(dissenting). In this state criminal warrants are issued by magistrates on the basis of complaints which, given the benefit of all reasonable inferences, are sufficient to establish probable cause that the defendant named committed the offense alleged.1
In this case, the claim is that the complaint did not warrant issuance of a warrant because, even given all reasonable inferences, it did not indicate probable cause that the defendant was guilty of aiding and abetting the commission of the crime of theft.2
The “. . . basically essential queries that a criminal complaint is statutorily expected to answer . . .” are six in number: Who, what, when, where, why and “who says so?” 3 This six W's test, adapted from the journalistic requirements for a lead paragraph in a news story,4 requires “. . . making clear to the relator that he is charged with a crime, what the crime is, when and where the offense is alleged to have taken place, why he is *799believed to have committed the [crime] and who said so.” 5
Here is how the particular complaint in this particular action answers the six questions of the W’s test:
What is the charge: Violation of sec. 939.05, Stats.,6 and sec. 943.20 (1) (a) 7 in that he:
. . did as party to the crime . . . intentionally take and carry away movable property of the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee to wit: 48 candy bars of total approximate value of $7.20 without the consent of the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee and with intent to permanently deprive University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee of possession thereof.”
Who is charged: Gary Melvin Haugen, named defendant.
*800When did offense occur: On “the sixth day of May A. D., 1970.”
Where did offense occur: At “2200 E. Kenwood, City and County of Milwaukee.”
Who makes complaint: Linda Nieft, student president of the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.”
Why is he believed to have committed the crime of aiding and abetting the theft: Based on personal observation, the complainant states in the complaint:
“. . . that on 5/6/70 at said Union she observed a male break the door on a storage case containing candy which was the property of the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee; that the said male took two 24 bar boxes of candy of the total approximate value of $7.20 and handed them to the defendant; that the defendant consumed one candy bar and gave the balance to other persons who had congregated in said Union.”
The court majority holds that “within the four corners” of this complaint there cannot be found facts stated and reasonable inferences therefrom to establish probable cause that the defendant “. . . intentionally undertook conduct to further the accomplishment of the act,” the reference being to the act of breaking and taking the candy. The majority finds “equally reasonable” the conclusion from “the four corners” of the complaint that the defendant was “an innocent bystander.”
The writer would hold that this complaint adequately stated facts sufficient, together with reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, to justify the issuance of the warrant by the magistrate, charging the defendant with being an aider and abettor to the crime of theft. The defendant was not charged with breaking the door open and removing the two boxes of candy from the storage case in which they had been locked. He was charged with being a party to the crime of theft by aiding and *801abetting its commission.8 The basis for the issuance of the warrant is the clear allegation in the complaint, based on the personal observation of the complainant, that defendant completed the criminal act of theft by dispersing the candy taken among the people assembled, making impossible its return to its lawful owner: the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. One of the elements of the crime of theft is that of asportation.9 It is the element of the completed crime of bank burglary provided by one who drives away with the loot. It is no defense for such driver to establish that he did not enter the bank and steal the money. When he provides transportation, he supplies asportation. When the complaint alleges that the defendant took and dispersed or distributed the candy, making impossible its return, it alleges that the defendant furnished the element of asportation to the sequence of events that completed the act of theft.
Based on the personal observations of the complaining witness, the complaint alleges a sequence of events, all occurring at one time and place. The complaint states that a male person, not identified by name and presumably unknown to the complainant, did in her presence break open the door of a storage case belonging to the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. It states that such person, after breaking open the door, took two 24-bar boxes of candy from the storage case. It states that the breaker and taker then “handed them to the defendant.” It states that the defendant did then and there hand out all except one of the candy bars to persons in the as*802sembled crowd. It is an entirely reasonable inference from the facts stated that the defendant completed the act of theft by furnishing the element of asportation. It is an entirely reasonable inference from the complaint that there existed probable cause that the defendant had thus aided and abetted the commission of the crime of theft — by distributing what had been stolen to the assembled crowd and making impossible its return, thus permanently depriving the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee of possession. Intent is specifically alleged, and clearly inferable from the facts stated in the complaint. Intent is to be inferred from the natural and probable consequences of a person’s voluntary acts.10 Intentional aiding and abetting of the crime of theft appears to the writer to be not only a reasonable inference, but the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the facts stated in this complaint.
Holding the complaint to be clearly adequate, meeting the six W’s test in each requirement of it, requires reviewing whether there was sufficient evidence presented at trial for the trier of fact (here the trial court) to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty under secs. 939.05 and 943.20 (1) (a), Stats. The testimony is in dispute and the issue for the court was one of comparative credibility. If the defendant’s testimony is accepted, he did not receive the two boxes of candy and was just walking by and took one candy bar which he ate. This testimony is in conflict with that of a detective who testified he found the defendant leaning on the main desk when he arrived. More significantly, it conflicts in every detail with the testimony of the complainant. She testified that she had known the defendant previously, and identified him as taking two boxes of candy from the man who broke into the storage case. *803She testified that the building and counter were closed, and that the counter was broken into by shoving the sliding door until the lock gave way. She testified that the person who broke into the storage case “handed over" the two boxes to the defendant. She testified that the defendant kept one bar, and handed the rest out to passers-by and persons in the assembled crowd. It was for the trial court, not the reviewing court, to determine which witnesses were to be believed.11 Apparently, the trial court did not believe the testimony of the defendant, and, accepting the testimony of the complainant and detective, had evidence sufficient to convince him beyond any reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of aiding and abetting the commission of the theft, contrary to secs. 939.05 and 943.20 (1) (a).
The writer would affirm, holding the complaint to be adequate and the conviction sustained by the evidence.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Leo B. Hanley and Mr. Justice Connor T. Hansen join in this dissent.
See: State ex rel. Pflanz v. County Court (1967), 36 Wis. 2d 550, 153 N. W. 2d 559, on functions of complaint and requirements for issuance of valid warrant on such complaint.
Id. at page 557, this court stating: “. . . there must be sufficient facts in the complaint which are themselves sufficient or give rise to reasonable inferences which are sufficient to establish probable cause.”
State ex rel. Evanow v. Seraphim (1968), 40 Wis. 2d 223, 230, 161 N. W. 2d 369.
Id. at pages 229, 230, this court stating: “In university journalism classes, students are taught that the lead paragraph to a news story must be made ‘. . . complete and clear through answering the questions that immediately arise — the so-called “Five W’s” — what, who, where, when, why.’ . . . Actually, there is a sixth ‘W.’ As the journalism professor puts it, ‘Unless the source (of the news) is obvious, the reader always asks at once, “Who says so?” ’ ” (citing Newspaper Reporting, by Grant Milnor Hyde, Prentice-Hall (1952), pp. 53, 55.
Id. at page 230.
“Parties to crime. (1) Whoever is concerned in the commission of a crime is a principal and may be charged with and convicted of the commission of the crime although he did not directly commit it and although the person who directly committed it has not been convicted or has been convicted of some other degree of the crime or of some other crime based on the same act.
“(2) A person is concerned in the commission of the crime if he:
“(a) Directly commits the crime; or
“(b) Intentionally aids and abets the commission of it; or
“(c) Is a party to a conspiracy with another to commit it or advises, hires, counsels or otherwise procures another to commit it. Such a party is also concerned in the commission of any other crime which is committed in pursuance of the intended crime and which under the circumstances is a natural and probable consequence of the intended crime. This paragraph does not apply to a person who voluntarily changes his mind and no longer desires that the crime be committed and notifies the other parties concerned of his withdrawal within a reasonable time before the commission of the crime so as to allow the others also to withdraw.”
“Theft. (1) Acts. Whoever does any of the following may be penalized as provided in sub. (3) :
“(a) Intentionally takes and carries away, uses, transfers, conceals, or retains possession of movable property of another without his consent and with intent to deprive the owner permanently of possession of such property.”
Under sec. 939.05, Stats., a person may be charged as a principal to a crime if he intentionally aids or abets or if he is a party to a conspiracy to commit the crime.
“Asportation. . . . The carrying away of goods; one of the circumstances requisite to constitute the offense of larceny. . . .” Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed. rev.), page 147. S&e: Hawpetoss v. State, ante, p. 71, 77, 78, 187 N. W. 2d 823.
See: Hawpetoss v. State, supra, at page 80.
See: State v. Christopher (1969), 44 Wis. 2d 120, 127, 170 N. W. 2d 803, this court stating: “On review, it is not the function of the appellate court to decide which witnesses are to be believed. That is the exact function of the trier of fact, be such trier of fact the judge or a jury. . . .” See also: Lock v. State (1966), 31 Wis. 2d 110,114, 115, 142 N. W. 2d 183.