concurring.
While I concur with Justice Chavez, I write to address the constitutional disqualification issue which becomes relevant due to the erroneous denial of the trial amendment by Judge Blackmon. The facts leading up to this proceeding are generally set out in the opinion of Justice Chavez.
Relators contend that mandamus should issue because:
1) Judge Blackmon erred on rehearing by withdrawing his original ruling recusing Judge Bennett and then refusing to recuse Judge Bennett, and
2) Judge Blackmon erred in refusing to allow a Trial Amendment to the Motion to Recuse which raised the issue of the constitutional disqualification of Judge Bennett. Because Judge Blackmon erred in refusing the trial amendment, the constitutional disqualification issue should be addressed.
CONSTITUTIONAL DISQUALIFICATION
The Texas Constitution provides in relevant part that “[n]o judge shall sit in any case wherein he may be interested_” Tex. Const, art. V, § 11. “It is a settled principle of law that the interest which disqualifies a judge is that interest, however small, which rests upon a direct pecuniary or personal interest in the result of the case presented to the judge or court.” Cameron v. Greenhill, 582 S.W.2d 775, 776 (Tex.1979); Blanchard v. Krueger, 916 S.W.2d 15, 19 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, orig. proceeding). “Constitutional disqualification of a judge renders any order involving judicial discretion absolutely void [and a] writ of mandamus will issue to correct the violation of a duty imposed by law when there is no *542other adequate remedy.” Id. at 19 (citing Buckholts I.S.D. v. Glaser, 632 S.W.2d 146, 148 (Tex.1982) and Canadian Helicopters, Ltd. v. Wittig, 876 S.W.2d 304, 305 (Tex.1994)). Therefore “mandamus relief is appropriate” when it appears that a judge is constitutionally disqualified. Blanchard, 916 S.W.2d at 19.
However, “[i]f his interest in the question is indirect, uncertain, or remote, and the result of the suit will not necessarily subject him to a personal gain or loss, he is not disqualified to sit in the case.” Hidalgo County Water Improve. Dist. No. 2 v. Blalock, 157 Tex. 206, 301 S.W.2d 593, 596 (1957). While I am unconvinced with the suggestion that an interest must be pecuniary to justify constitutional disqualification, it must be direct, certain, and not remote.
In Blanchard, the court held that a judge who filed a general denial and a request for attorneys fees in the underlying case was constitutionally disqualified. The court stated:
Courts have held that a judge should not voluntarily participate in a mandamus action that challenges the judge’s refusal to recuse himself. Rapp v. Van Dusen, 350 F.2d 806, 810 (3d Cir.1965); U.S. v. Craig, 875 F.Supp. 816, 818 (S.D.Fla.1994). In Rapp, 350 F.2d at 813, the court of appeals said a judge who is challenged by a motion to recuse should not hire his own lawyer or designate the lawyers for the real party in interest as his lawyer. In Craig, 875 F.Supp. at 818, the district court held that challenged judge was required to be re-cused because the judge filed a brief in response to a mandamus action following the judge’s refusal to recuse himself. By filing a response, the judge made an appearance in the case and became aligned with the party opposing recusal. Id.; see also Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 10 F.3d 155, 166 (3d Cir.1993)(judge should not have written letter to plaintiff objecting to statements in the Plaintiffs petition for mandamus that was filed to challenge the denial of a motion to recuse).
Id. at 19 n. 9.
In Gulf Maritime Warehouse Co. the court held that the trial judge was constitutionally disqualified because he may have had an interest in the case. The court stated:
Where doubt exists as to a judge’s interest that doubt should be resolved in favor of disqualification. Lindsley v. Lindsley, 152 S.W.2d 415, 432 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1941)(opinion on rehearing), rev’d on other grounds, 139 Tex. 512, 163 S.W.2d 633 (1942). The Dallas Court of Civil Appeals provided further that the constitutional language “may be interested” implies that if there is doubt, the judge should be disqualified.
Public policy demands that the judge who sits in a case act with absolute impartiality. Pendergrass [Pendergass] v. Beale, 59 Tex. 446, 447 (1883). Beyond the demand that a judge be impartial, however, is the requirement that a judge appear to be impartial so that no doubts or suspicions exist as to the fairness or integrity of the court. Aetna Life Ins. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 106 S.Ct. 1580, 89 L.Ed.2d 823 (1986); Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 100 S.Ct. 1610, 64 L.Ed.2d 182 (1980).
If a judge is disqualified under the Constitution, he is absolutely without jurisdiction in the case, and any judgment rendered by him is void, without effect, and subject to collateral attack. [.Disqualification and Recusal of Judges, 17 ST. MARY’S L.J. 599 (1986) ].
Disqualification may be raised at any time. See Buckholts Indep. School Dis. v. Glaser, 632 S.W.2d 146, 148 (Tex.1982). Furthermore, disqualification may even be raised for the first time in a collateral attack on the judgment. See Lee v. State, 555 S.W.2d 121, 124 (Tex.Crim.App.1977); Ex Parte Washington, 442 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex.Crim.App.1969). Either a trial court or appellate court may raise the question of disqualification on its own motion. See Lee, 555 S.W.2d at 122; City of Houston v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 530 S.W.2d 866, 868 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ ref d n.r.e.); Pinch-*543back v. Pinchback, 341 S.W.2d 549, 553 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1960, writ ref d n.r.e.).
Gulf Maritime Warehouse Co. v. Towers, Sr., 858 S.W.2d 556, 558-60 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1993, writ denied).
TRIAL AMENDMENTS
Tex.R. Civ. P. 66 provides in relevant part that the trial “court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so freely when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the allowance of such amendment would prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon the merits....” “Although the application of [Rule 66] is within the sound discretion of the trial judge, nevertheless, the interpretation followed by the appellate courts is that such discretion is to be exercised liberally in favor of justice.” Mergele v. Houston, 436 S.W.2d 951, 955 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1969, writ refd n.r.e.)(citing Rose v. Shearrer, 431 S.W.2d 939 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1968, no writ); Alamo Ambulance Service, Inc. v. Moulton, 402 S.W.2d 200 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1966), aff'd, 414 S.W.2d 444 (Tex.1967)). Therefore, trial amendments are mandatory when there is no opposition to the amendment, and the trial judge abuses his discretion in denying the motion to amend under these circumstances. Blanchard, 916 S.W.2d at 18.
DISCUSSION
The trial amendment alleged that Judge Bennett should be constitutionally disqualified for appearing to have an interest in the case as prohibited by the Texas Constitution. Tex. Const, art. V, § 11. The amendment however, failed to allege any pecuniary or property interest. Instead it seemed to assert a personal interest based on the at-tomey/elient relationship between Judge Bennett and the opposing attorneys and his unusual activities during the recusal proceedings.
Since “disqualification may be raised at any time,” Judge Blackmon clearly abused his discretion in denying the amendment. Gulf Maritime Warehouse Co., 858 S.W.2d at 560; see Buckholts, 632 S.W.2d at 148. Further, there is no indication in this record of any opposition to the amendment by any party. Therefore, under these circumstances, “the trial amendment was mandatory” and Judge Blackmon abused his discretion in denying the motion to amend. Blanchard, 916 S.W.2d at 18.
Moreover, in denying the trial amendment Judge Blackmon failed “to analyze [and] apply the law correctly.”1 The order denying the motion to recuse was signed by Judge Blackmon on November 18, 1996. The Motion for Leave to File the Trial Amendment in question was filed on December 9, 1996. On December 10, 1996, Judge Blackmon denied leave to file the amendment, stating:
I am of the opinion this court does not have Jurisdiction to hear this matter. Judge Bennett’s recusal has been heard, denied and an order signed.
Therefore, the sole basis for denying leave to file the amendment was Judge Blackmon’s judicial determination that he had no jurisdiction because the recusal had been heard, denied and an order signed. This ruling is obviously erroneous.
If jurisdiction terminates upon a hearing on a motion to recuse and the signing of an order as Judge Blackmon ruled, then Judge Blackmon’s court order before this court withdrawing his original order recusing Judge Bennett and denying the motion to recuse is void for lack of jurisdiction. This is so, because that order was entered after the first recusal hearing and after Judge Blaek-*544mon entered the original order recusing Judge Bennett. Further, the order denying leave to file was signed within the 30 days that the trial court has plenary powers, and without consideration that constitutional disqualification of a judge may be raised at any time. Gulf Maritime Warehouse Co., 858 S.W.2d at 560. The refusal to allow the trial amendment under these circumstances amounts to gross abuse of discretion which justifies mandamus relief under appropriate circumstances. State v. Sewell, 487 S.W.2d 716, 718 (Tex.1972).
Thus, this court should grant the motion to amend and consider whether Judge Bennett was constitutionally disqualified under the facts presented to Judge Blackmon. Blanchard, 916 S.W.2d at 19.
DISCUSSION
Although this record reflects questionable participation by Judge Bennett in the recusal proceedings below, the immediate question is, whether the facts presented established the sufficient amount of interest in the underlying case to constitutionally disqualify Judge Bennett.
During the initial recusal hearing on the 29th of October, 1996, Judge Bennett voluntarily appeared 2 and requested permission to testify, aligning himself with the position of the party opposing the motion to recuse. The law firm representing the party opposing the motion to recuse with which Judge Bennett aligned himself, was the same law firm that was representing Judge Bennett before the Supreme Court of Texas at the same time. Ironically, it was this fact which formed the basis for the motion to recuse initially. On November 5, 1996, Judge Blackmon correctly entered an order recus-ing Judge Bennett.
However, on November 5, 1996, Judge Bennett personally wrote to Judge Blackmon on stationery of 319th Judicial District Court, stating:
In view of your ruling, and considering that the hearing started early and was practically over before I arrived, on time, for the 9:30 a.m. hearing, I request that this matter be heard again, so that I can fully participate in the matter, and so that a full record can be made on this very significant policy matter, [emphasis added].
On November 7, 1996, Judge Blackmon responded, stating:
The recusal of Judge Max Bennett is set for rehearing, at the Judge's request, on November 15th, 1996 at 3:00 p.m. [emphasis added].
At the rehearing on November 15, 1996, Judge Bennett again voluntarily appeared and testified on behalf of the parties opposing the motion to recuse represented at the rehearing not only by the same law firm that represented Judge Bennett at the same time, but also by the individual member of the firm which was representing Judge Bennett. During final arguments before the court by both parties, Judge Bennett extraordinarily also made a final statement to the court, again aligning himself with the position of the party opposing the motion to recuse.
While these extraordinary activities of Judge Bennett raised the appearance of partiality, this record reflects insufficient evidence to establish that Judge Bennett had either a pecuniary or personal interest in the outcome of the underlying case which would justify a constitutional disqualification.
RECUSAL
However, I agree with the opinion of Justice Chavez that Judge Blackmon originally correctly recused Judge Bennett under the provisions of Tex.R. Civ. P. 18b, and abused his discretion thereafter by withdrawing his earlier order and denying the motion to re-cuse on rehearing. I also agree that mandamus relief is warranted.
Tex.R. Civ. P. 18b(2)(a) provides that “[a] judge shall recuse himself in any proceeding in which: (a) his impartiality might reasonably be questioned; ....” In Rogers v. Bradley, the Texas Supreme Court estab*545lished that the proper inquiry to be made under Tex.R. Civ. P. 18b(2)(a) is “whether a reasonable member of public at large, knowing all the facts in the public domain concerning the judge’s conduct, would have a reasonable doubt that the judge is actually impartial.” Rogers v. Bradley, 909 S.W.2d 872, 881 (Tex.1995).
28 U.S.C. 455(a) (1988) is identical to Tex.R. Civ. P. 18b(2)(a) in its provision that “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” The interpretation of the provision by the court in In re Cargill, Inc. is instructive:
The disqualification requirements of section 455(a) is triggered, despite the lack of any actual bias on the judge’s part, if a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, would question the judge’s impartiality. See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 861-62, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 2203-04, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988). Most observers would agree that a judge should not hear a case argued by an attorney who, at the same time, is representing the judge in a personal matter. [emphasis added] See 13A Charles Wright, Arthur Miller & Edward Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3549, at 614 (1984)(citing cases). Although the appearance of partiality is attenuated when the lawyer appearing before the judge is a member of the same law firm as the Judge’s personal counsel, but not the same individual, many of the same cautionary factors are still at play. See e.g. 2 Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Guide to Judiciary Policies and Procedures, V-32 (1995) (expressing the view that “where an attorney client relationship exists between the judge and the lawyer whose law firm appears in the case, the judge should re-cuse absent remittal”). This principle would seem to have particular force where, as here, the law firm is small and the judge’s lawyer is a name partner.
In re Cargill, Inc., 66 F.3d 1256, 1260 n. 4 (1st Cir.1995).
It is uncontested that the same law firm representing one of the parties in the underlying suit also represents Judge Bennett at the same time. In fact, on rehearing of the motion to recuse, not only did the law firm representing Judge Bennett appear on behalf of the party with which Judge Bennett aligned himself, but the individual member of the law firm representing Judge Bennett appeared on behalf of the party. The fiduciary relationship that was created between Judge Bennett and his attorneys permitted and indeed encouraged private and confidential communications between client and attorney, which posed the possibility of inadvertent ex parte communications involving the underlying suit. Thus, the appearance of partiality is raised. Added to this, is the extraordinary participation of Judge Bennett in both recu-sal hearings which not only directly brought about the rehearing after he had been re-cused, but also directly aligned him with the party in the case below represented by the same attorneys representing Judge Bennett. On rehearing, Judge Bennett and the attorneys representing both the party in the underlying case objecting to the recusal and Judge Bennett, succeeded in obtaining an order from Judge Blackmon withdrawing the original recusal order and denying the motion to recuse.
Contrary to the contention that Judge Bennett was merely protecting his jurisdiction, his actions were indeed extraordinary and went beyond what is permissible for a trial judge. A hearing on a motion to recuse is in effect an appeal from the ruling of the trial court refusing to recuse himself. There is no real distinction between this form of appeal and any other. If every trial judge personally participated in this manner every time a ruling of the court was challenged, chaos would reign. Whether intended or not, such a situation would create the appearance that the judge was lending his personal prestige and the prestige of his office to one party or the other. This is prohibited. The appearance of partiality is unescapable under these circumstances.
I agree with Justice Chavez, that any member of the public apprised of these circumstances would conclude that reasonable doubts exist as to Judge Bennett’s actual impartiality which requires recusal. I fur*546ther agree that these circumstances dictate the conclusion that the abuse of discretion was gross, which warrants mandamus relief. Sewell, 487 S.W.2d at 718; see Corpus Christi Caller-Times v. Mandas, 794 S.W.2d 852, 854 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1990, orig. proceeding).
. "A trial court has no 'discretion' in determining what the law is or applying the law to the facts. Thus, a clear failure by the trial court to analyze or apply the law correctly will constitute an abuse of discretion, and may result in appellate reversal by extraordinary writ See Joachim v. Chambers, 815 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex.1991)(trial court abused discretion by misinterpreting Code of Judicial Conduct); NCNB Texas National Bank v. Coker, 765 S.W.2d 398, 400 (Tex.1989)(trial court abused discretion by failing to apply proper legal standard to motion to disqualify counsel); Earns ISD v. Logue, 712 S.W.2d 741, 742 (Tex.1986)(trial court abused discretion by erroneously finding constitutional violation).” Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex.1992).
. This record does not reflect that Judge Bennett was subpoenaed for either the first or second recusal hearing.