In Docket No. 192303, defendant City of Midland appeals as of right from the trial court’s amended judgment entered in favor of plaintiffs CS&P, Inc., 3-S Construction, Inc., and LBL Investments following a jury trial. In Docket No. 192304, Midland appeals as of right from the amended judgment entered in favor of plaintiff Cincinnati Insurance Company following a consolidated jury trial. We affirm.
According to the undisputed testimony, water and sewage emanating from the toilets and floor drains invaded the premises of a commercial building located in Midland and owned by LBL Investments. Both CS&P and 3-S Construction occupied suites in the lower level of the building. The flooding caused extensive damage to the building and its contents. The tenants could not occupy the lower portion of *143the building for several weeks. CS&P received $48,367.62 in insurance proceeds from Cincinnati Insurance because of the damage. Cincinnati Insurance subsequently received a $10,000 salvage refund. Broken risers in the sewer on a street adjacent to the building caused a blockage, and diverted the water and sewage into the building. Midland admitted that it owned the sewer system, that it was responsible for maintaining, installing, and repairing sanitary sewers, and that the section of the sewer that failed had been cleaned and inspected, no problems having been found.
On November 2, 1994, CS&P, 3-S Construction, and LBL Investments filed a one-count complaint against Midland, claiming that Midland was liable for damages to the building and its contents under a trespass-nuisance theory. On November 7, 1994, Cincinnati Insurance, as the subrogee of CS&P, filed a complaint against Midland. In its pretrial statement, Cincinnati Insurance indicated that it was proceeding under a theory of trespass-nuisance. Midland pleaded governmental immunity and contributory or comparative negligence as affirmative defenses to both complaints.
3-S Construction, LBL Investments, and Cincinnati Insurance all moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(9) and (10), arguing that Midland had admitted to the elements of trespass-nuisance and that negligence did not need to be proved to find liability under a trespass-nuisance theory. CS&P made a similar motion pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). Midland filed motions for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), (8), and (10), arguing that because maintenance of a sewer system *144is a governmental function, plaintiffs’ claims were barred by governmental immunity.
The trial court held that plaintiffs had pleaded causes of action under the trespass-nuisance exception to governmental immunity, that a genuine issue of material fact remained only with respect to plaintiffs’ damages, and that governmental immunity was not a defense for Midland. The trial court also ruled that negligence was not an element that plaintiffs had to prove to establish Midland’s liability under a trespass-nuisance theory. Following a jury trial with respect to damages, CS&P was awarded $30,348.74 in damages, interest, and costs; LBL Investments was awarded $20,802.99 in damages and interest; 3-S Construction was awarded $10,739.21 in damages and interest; 3-S Construction and LBL Investments were jointly awarded $165.80 in costs; and Cincinnati Insurance, as the subrogee of CS&P, was awarded $33,618. The trial court subsequently awarded mediation sanctions to plaintiffs on the basis of Midland’s refusal to accept the meditation determinations.
Midland’s sole issue on appeal is that the trial court erred in ruling that plaintiffs did not need to prove negligence as a predicate to establishing liability under the trespass-nuisance exception to governmental liability. We disagree.
Under the governmental immunity act, MCL 691.1401 et seq.) MSA 3.996(101) et seq., governmental agencies are immune from tort liability when engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function. Phinney v Perlmutter, 222 Mich App 513, 549; 564 NW2d 532 (1997). In Hadfield v Oakland Co Drain Comm’r, 430 Mich 139; 422 NW2d 205 (1988), the Court considered whether there was a nuisance *145exception to governmental immunity. The Court concluded that a limited trespass-nuisance exception to governmental immunity existed. Continental Paper & Supply Co, Inc v Detroit, 451 Mich 162, 164; 545 NW2d 657 (1996); Hadfield, supra at 145, 205, 209, 213.
Trespass-nuisance is a “trespass or interference with the use or enjoyment of land caused by a physical intrusion that is set in motion by the government or its agents and resulting in personal or property damage.” Continental Paper, supra at 164; Hadfield, supra at 169, 209. To establish trespass-nuisance, a plaintiff must show: (1) condition (nuisance or trespass); (2) cause (physical intrusion); and (3) causation or control (by government). Continental Paper, supra at 164; Hadfield, supra at 169. The trespass-nuisance doctrine applies only to state and local governments. See Cloverleaf Car Co v Phillips Petroleum Co, 213 Mich App 186, 193; 540 NW2d 297 (1995).1
In Peterman v Dep’t of Natural Resources, 446 Mich 177, 205, n 42; 521 NW2d 499 (1994), the Court stated the following with regard to a claim pursuant to the trespass-nuisance doctrine:
While a governmental entity must have been a proximate cause of the injury, “the source of the intrusion” need not originate from “government-owned land.” Li [v Feldt (After Remand), 434 Mich 584; 456 NW2d 55 (1990)], supra at 594, n 10. Moreover, “[n]egligence is not a necessary element of this cause of action.” Robinson v Wyoming Twp, 312 Mich 14, 24; 19 NW2d 469 (1945). This is true even if an instru*146mentality causing the trespass-nuisance was “built with all due care, and in strict conformity to the plan adopted by” a governmental agency or department. Seaman v City of Marshall, 116 Mich 327, 329-330; 74 NW 484 (1898).
This Court is obligated to follow the Supreme Court’s decision in Peterman until such time as the Supreme Court overrules itself.2 See O’Dess v Grand Trunk W R Co, 218 Mich App 694, 698, 700; 555 NW2d 261 (1996). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in ruling that plaintiffs did not need to prove negligence as a predicate to establishing liability under the trespass-nuisance exception to governmental immunity.3 Id.; Robinson, supra at 23-24.
Affirmed.
Kelly, P.J., concurred.A person who is not a governmental agency must intend to intrude upon the private property of another in order to be liable under a trespass theory. Cloverleaf, supra at 195. A private actor is not hable for a negligent intrusion onto the property of another. Id.
Unlike the dissent, we conclude that we are bound by the rule in Peterman. Even if the footnote in Peterman is dicta, we believe that the cases cited there bind us to the same rule. See Robinson, supra at 23-24. The trespass-nuisance exception to governmental immunity has its roots in the “Taking” Clause of the Michigan Constitution, Const 1835, art 1, § 19 through Const 1963, art 10, § 2. “Trespassory invasions that stopped short of being ‘takings’ of property were considered actions for which governmental entities should not escape liability.” Hadfield v Oakland Co Drain Comm’r, 430 Mich 139, 155, 168-169; 422 NW2d 205 (1988) (Brickley, J.).
In most jurisdictions, the liability of a municipality for the damage caused by the clogging of a drain or sewer is predicated in the first instance upon its negligence. Anno: Municipality’s liability for damage resulting from obstruction or clogging of drains or sewers, 59 ALR2d 281, 301, § 7[a], Professor Luke K. Cooperrider criticized the Court’s decision in Robinson, supra, as blurring the “distinction between the intrusion that is the intended or necessary result of the defendant’s act and that which is accidental.” Cooperrider, The court, the legislature, and governmental tort liability in Michigan, 72 Mich L R 187, 243 (1973).