dissenting.
Although the majority has set forth the proper standard of review for errors appearing on the record, it has failed to properly apply it. When reviewing an order of a district court under the Administrative Procedure Act for errors appearing on the record, the inquiry is whether the decision conforms to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable. Keys v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 249 Neb. 964, 546 N.W.2d 819 (1996); Knowlton v. Harvey, 249 Neb. 693, 545 N.W.2d 434 (1996); Metro Renovation v. State, 249 Neb. 337, 543 N.W.2d 715 (1996).
First, I would like to clarify what I assume to be a misstatement by the majority. The majority states that “[t]he statement of the district court of the reasons for its order, even if wrong, is not necessarily cause for reversal when the standard of review is error appearing in the record.” (Emphasis sup*574plied.) Surely, the majority does not mean to say that if the court’s reasons are incorrect, we may not reverse. If this statement were true, which it is not, it would pervert the entire review process.
Furthermore, the majority states that
the change in the level of discipline by the district court was based on a factual finding following its de novo review that some of the cause for the alleged misleading that Rainbolt did was due to a “failure to communicate” rather than intent on Rainbolt’s part. Because there is competent evidence in the record to support same, we are obligated to accept that finding under our standard of review.
The majority correctly determines whether the district court’s decision is supported by competent evidence, but then fails to consider the last part of the standard — that the decision is “neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable.”
I believe that the district court’s decision was unreasonable. Presented with a case in which an employee of DSS lied to his supervisor, the district court decided that termination of the employee was “too severe.” I do not agree that termination was “too severe” after Rainbolt lied to his supervisor about a crucial component of his work — the placement of a juvenile.
The need for open, truthful communications is especially compelling under the facts of this case because Rainbolt worked as a protective services worker — one who is charged with the care, custody, and placement of juveniles. A protective services worker who chooses to “mislead,” or lie to, a supervisor potentially places the juvenile about whom he is lying in danger of failing to receive vital services. The consequences of Rainbolt’s misrepresentations in the placement incident were not only that the juvenile failed to receive the proper care, but that he actually ran away from the short-term facility. Rainbolt continued his prevarication by pretending that the juvenile had been placed with the group home. However, he had not. In short, by the time DSS discovered Rainbolt’s series of lies, it had no appropriate alternative except to terminate him.
*575In his brief, Rainbolt even acknowledges his motive in “misleading” his supervisor. Rainbolt argues that he had been placed in a “difficult” position; that he had already received the statement of charges concerning the home evaluation incident and “believed . . . Squires was attempting to make a case against him.” Brief for appellee at 11. Rainbolt also admits that he “may have said that [the juvenile] had run away from the group home,” brief for appellee at 8, even though he knew that he had never placed the juvenile in the group home.
I find the majority’s decision particularly puzzling, given the fact that we have been critical of DSS in the past for failing to be truthful when giving information to foster parents. See, Anderson/Couvillon v. State, 248 Neb. 651, 538 N.W.2d 732 (1995); Haselhorst v. State, 240 Neb. 891, 485 N.W.2d 180 (1992). It appears that the majority opinion creates an inconsistency: admonishing DSS to be truthful and make full disclosure in the placement of juveniles, while allowing DSS employees who lie about that very topic to remain in the workplace. I would reverse the decision of the district court.
Gerrard, J., joins in this dissent.