(dissenting). In this case, the trial court refused to give the jurors plaintiffs requested instruction on the issue of mitigating measures when determining handicapped status. The primary question is whether the Court of Appeals erred in upholding that decision. It is a question of first impression for our Court.
I disagree with the majority’s holding that the jury’s verdict was not “inconsistent with substantial justice.” Johnson v Corbet, 423 Mich 304, 327; 377 NW2d 713 (1985). Therefore, I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, vacate the jury’s verdict, and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
A trial court’s failure to give a jury instruction when requested is reviewed under the “harmless error” standard. MCR 2.613(A); id. at 326. The issue of mitigating measures is generally a question of fact for the jury. However, if the jury is to perform its function properly, it must receive correct instructions regarding the law on the effect of mitigating measures.
Generally, the decision that an instruction is accurate and applicable to a case is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Williams v Coleman, 194 Mich App 606, 623; 488 NW2d 464 (1992). A trial court has the discretion to give an instruction not included in the Standard Jury Instructions. However, its discretion is limited by the duty to assure that the instructions given accurately state the law. MCR 2.516(D)(4); Wengel v Herfert, 189 Mich App 427, 431; 473 NW2d 741 (1991).
The issue here is whether the trial court fulfilled its duty to assure that an accurate instruction was given. Because this is a case of first impression for this *620Court and because the Michigan Handicappers’ Civil Rights Act (hcra)1 definition of handicap reflects that of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ada),2 I find the guidance from the federal courts highly persuasive.3 The guidance is that, when assessing an individual’s handicap status, one considers his condition as it would exist without regard to medication or other mitigating measures.
Therefore, I would find that the failure to give the requested instruction regarding mitigating measures was not harmless error.
i
Before its amendment in 1990, the HCRA defined the term “handicap” as follows:
[A] determinable physical or mental characteristic of an individual or a history of the characteristic which may result from disease, injury, congenital condition of birth, or functional disorder which characteristic ... is unrelated to the individual’s ability to perform the duties of a particular job or position, or is unrelated to the individual’s qualifications for employment or promotion. [MCL 37.1103(b)(i); MSA 3.550(103)(b)(i).]
The Legislature amended the definitional language in 1990 to define “handicap.” It states in pertinent part:
*621A determinable physical or mental characteristic of an individual, which may result from disease, injury, congenital condition of birth, or functional disorder, if the characteristic .. . substantially limits 1 or more of the major life activities of that individual and is unrelated to the individual’s ability to perform the duties of a particular job or position ... . [MCL37.1103(e)(i)(A);MSA3.550(103)(e)(i)(A).]
Under both definitions, a condition related to an individual’s ability to perform the duties of a job is not a handicap. Koester v Novi, 213 Mich App 653, 661-662; 540 NW2d 765 (1995). Mr. Chmielewski’s physician testified that, as long as plaintiff took his antirejection medication, his liver transplant would not limit his major life activities or ability to perform job duties.
It should be noted that the definition of “handicapped” contains three interrelated categories of persons who fall within the protections of the act: (1) persons with an underlying disability, (2) persons with a history of an underlying disability, and (3) persons perceived as having an underlying disability. Here, defendant argues that the act does not cover plaintiff because he has no determinable physical characteristic that substantially limits a major life activity when he takes his antirejection medication. The argument focuses on subsection i of the act.
To mitigate that argument, plaintiff relied on testimony from his physician, together with the Court of Appeals holding in Hines v Grand Trunk W R Co.4 He requested the following supplemental jury instruction:
*622A person that has a determinable physical [characteristic] which substantially limits one or more life activities is handicapped even if the determinable physical condition is controlled with medication or medical care.
The trial court refused to give the instruction on the ground that Hines was decided under the 1990 preamendment definition of handicap. That definition required only that the condition be unrelated to a person’s ability to perform the duties of a particular job.
The majority concludes that the requested instruction was properly refused because it does not reflect the proper interpretation of the first paragraph of the definition of handicapped. However, it does not address whether the requested instruction reflects the entire definition of handicapped.5
Even if the majority’s interpretation of the underlying disability provision of subsection i were correct, the requested instruction would still be proper, because it reflects the language contained in subsection iii. A person who has an underlying disability *623controlled by medication may be handicapped by virtue of being perceived as having the underlying disability. Hence, although the requested instruction could have been more artfully stated, it is technically correct.
Merely because plaintiff in this case is able to control his condition with medication does not mean that the condition does not substantially limit a major life activity. I agree with the rationale in Hines and believe that it is applicable to this case. I also conclude that, in addition to the analysis regarding actual disability, a thorough resolution of this case requires an analysis of perceived disability.
The Court of Appeals decision in this case conflicts with its earlier decision in Szymczak v American Seating Co, 204 Mich App 255; 514 NW2d 251 (1994). There, the plaintiff had seizures that were controlled by medication. The Szymczak Court found the plaintiff handicapped. It noted:
Plaintiff takes medication to control the seizures. The medication limits their frequency and severity, but does not prevent them from occurring. As a result, plaintiff experiences seizures about once a year, and can expect to continue to experience them for the foreseeable future.[6] [Id. at 257.]
If today’s majority opinion were applied to Szymczak and Hines, neither would have been found *624to be handicapped. Moreover, under the majority’s rationale, a great many people who would appear to satisfy the statutory definition would be denied handicapped status. This is because persons with physical disabilities often control them with medication or other mitigating measures.
I conclude that, by narrowing the class of persons qualified as handicapped, the majority contracts the intent of the Legislature in enacting the HCRA. As the Court of Appeals noted in Crittenden v Chrysler Corp,7 the intent was “to mandate the employment of the handicapped to the fullest extent reasonably possible.” Id. at 331, citing Allen v Southeastern Michigan Transportation Authority, 132 Mich App 533, 537-538; 349 NW2d 204 (1984). The Crittenden Court held that “[t]o this end, the act should be liberally construed by the courts.” Id., citing Rancour v Detroit Edison Co, 150 Mich App 276, 285; 388 NW2d 336 (1986); see also Chandler v Dowell Schlumberger Inc, 456 Mich 395, 398; 572 NW2d 210 (1998), which held that remedial statutes should be liberally construed. In ruling on Chmielewski, the majority has failed to liberally construe the act.
ii
The majority neglects to consider the purpose behind the statute and the intent of the Legislature in determining whether the Court should consider mitigating measures when determining a disability. Rather, it relies on a strained plain-language argument.
*625It asserts that the language of the statute is unambiguous, stating:
The ADA and HCRA definitions require an individual to have a condition that substantially limits a major life activity. In contrast, the administrative gloss imposed on this plain language by the guidelines provides that an individual who would have a substantial limitation if he failed to take his medication or discontinued using other mitigating measures comes within the definition. In other words, the EEOC approach, which is the approach that the plaintiff would have this Court adopt, would require us to read out of the statute the requirement that the individual’s condition substantially limits a major life activity. [Ante at 605-606.]
That discussion begs the question. If, on one hand, one does not consider medication, then the plaintiff has a substantial limitation on a major life function. On the other hand, if the medication is considered, then he does not have a substantial limitation. Unlike the majority, I find that the Legislature did not clearly and unambiguously address the issue.
The purpose behind that HCRA is to ensure that all persons be accorded equal opportunities to obtain employment and housing, and to utilize public accommodations, services, and facilities. This purpose is echoed in the ADA as well as in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.8 The acts share definitional similarities, as well. All define disability as a condition that “substantially limits” one or more of a person’s “major life activities.” See Sanchez v Lagoudakis, 440 Mich 496, 504, n 25; 486 NW2d 657 (1992). The majority disregards the “substantial limitation” language. Its inter*626pretation narrows the scope of the act, rather than construing it liberally.
As Justice Cavanagh stated in Pulver v Dundee Cement Co,9 where words and phrases have acquired a unique meaning at common law, they are interpreted as having the same meaning when used in statutes dealing with the same subject. Thus, because of the similarity in their purpose and definitions, the ada and its eeoc guidelines must receive our careful scrutiny in determining legislative intent.
In examining the House Legislative Analysis, HB 4764, April 4, 1990, and June 27, 1990, the Legislature’s intent is evidenced by the following:
Yet like people with diabetes or epilepsy, whose physical condition can be controlled while under treatment, people who are undergoing treatment by a psychiatrist, psychologist, or therapist, or who are receiving medication to control a mental condition, can function as productive members of society. For too long, mentally ill people have been excluded from the protections of the handicappers’ civil rights act. This exclusion was never based on any relevant policy considerations and it is time to extend the act’s protections to all of our handicapped citizens.[10]
Hence, I conclude from these statements that the Legislature intended that persons like plaintiff, with conditions controlled by treatment, can enjoy protection under the HCRA.
*627Moreover, in Wilson v Pennsylvania State Police Dep’t,11 the court rejected a plain language argument. It held:
I do not find that the text of the statute unambiguously precludes a plaintiff from being considered disabled where he is substantially limited without mitigating measures but is able to use such measures to overcome the substantial limitations which would otherwise flow from his impairment. See, e.g., Harris v H & W Contracting Co, 102 F3d 516, 521 (CA 11, 1996) (“There is nothing inherently illogical about determining the existence of a substantial limitation without regard to mitigating measures . . . and there is nothing in the language of the statute itself that rules out that approach”). Although the term “substantially limits” may be unambiguous in and of itself, it nonetheless does not speak to the issue before me; that is, the statute is silent as to whether a substantial limitation is to be considered with or without regard to mitigating measures.
In the absence of interpretation of the amended definitional language in Michigan, federal case law construing the similar language of the federal act provides guidance. I agree with the Wilson court rationale and would subscribe to its application in this case.
It is well settled that federal civil rights law is persuasive in interpreting its counterpart under Michigan law. Fritz v Mascotech Automotive Systems Group, Inc, 914 F Supp 1481, 1491 (ED Mich, 1996). Fritz held that analysis of claims under the hcra largely parallels analysis under the ADA. Also, Hamlin v Flint Charter Twp,12 held that claims of handicap discrimination under Michigan law essentially track those *628under federal law. Therefore, crucial to the analysis of this issue under the hcra are ADA regulations and cases addressing whether mitigating measures should be considered in determining the existence of a disability.
m
In 1990, Congress enacted the ADA “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities . . . .” 42 USC 12101(b)(1). In the employment context, it is understood to mean that employers cannot discriminate against people with disabilities in regard to employment practices or the terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.
In order to be protected by the ADA, it must be shown that an individual (1) has a disability, (2) is qualified, and (3) has suffered an adverse employment decision because of the disability. MacKay v Toyota Motor Mfg, USA, Inc, 110 F3d 369, 371 (CA 6, 1997). The MacKay analysis is pertinent to this case because the issue is whether plaintiff has a disability as defined by the analogous hcra.
The ADA, 42 USC 12102(2), defines an individual with a disability as someone who has:
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such impairment; or
(C) been regarded as having such an impairment.
There appears to be no dispute that Mr. Chmielewski has a physical impairment. Rather, the issue centers on whether the impairment substantially limits a *629major life activity, thus adversely affecting his employability.
The amended language in the hcra is nearly identical to the language in the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 USC 706(8)(B), the precursor of the ADA. The act defines a handicapped individual as any person who (1) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, (2) has a record of such an impairment, or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment.
The EEOC has provided comprehensive guidance on interpreting the ADA, including how to assess whether an impairment is substantially limiting.13 At first glance, it is not obvious how a condition completely controlled by medication can substantially limit a major life activity. However, the appendix to the applicable federal regulations provides explicit guidance on this point, and that guidance militates against the majority’s position. The commentary to 29 CFR 1630.2(h) indicates in pertinent part:
*630The existence of an impairment is to be determined without regard to mitigating measures such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic devices. See Senate Report at 23, House Labor Report at 52, House Judiciary Report at 28. For example, an individual with epilepsy would be considered to have an impairment even if the symptoms of the disorder were completely controlled by medicine. Similarly, an individual with hearing loss would be considered to have an impairment even if the condition were correctable through the use of a hearing aid. [Appendix, p 350 (1997).]
The commentary to CFR 1630.2Q) states:
[A]n impairment is substantially limiting if it significantly restricts the duration, manner or condition under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the average person in the general population’s ability to perform that same major life activity. Thus, for example, an individual who, because of an impairment, can only walk for very brief periods of time would be substantially limited in the major life activity of walking. An individual who uses artificial legs would likewise be substantially limited in the major life activity of walking because the individual is unable to walk without the aid of prosthetic devices. Similarly, a diabetic who without insulin would lapse into a coma would be substantially limited because the individual cannot perform major life activities without the aid of medication.
The determination of whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity must be made on a case by case basis, without regard to mitigating measures such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic devices. [Appendix, pp 350-351 (1997).]
Thus, the availability of reasonable accommodation or auxiliary aids, such as hearing aids, to alleviate the effects of a condition has no bearing on whether the *631condition is an impairment. It is the scope or perceived scope of the condition itself, not its origin or capacity for being corrected, that determines whether it constitutes an impairment.14
The mere use of a mitigating measure does not automatically indicate the presence of a disability. Some individuals may use medication, prosthetic devices, or auxiliary aids to alleviate impairments that are not substantially limiting. For example, applying the first part of the definition of disability, an individual who uses a hearing aid to correct a slight hearing impairment may not have a disability. The individual’s impairment may only mildly affect his hearing and may not substantially limit his ability to hear. Indeed, several federal cases have addressed the issue.15
Additionally, several circuits have decided ADA cases that are directly on point. They hold that the existence of mitigating measures should not be taken into account when deciding whether a disability *632exists.16 Also, the interpretation provided by the EEOC has recently been considered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Gilday, supra. Judge Moore, in her lead opinion in that case, reaches the conclusion held by the majority of the circuits. Her view is consistent with the ADA and EEOC guidelines.
Judge Moore’s conclusion is that numerous people with disabilities take medicine, engage in exercise and other regimens, and use accommodations to mitigate the effects of their disabilities. With the help of mitigating measures, they are able to perform the specific requirements of their job. It would be a painful irony if the courts deprived these people of their status as persons protected from discrimination due to disability because of their successful use of mitigating measures.
Moreover, under the federal statute, the courts have recognized that it is sufficient to justify a finding of handicapped status if an individual has a “record” of impairment. It is not relevant if the impairing condition is in remission or under control. In School Bd of Nassau Co v Arline,17 the United States Supreme Court found that hospitalization for tuberculosis constituted a sufficient record of impairment to establish handicapped status under the federal act. In that case, the disease had remained in remission for approximately twenty years after the hospitalization. The Court stated:
*633This impairment was serious enough to require hospitalization, a fact more than sufficient to establish that one or more of her major life activities were substantially limited by her impairment. Thus, Arline’s hospitalization for tuberculosis in 1957 suffices to establish that she has a “record of . . . impairment” . . . and is therefore a handicapped individual.
This is farther support for a broad reading of the statute.
As this Court did in Sanchez v Lagoudakis,18 I would read the handicap statute broadly. In Sanchez, we stated:
If the employer acts on a belief that the employee has a handicap, and subsequently discharges or otherwise discriminates against the employee on the basis of that belief, it is inconsequential whether the employee actually has the handicap because, in either hypothesis, the employer has undertaken the kind of discriminatory action that the act prohibits.
Against this backdrop, I would hold that the following factors should be considered to determine whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity: (1) the nature of the impairment, (2) its severity, (3) its duration or expected duration, and (4) its long-term effect. Sarsycki v United Parcel Service, 862 F Supp 336, 340 (WD Okla, 1994). I would find that the existence of an impairment is to be determined without regard to mitigating measures such as medicines.
I believe that the Court of Appeals mischaracterized the requested jury instruction as defining a handicap. Rather, the instruction simply clarified that con*634trol of a detemünable physical condition with medication does not disqualify an otherwise qualified person from handicap status.
IV
In conclusion, I find that the majority’s position is at odds with the overwhelming majority of federal cases on the subject and with three Michigan Court of Appeals cases, Hines, Crittenden, and Szymczak, supra.19 It conflicts with the intent of the Legislature in enacting the HCRA, with the position articulated by the EEOC, and with common sense.
We do not have the benefit of a special verdict to determine the basis of the jury’s decision for defendant. Therefore, we do not know the jury’s rationale. Consequently, I would conclude that the failure of the trial court to give plaintiff’s proposed instruction resulted in substantial injustice. Johnson, supra at 327. I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for a new trial.
Cavanagh, J., concurred with Kelly, J.MCL 37.1101 et seq.; MSA 3.550(101) et seq.
42 USC 12101 et seq.
The majority acknowledges that “[bjecause the hcra definition mirrors that of the ada, we examine federal law for guidance.” Ante at 603-604. Most federal courts of appeals follow the direction given by the EEOC. The majority predicts that the future trend is in the opposite direction. However, the fact remains that the majority of federal appellate courts continue to adhere to the position taken by the eeoc.
151 Mich App 585, 595-596; 391 NW2d 750 (1985). hi Hines, the Court of Appeals held that a person who has diabetes that is controlled by the use of insulin is handicapped for purposes of the hcra. The Hines Court specifically rejected a literal reading of the act, although it referred to the *622pre-1990 definition of handicap. Rather, it found that the plaintiff was a protected individual under the act.
See also Crittenden v Chrysler Corp, 178 Mich App 324, 332; 443 NW2d 412 (1989), which held that the plaintiffs hypertension was a handicap, even though it was controlled with medication. The majority here states that, because the Crittenden Court said “[p]laintiff presented evidence, through his deposition testimony and the affidavit of his personal physician, that his hypertension was being controlled by medication,” its decision was predicated upon the inclusion of medication. I find that the quoted statement says nothing about how the Court arrived at its decision. It simply says that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to survive summary disposition.
Subsection iii states in pertinent part:
Being regarded as having a determinable physical or mental characteristic described in subparagraph i. [MCL 37.1103(e); MSA 3.550(103)(e).]
The majority, in discussing this case, states that the Szymczak Court made its decision by considering the use of mitigating measures, namely, the use of medication to control seizures. However, I find no support for that position. Rather, Szymczak concluded that there was a dispute of fact regarding the use of power tools. It remanded, stating that the factual issue had to be decided before the Court could determine whether the defendant’s conduct violated the hcra. Id. at 258.
178 Mich App 324; 443 NW2d 412 (1989).
29 USC 706(8)(B).
445 Mich 68, 75; 515 NW2d 728 (1994).
Representative H. Lynn Jondahl, the bill’s sponsor, made those statements. I agree with the majority that the opinion of a single legislator is not necessarily equivalent to the intent of the entire Legislature. However, the statement is edifying. Moreover, because the hcra does not specifically address the issue of mitigating measures, I find it difficult to conclude that the statute is unambiguous. Since it is ambiguous, a legislative analysis is appropriate.
964 F Supp 898, 904 (ED Pa, 1997).
942 F Supp 1129 (ED Mich, 1996).
In Gilday v Mecosta Co, 124 F3d 760 (CA 6, 1997), Judge Kennedy pointed out in her opinion:
“[S]uch administrative interpretations of the [ada] by the enforcing agency, ‘while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.’ ” [Id. at 766, quoting Grenier v Cyanamid Plastics, Inc, 70 F3d 667, 672 (CA 1, 1995).]
It appears that the guidelines were subject to public notice and comment procedures similar to those that normally apply to regulations. See Equal Employment Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities, 56 Fed Reg 8578 (1991). Thus, the guidelines arguably have more force than would an ordinary interpretative rule. In any event, I note that, to the extent the guideline is elaborating on a term used in a regulation, it is entitled to “controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” Thomas Jefferson Univ v Shalala, 512 US 504, 512; 114 S Ct 2381; 129 L Ed 2d 405 (1994).
The msyority states that it “declines to head down that slippery slope.” Ante at 609. However, it is the majority’s approach, and not the eeoc’s, that gives rise to the slippery slope argument, leading to the categorical inclusion of many commonplace and relatively benign conditions. There are no categories under the ada. Nor does the eeoc refer to any specific categories. In fact, the eeoc specifically notes that courts must analyze the individual’s condition case by case.
See Holihan v Lucky Stores, Inc, 87 F3d 362, 366 (CA 9, 1996), where, even without the consideration of mitigating measures, the plaintiff failed to show that he was substantially limited from any major life activity; Oswalt v Sara Lee Corp, 74 F3d 91, 92 (CA 5, 1996), which held that high blood pressure alone does not establish a substantial limitation; Roth v Lutheran General Hosp, 57 F3d 1446, 1454-1455 (CA 7, 1995), which held that mitigating measures should not be considered in determining an impairment; Chandler v City of Dallas, 2 F3d 1385, 1390-1391 (CA 5, 1993), where the court held that both impaired vision and insulin dependent diabetes did not rise to the level of substantial impairment.
Doane v Omaha, 115 F3d 624, 627 (CA 8, 1997); Harris, supra at 520-521. See also Wilson, supra at 904.
480 US 273, 281; 107 S Ct 1123; 94 L Ed 2d 307 (1987).
Supra at 502.
Recognizing that we are not bound by these decisions, I nevertheless find them highly persuasive.