Defendant appeals his jury conviction of larceny in a building. MCLA § 750.360 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.592).
On April 27, 1967, defendant and a companion, Joseph Pritchard, stopped at a service station for automobile repairs on defendant’s car. While defendant and Pritchard were still at the station, the attendant, Jerry Wrenn, noticed that a canvas bag containing the station’s receipts was missing. Wrenn phoned the State Police who immediately dispatched two officers to the service station. Upon their arrival, the officers were told by Wrenn that he thought the defendant was the person who took the canvas bag. The officers then searched defendant, his companion, and defendant’s car where they found the missing canvas bag. Defendant was charged with larceny in a building, MCLA § 750.360 (Stat Ann § 28.592), and was convicted by a jury and sentenced to serve from 3-1/2 to 4 years in prison. After his motion for a new trial was denied, defendant brought this appeal contending that the court below committed several reversible errors.
*582The complainant, Jerry Wrenn, could not be located at the time of the trial for purposes of testifying. He had, however, testified at the preliminary examination and that testimony was admitted at trial. Defendant contends that the prosecution’s failure to produce the witness at trial violates the confrontation clause of both the United States Constitution1 and the Michigan Constitution.2
The United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to the confrontation of witnesses is applicable to the states in Pointer v. Texas (1965), 380 US 400 (85 S Ct 1065, 13 L Ed 2d 923). The Supreme Court there reversed petitioner’s conviction because it was based in part upon testimony taken at the preliminary examination where defendant was not represented by counsel. The Court pointed out, however, that the result would have been quite different had the defendant been represented by counsel and the witness been cross-examined:
“The case before us would be quite a different one had Phillips’ statement been taken at a full fledged hearing at which petitioner had been represented by counsel who had been given a complete and adequate opportunity to cross-examine.”
In the case at bar, defendant was represented by counsel at the preliminary examination and counsel did conduct a cross-examination of the complainant. Although defendant now claims that counsel was inexperienced and that he should have questioned Wrenn about his criminal record for credibility purposes, defendant, in his brief, offers nothing to establish either defense counsel’s inexperience or the existence of any criminal record which Wrenn might have. This Court finds nothing to indicate that de*583fendant’s counsel’s performance at the preliminary examination was anything hut competent.. We find, therefore, that defendant was not deprived of his right to confrontation since the witness was adequately cross-examined at the preliminary examination.
Michigan does require, however, a showing by the prosecution that a reasonable effort has been made to locate the witness before the prior testimony may be admitted.3 Defendant contends that such a reasonable effort was not made in the case at bar.
Detective Mungeon of the Michigan State Police testified that a subpoena was issued for Wrenn on July 10, 1968. The first place where he attempted to serve the subpoena was the situs of the crime, the gasoline station where Wrenn had been an attendant. Wrenn’s boss, Mr. Buchanan, told Detective Mungeon that Wrenn’s real name was Danny Hill and that he believed that he was in prison in North Carolina.
Detective Mungeon and Buchanan then went to an uncle of Wrenn in Flint who advised them that Wrenn was in Burlington, North Carolina, living on Webb Street.
Detective Donovan then testified that after learning that Wrenn was in North Carolina, he made long distance calls to that state attempting to contact him. These efforts were without results. Donovan also contacted the Burlington, North Carolina, police and requested them to locate witness Wrenn and also informed them that complainant also went by the name of Danny Hill. Donovan was informed that they would attempt to locate Wrenn, hut he testified that the Burlington police never contacted him.
The trial judge, upon learning that Wrenn was unavailable, adjourned the trial from July 23, 1968, *584to October 29, 1968. Trooper Dailey of the Michigan State Police testified that he received the subpoena for Wrenn on October 22, 1968. He stated that he called the Burlington, North Carolina, Police Department and that they told him that they would contact him by certified mail if Wrenn could be located. The North Carolina police also told Dailey that they were running a check to determine whether Wrenn was incarcerated in one of their institutions. Dailey stated that he received no communication from the North Carolina police, and, therefore, on the day of trial he made two more calls to the North Carolina authorities but received no further information.
The trial judge, after hearing the above testimony, was satisfied with the attempts of the state to locate the complainant. Under People v. Boyles (1968), 11 Mich App 417, 422, the sufficiency of the effort to produce a witness is a question for the trial court and its determination will not be disturbed, absent a showing of an abuse of discretion by the trial judge. Based upon the above testimony, we find no'such abuse of discretion, and therefore find no error by the trial judge in admitting the complainant’s prior testimony.
Defendant also contends that the people did not make a diligent and reasonable effort to produce defendant’s companion at the scene of the crime, Joseph Pritchard, who had been indorsed as a witness. Although we have no confrontation issue involved here, the people must still show that a reasonable effort was made to produce the witness.4
Detective Mungeon was recalled to the stand to establish the prosecution’s diligent effort to locate witness Pritchard. He stated that he received the *585subpoena for Pritchard about the same time he received the subpoena for Wrenn. Detective Mungeon then testified that he was informed that Pritchard was in Detroit so he sent the subpoena to the State Police there. The State Police then made a check of Pritchard’s street address in Detroit but could not locate him.
Detective Mungeon then testified that he had been informed that Pritchard might be in the State Prison in Jackson, Michigan, but that a check with the record officer there indicated that Pritchard had been discharged in 1962 and that they had no further record of him.
Detective Dailey, who had also attempted to locate the complainant, testified that he had personally gone to Pritchard’s last known address, but that the party living there had never heard of Pritchard. Dailey also stated that since defendant and Pritchard were friends, he had attempted to locate Pritchard through the defendant who was out on bond at the time. However, neither Dailey nor defendant’s attorney were able to locate the defendant for purposes of finding out if defendant knew the whereabouts of his friend.
The trial court, after hearing the above testimony, expressed itself satisfied with the state’s effort to produce indorsed witness Pritchard. We find nothing in the record to indicate that the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that the state’s effort had been sufficiently diligent.5 We therefore find defendant’s second contention to be without merit.
The defendant next submits that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s pretrial motion to, suppress the evidence (the canvas bag and its contents) obtained from a search of the defendant’s automobile.
*586In People v. McDonald (1968), 13 Mich App 226, a case involving the search of an automobile, this Court stated at pages 232, 233:
“The Constitutions do not prohibit all warrantless searches. Where a warrant has not been obtained, the validity of the search depends upon the law’s appraisal of the reasonableness of the search, only unreasonable, warrantless searches and seizures being barred. Searches, incident to a lawful arrest, or following hot pursuit for instruments used in the commission of crime, its fruits, contraband and means of escape have been held to be reasonable.”
In the present case officers of the Michigan State Police testified that they entered the police post about 6:55 p.m. on April 25,1967, and were informed by the desk corporal that a larceny had just been committed at Buchanan’s Gulf Station on Miller Road. The officers proceeded directly to the service station and arrived there about two minutes later.
Upon their arrival the officers were informed by Jerry Wrenn, the attendant, that defendant, who was still at the station was the person he suspected of committing the larceny. The officers then proceeded to search the defendant and defendant’s car. One of the officers then found the canvas bag, which was identified by Wrenn as the one missing, under the front seat on the passenger side of the car.
The above facts indicate that the search was not “unreasonable” as that term has been interpreted under the Fourth Amendment. The officers had been informed by Wrenn that a larceny had been committed and that he believed defendant had committed it. This certainly is sufficient to give the officers probable cause to believe that defendant had committed a felony, and therefore the search was not *587unreasonable.6 We therefore hold that the trial court was correct in denying the motion to suppress the evidence.
Defendant also contends that the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to establish defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The thrust of defendant’s argument seems to be that since the automobile in which the police found the contraband was occupied by both Pritchard and the defendant, it was impossible for the prosecution to prove that it was defendant rather than Pritchard who placed the canvas bag under the front seat.
A review of the record reveals the following: two State Police officers testified that they were informed by the desk corporal that a larceny had just been reported at Buchanan’s Gulf Station; upon their arrival at the station, an attendant, Jerry Wrenn, informed them that he thought that defendant was the one who had taken the canvas bag containing the station’s receipts; after a search of defendant, his companion, and the automobile, they located the canvas bag under the automobile’s front seat.
Jerry Wrenn, the attendant, testified that he had entered the office from the rear of the station where he encountered the defendant who was alone. Wrenn stated that defendant had a surprised look on his face and had a bulge under the sweater he was wearing. Wrenn then testified that he noticed that the receipts bag was missing and immediately called the police.
Another attendant testified that he saw the defendant go into the station and go back and lean into the car. He also testified that defendant’s com*588panion did not leave the car until after the canvas bag was discovered missing.
The above testimony shows sufficient evidence, if believed by the jury, to justify a finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.7
Defendant raises three other issues which are:
(1) was it error for the trial court to allow testimony about the canvas receipts bag bécause the prosecution failed to produce said bag at the trial;
(2) was it error to permit a police officer who had interviewed the defendant after his arrest to testify as to the content of that interview even though he had taken notes during the interview but did not have those notes with him at the time of trial; and
(3) is defendant entitled to a reversal based upon certain alleged comments by the prosecutor during closing argument.
Defendant raised no objection at the trial to any of the three alleged errors. This Court will not, therefore, consider any of these questions unless, in our opinion, the errors have resulted in a clear injustice.8 A reading of the entire record, especially the portions of the testimony which we set forth in the preceding issue, convinces us that the alleged errors, if true, could not have resulted in the miscarriage of justice which is required before we may reverse.9
Affirmed.
J. E. Hughes, J., concurred.US Const, Am VI.
Michigan Const 1963, art 1, § 20.
Sea also People v. VanVorce (1927), 240 Mich 75, 78.
People v. Lewis (1970), 25 Mich App 132.
People v. Boyles, supra.
Preston v. United States (1964), 376 US 364 (84 S Ct 881, 11 L Ed 2d 777); Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, v. Hayden (1967), 387 US 294 (87 S Ct 1642, 18 L Ed 2d 782).
People v. Bynum (1970), 21 Mich App 596.
People v. Jackson (1969), 17 Mich App 675.
MCLA § 769.26 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.1096).