Spills Law also speaks in contemporaneous terms: "Any person discharging with a permit or approved under this chapter is exempted from the reporting and penalty requirements of this section." Finally, Wis. Stat. § 144.76(10)(b) directs that:
"Any person who discharges a hazardous substance, where the responsibilities for such a discharge are prescribed by statute other than ss. 144.60 to 144.74, shall be subject to the penalty under either this section or the other section but not both."
¶ 141. All of the referenced subsections speak in active terms about persons who possess or control, or who cause, hazardous discharges. Application of those subsections would not have a retroactive effect. How*202ever, under the majority's application of Wis. Stat. § 144.76(3) to Chrysler, that subsection does have a retroactive effect.
¶ 142. Landgraf reminds us that the Court has "strictly construed the Ex Post Facto Clause to prohibit application of new statutes creating or increasing punishments after the fact." 511 U.S. at 275 n.28. In this case, the State seeks to recover penalties from Chrysler. The majority concedes that "authorization of penalties up to $5,000 per day serves, at least in part, to punish offenders of the Solid Waste Law."8 Majority op. at 153-54. In my view, by applying the Spills Law to Chrysler, the State seeks to create or increase punishment after the fact. Chrysler's only conduct in this case occurred in 1970. Under the majority's reasoning, Chrysler will pay Spills Law forfeitures for action it took eight years before the law was enacted.9
¶ 143. The majority relies on the continuing nature of a discharge to avoid invocation of ex post facto: "In this case, the ongoing nature of a hazardous substance spill eliminates any concern that the State seeks to 'impose a new duty' or 'attach new legal conse*203quences' to events completed before the effective date of the Spills Law." Majority op. at 172. But the federal environmental case law cited by the majority makes a distinction between prospective remedial or injunctive relief, and the retroactive imposition of compensatory or punitive sanctions.
¶ 144. The majority cites United States v. Diamond Shamrock, 17 E.R.C. 1329, 12 Envtl. L. Rep. 20, 819 (N.D. Ohio 1981), where a district court considered a summary judgment motion under § 6973 of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). The defendant asserted that as it applied to antecedent acts, the RCRA provision was unlawfully retroactive. The district court disagreed, citing legislative history characterizing the particular RCRA provision as "designed to abate and remedy conditions which constitute imminent hazards to health or the environment. Its focus is on the prevention and amelioration of conditions, rather than the cessation of any particular affirmative human conduct." 12 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20822. The Diamond Shamrock court concluded that because § 6973 provided for injunctive relief, "as opposed to compensatory or punitive relief," it was not impermissibly retroactive. See id.
¶ 145. The majority essentially ignores this distinction by the Diamond Shamrock court in the remainder of its discussion of penalties for Spills Law violation. In avoiding this analysis, the majority overlooks the fact that the presumption against retroactivity is strongest when the application of the law results in punishment.10
*204¶ 146. Despite the ongoing nature of a hazardous discharge, Chrysler's conduct in this case, unlike the *205conduct of Mr. Mauthe, was a completed event before the enactment of the Spills Law. The majority's application of the forfeiture provision to Chrysler attaches new legal consequences to a completed event.11
¶ 147. In my view, the majority's analysis of the retroactive effect of the Spills Law forfeiture provision, as applied to Chrysler, is inadequate, in error, and as a result reaches the wrong conclusion. I would affirm that part of the decision and order of the circuit court granting summary judgment to Chrysler on the State's request for forfeitures under the Spills Law.
¶ 148. I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson and Justice Ann Walsh Bradley join in this opinion.Article I of the United States Constitution provides:
Section 10. No State shall.. .pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.
Article I of the Wisconsin Constitution provides:
Attainder; ex post facto; contracts. Section 12. No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, nor any law impairing the obbgation of contracts, shall ever be passed, and no conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate.
There is no dispute that the Solid Waste Law also permits the State to seek remediation of the site in the form of removing the hazardous material. Beginning in late 1993, Chrysler excavated the site and removed 401 drums. Chrysler also remediated the contaminated soil, but thus far has not remediated the contaminated groundwater.
In deciding that application of the penalty provision of the Spills Law in this case is not retroactive, and thus is not unconstitutional, the majority quotes Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 269-70 (1994), "a statute does not operate 'retrospectively' merely because it is applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the statute's enactment, or upsets expectations based on prior law. Rather, the court must ask whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment." This single reference to the retroactivity analysis of Landgraf is insufficient to support the majority's conclusion.
Citing Wisconsin cases, the majority acknowledges the presumption that legislation applies prospectively only, unless express statutory language or necessary implication indicates an intended retroactive application. See majority op. at 162. In my view, the approach taken by our prior decisions is consistent with the approach and philosophy of Landgraf. See, e.g., Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Smith, 154 Wis. 2d 199, 223-24, 453 N.W.2d 856 (1990) ("The strong common-law tradition is that the legislature's primary function is to declare law to regulate future behavior. As a matter of justice, laws should not be enforced before people can learn of the law and conduct themselves accordingly, and retroactivity disturbs the stability of past transactions.").
We have noted that the doctrine of prospective interpretation does not apply to procedural or remedial statutes. See, e.g., Gutter v. Seamandel, 103 Wis. 2d 1, 17, 308 N.W.2d 403 (1981); Employers Ins., 154 Wis. 2d at 224 n.21. "While statutes in general are construed prospectively the rule is otherwise with statutes whose operation is procedural or remedial. . . .'This doctrine. . .is not understood to apply to remedial statutes, which. . .only go to confirm rights already existing and in furtherance of the remedy, by curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations.'" Gutter, 103 Wis. 2d at 17-18 (citations omitted). Procedural and remedial statutes are therefore distinguished from statutes that affect substantive rights. See, e.g., the distinction made by the Landgraf Court: "We have sometimes said that new 'remedial' statutes.. .should presumptively apply to pending cases. While that statement holds true for some kinds of remedies, we have not classified a statute introducing damages liability as the sort of 'remedial' *198change that should presumptively apply in pending cases." 511 U.S. at 285 n.37.
I conclude that the Spills Law, as it imposes liability for the restoration or remediation of environmental contamination and for penalties or forfeitures, affects substantive rights. Effective May 21,1978 it imposed a new obligation on persons possessing or controlling or causing a hazardous discharge. Therefore, the Spills Law is not merely procedural or affecting a remedy.
Wis. Stat. § 144.76 (1977) Hazardous substance spills. (1) DEFINITIONS. As used in this section:
(a) "Discharge" means, but is not limited to, spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying or dumping.
(b) "Hazardous substance" has the meaning given under s. 144.30(10).
(3) RESPONSIBILITY. Persons having possession of or control over a hazardous substance being discharged, or who cause a hazardous discharge, shall take the actions necessary to restore the environment to the extent practicable and minimize the harmful effects from any discharge to the air, lands or waters of this state.
Wis. Stat. § 144.57 (1969) Penalties. Any person who violates this chapter, or who fails, neglects or refuses to obey any general or special order of the department, shall forfeit not less than $10 nor more than $5,000, for each violation, failure or refusal. Each day of continued violation is a separate offense.
Wis. Stat. § 144.025, the statement of policy and purpose for ch. 144, states that this act and rules and orders pursuant to it shall be liberally construed in favor of the policy objectives of the act. I agree that remedial statutes, such as those requiring restoration of contaminated property, can be liberally construed. Punitive statutes, in contrast, are strictly construed.
Violations of both the Solid Waste Law and the Spills Law were subject to penalties or forfeitures as provided by Wis. Stat. § 144.57, or a subsequent version of the same statute. See majority op. at 141.
I am perplexed by the majority's conclusion, despite Chrysler's assertion that penalties cannot be assessed under the Spills Law until a defendant affirmatively declines to undertake remedial action, that "a plain reading of (the statutes) illustrates that a de facto violation of the Spills Law is sufficient to trigger penalties." Majority op. at 145 n.13 (emphasis added). If de facto violation means a literal, in fact or actual violation, how is that description different from Chrysler's interpretation?
The parties' briefs and the majority opinion to some extent blend the analysis of whether a statute which imposes sanctions for past conduct violates either the specific prohibition against ex post facto laws, or the general presumption *204against retroactivity. This court said that "An ex post facto law is one which imposes punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time it was committed or imposes an additional punishment to that then prescribed. [This] constitutional provision!) appl[ies] only to statutes which impose penalties." Wis. Bingo Sup. & Equip. Co. v. Bingo Control Bd., 88 Wis. 2d 293, 304-05, 276 N.W.2d 716 (1979) (citations omitted). The Wis. Bingo court went on to describe the prohibition against retroactive laws. "This doctrine is applicable to civil statutes which adversely affect vested rights. A retrospective statute is unconstitutional if its effect is to deprive a person of life, liberty or property without due process of law." Id. at 306 (citation omitted).
More recently, this court adhered to the United States Supreme Court's definition of an ex post facto law as one which "punishes as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done; which makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission, or which deprives one charged with crime of any defense available according to law at the time when the act was committed. . . ." State v. Thiel, 188 Wis. 2d 695, 703, 524 N.W.2d 641 (1994), quoting Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 42 (1990). In my view, the ex post facto prohibition is directed not only against crimes, but against certain civil offenses. For instance, this court cited both Thiel and Collins in State v. Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d 252, 272, 541 N.W.2d 105 (1995), when it said that "[i]t is well established that the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws applies only to penal statutes." Black's Law Dictionary at 1132 (6th ed. 1009), defines the word "penal" as "punishable; inflicting a punishment; containing a penalty, or relating to a penalty." Black's defines "penal action" in this manner:
In its broadest context, it refers to criminal prosecution. More particularly, it refers to a civil action in which a wrongdoer is subject to a fine or penalty payable to the aggrieved party... The word 'penal' is inherently a much broader term than 'criminal' since it pertains *205to any punishment or penalty and relates to acts which are not necessarily delineated as criminal.
Id.
Indeed, when the majority opines that "Chrysler caused the discharge at issue after the Spills Law took effect in 1978, irrespective of Chrysler's activities prior to that date," majority op. at 173 (emphasis added), it unleashes Spills Law forfeiture liability on anyone who failed to restore land or groundwater contaminated by a hazardous discharge. The majority's following statement, that "because Chrysler generated the hazardous substances, and caused their discharge after 1978 by failing to remediate, it is liable ..." does not re-tether liability to the terms of the statute.