(dissenting). Because I continue to believe that a letter from the Environmental Protection Agency asking a company to perform a remedial investigation and a feasibility study does not constitute a suit, see Michigan Millers Mut Ins Co v Bron*465son Plating Co, 445 Mich 558, 576-597; 519 NW2d 864 (1994) (Griffin, J., dissenting, joined by Brickley and Riley, JJ.), I respectfully dissent. Even if I accepted the reasoning of the majority in Bronson, I would nevertheless remand this case to the Court of Appeals, requiring it to expressly address the trial court’s decision to grant summary disposition for defendant insurers Employers Mutual Casualty (insurer from 1962-66), Providence Washington (1966-68), and Hartford Fire (1968-74) because the trial court concluded that there was no property damage that manifested during the periods in which these companies insured Anodco. The majority resolves this matter in part m(B) without the benefit of a Court of Appeals decision on the question.
i
In June 1987, the epa sent Anodco a letter informing the company that it had “documented the release or threatened release of hazardous substances, pollutants and contaminants” at the Anodco disposal site and that, pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation & Liability Act (cercla), 42 USC 9601 et seq., Anodco was a potentially responsible party for the possible hazardous release. The epa asked that Anodco “voluntarily perform the work required to abate any release or threatened release of hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants from the site.” The letter also asked Anodco to propose and implement a remedial investigation to define the extent of soil, air, and surface water contamination at the site and a feasibility study to evaluate possible remedial actions. The epa explained that if Anodco refused to do so, the epa *466would itself perform the remedial investigation and feasibility study. Id. Furthermore, the EPA required Anodco, under the CERCLA, to provide certain information regarding the site, explaining that failure to comply with the request “may result in a civil enforcement action being brought against you . . . .” As a consequence of this letter, Anodco entered into a consent order (dated September 30, 1987) with the EPA, in which Anodco agreed to conduct the remedial investigation and feasibility study.
The majority in the present case has decided to reaffirm the holding in Bronson, supra at 562, that such a letter from the EPA constitutes a “suit” and not just a “claim” as these terms are used in the insurance contracts between Anodco and the insurers.1 Ante at 450. I believe that Justice Griffin’s analysis from Bronson applies to this case:
In common usage, the word “suit” refers to a proceeding in court, and that meaning is starkly apparent in the context of this policy language, which draws a clear distinction between a “claim” and a “suit.” Significantly, no obligation is imposed upon the insurer to defend against a claim. However, if a suit is brought against the insured, the duty of the insurer to defend is engendered even though the allegations in the complaint may be “groundless, false or fraudulent.”
Giving the policy language its ordinary, common-sense meaning, I believe it is apparent that the epa’s issuance of a *467prp letter is a “claim made,” and not a “suit brought.” [Id. at 582-583.]
The facts in this case confirm Justice Griffin’s analysis that a letter from the epa requesting a remedial investigation is not the same as a “suit.” After entering into a consent order with the epa, Anodco allegedly spent more than $400,000 between August, 1986, and December 31, 1991, to investigate whether there was any groundwater contamination. As the majority properly notes, there was no hazardous contamination found. Ante at 447. In other words, despite the claim of the epa letter, the investigation revealed that there never was an “accident” or “occurrence,” as defined by the insurers’ policies,2 because the contamination was not a threat to human health or the environment and, thus, did not require remedial action. The epa entered a “no action” order. Under the majority’s analysis, the insurers must bear the cost of defending this “suit” regardless of its merits.3 However, Anodco voluntarily entered into the consent order with the epa. If Anodco had refused, the epa stated that it would have proceeded to “perform the ri/fs utilizing public funds available to the Agency,” and, therefore, the epa would have initially borne the burden of these costs demonstrating that there was *468no hazardous contamination. Because of the strict nature of liability under cercla, the epa apparently would have been able to recover against Anodco with respect to its costs associated with investigating Anodco’s intentional discharge of chemical waste into the seepage lagoon under § 107 (42 USC 9607) even though the release of this waste did not create a hazardous contamination.* 4 Yet, I believe, at the very least, that the insurers with pollution-exclusion policies would not have been responsible for defending Anodco in an action related to these costs because, in my opinion, the purposeful discharge of identified hazardous wastes into a seepage lagoon is not a “sudden and accidental” discharge.5
Moreover, in June 1989, after Anodco presented its revised draft of the remedial investigation, the epa “formally requested]” that Anodco perform a second round of tests for arsenic and for volatile organic compounds (vocs), while conceding that the hazardous chemicals that Anodco was intentionally dis*469charging into the lagoon were seeping into the environment at nonhazardous levels. Anodco contended that it did not discharge arsenic or vocs into the lagoon. Anodco’s environmental expert, Edward Klep-pinger, swore that there was no evidence to substantiate the presence of vocs in the groundwater, and he claimed that there were only trace elements of arsenic at the site. Thus, it is not clear that the epa would have been able to establish that there was a “release” or “substantial threat of such a release,” § 104(a)(1)(A), of these hazardous substances if it had performed the remedial investigation itself and then brought a cost recovery action pursuant to § 107 for the costs associated with its examination of the site with respect to arsenic and vocs.6 If the epa were unable to establish this element in a recovery action, Anodco and its insurers would not have been responsible for the costs that the epa would have incurred for the second round of tests.
Furthermore, there is another way in which this case reveals the fallacy of equating an epa letter with a legal suit. The epa did not provide any support in its June 1987 letter for the claim that it had “documented *470the release or threatened release of hazardous substances” from the site. As a consequence of this Court’s ruling in Bronson, supra, however, the epa need not present a complaint with proof that there was a hazardous discharge before triggering the insurer’s duty to defend because the epa need only ask the insured to investigate the matter in its letter identifying the insured as a potentially responsible party. Any error by the epa in its own examination of the site before sending such a letter would be shouldered by the insured and its insurers once the insured agreed to enter into a consent order and perform the remedial investigation and feasibility study. I would overrule Bronson and reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.7
*469(1) the defendant falls within one of the four categories of responsible parties as defined in § 107(a)(l)-(4);
(2) the hazardous substances are disposed at a facility;
(3) there is a release or threatened release of hazardous substances from the facility into the environment-,
(4) the release causes the incurrence of response costs. [Id. at 258-259.]
*470n
Even if a letter from the epa requesting a remedial investigation by a potentially responsible party were the same as a suit, I disagree with the majority’s resolution in part m(B) regarding whether an accident or occurrence arguably transpired during each respective insurer’s policy period. The majority states that it refuses to adopt either the “occurrence-manifestation doctrine” or the “continuous-trigger theory,” ante at 457-458,8 but ultimately decides that “the duty to defend is triggered when a claim is made against the *471insured that even arguably comes within the policy’s period and scope of coverage.” Id. at 458. In applying this standard, the majority concludes that none of the defendants may “claim that an occurrence could not have taken place within their respective policy periods.” Id. I fail to see the distinction in application between this standard and the continuous-trigger theory. Each standard provides the insured party with coverage even if there was no manifestation of property damage during the insurer’s policy period.
Instead, if I reached this issue, I would remand the case to the Court of Appeals to enable it to address the trigger question more directly. The trial court granted summary disposition to Employers Mutual Casualty and Providence Washington Insurance, as well as to Hartford Fire Insurance, relying on the Court of Appeals analysis in Transamerica Ins Co of Michigan v Safeco Ins Co, 189 Mich App 55, 56; 472 NW2d 5 (1991),9 because there was no manifestation of property damage or injury during the policy period. Despite this conclusion, the Court of Appeals neglected to distinguish Transamerica, supra. Nothing in the analysis of the Court of Appeals contradicts the trial court’s conclusion that there was no manifestation of property damage during these insurers’ pol*472icy periods. See 207 Mich App 60, 65-70; 523 NW2d 841 (1994). This Court is assisted by the Court of Appeals when it squarely addresses a legal question and shares its legal reasoning before we examine it. Hence, I would remand this question to the Court of Appeals rather than resolving it on this appeal.
Each of the insurers in its contract with Anodco only guaranteed that it would defend against a “suit . . . seeking damages.” Each of the contracts also authorized the insurer to investigate and settle “any claim or suit as [the insurer] deems expedient,” and all but Employer Mutual’s contract further explains that the company “shall not be obligated to pay any claim or judgment or to defend any suit” beyond the limit of the insurance policy. (Emphasis added.)
Defendant Employers Mutual Casualty’s contract provided coverage for property damage “caused by [an] accident,” whereas the other insurers guaranteed coverage for “an occurrence” which was defined as an “accident,” including injurious exposure to conditions (“continuous or repeated exposure to conditions” in Farm Bureau’s policy), which results, during the policy period, in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured. (Emphasis added.)
Each of the insurers guaranteed that it would provide a defense even if the “suit” was “groundless [or] false.”
See United States v Alcan Aluminum, Corp, 964 F2d 252, 259-261 (CA 3, 1992) (in order to establish that there was a release of a hazardous waste, the CERCLA does not require a showing of a threshold quantity of that hazardous substance). See also Sullivan, ed, Environmental Law Handbook (Rockville, Md: Government Institutes, Inc, 13th ed, 1995), ch 8, pp 229-230. But see Amoco Oil Co v Borden, Inc, 889 F2d 664, 670 (CA 5, 1989) (“[T]he EPA argue[s] that CERCLA liability attaches upon the release of any quantity of a hazardous substance and that the extent of a release should be considered only at the remedial phase. However, we must reject this approach because adherence to that view would permit CERCLA’s reach to exceed its statutory purposes by holding parties hable who have not posed any threat to the pubhc or the environment. . . . [T]he relevant factual inquiry should focus on whether the particular- hazard justified any response actions.” [Emphasis in original.]).
Defendant Farm Bureau’s insurance policy included a pollution-exclusion clause; defendant Hartford Fire contended that its second policy, governing from 1971 to 1974, also included such a provision. See Mallett, J., ante at 448449, for the text of the exclusion.
The EPA demonstrates liability against a responsible party in a cost recovery action under § 107 if it establishes that it has properly taken action pursuant to § 104. Alcan, n 4 supra at 258. Thus, under § 107, “CERCLA liability is imposed where [the EPA] establishes the following four elements”:
This issue was not briefed by the parties and it was not the focus of the case. Rather, it is a product of my independent research, which expands on the reasoning of the dissent in Bronson by providing practical reasons why it is an error to equate an EPA letter with a suit.
The majority explains that, under the manifestation doctrine, insurance coverage is not triggered until the occurrence “manifests itself,” and that, under the continuous-trigger theory, continuous pollution through successive periods is covered by all policies in effect during those periods. Ante at 457-458. The majority refuses to adopt either theory because *471“an event sufficient to trigger indemnification coverage under the policies never occurred.” Id. at 458.
In Transamerica, supra, the Court of Appeals held:
We affirm to the extent the trial court found that coverage under the respective comprehensive liability policies in question is triggered by the manifestation of injury or damage resulting from a claimant’s exposure to urea-formaldehyde gas, but remand for a determination of when various underlying plaintiffs’ symptoms or damages manifested themselves. [Emphasis added.]