(dissenting). Repeat after me: “This is a rezoning case. This case does not involve a request for a use variance. The city council alone has the power to rezone. The zoning board of appeals has no authority to rezone property.” If these basic principles are kept in mind, the “ripeness” argument is seen as the pointless waste of time and resources that it is.
The majority holds that “[b]ecause Paragon failed to obtain a final decision from which an actual or concrete injury can be determined, its constitutional claim is not ripe for review.” Ante, p 583. Under longstanding precedent of this Court, the Novi City Council’s denial of plaintiff’s rezoning request was a final decision on the actual issue presented by plaintiff’s complaint in this case, i.e., the constitutionality of the challenged zoning ordinance. Furthermore, the Novi Zoning Board of Appeals is precluded by the zoning enabling act, MCL 125.581 et seq.; MSA 5.2931 et seq., and the Novi Zoning Ordinance from granting the relief sought. Accordingly, I dissent from the major*584ity’s conclusion that the merits of plaintiffs constitutional challenge to the Novi Zoning Ordinance axe not ripe for appellate review.
i
The statement of facts in the majority opinion contains what I perceive as the essential fact in resolving the case before us.
In May 1984, Paragon submitted a request to the Planning Board of the City of Novi to rezone the property from a single-family residential zone to a mobile home district zone. The planning board held a public hearing in August 1984 and recommended that the rezoning request be denied. At a subsequent public hearing, the Novi City Council denied Paragon’s request. [Ante, p 572.]
Plaintiff’s request for rezoning is the accurate characterization of the substance of that request, a characterization that is the necessary prerequisite to a proper application of the relevant law. What plaintiff wants is its property rezoned from large lot, single family to mobile home, a totally distinct zoning classification and a difference that exceeds the applicability of a use variance. At the hearing on defendant’s request for summary judgment, plaintiff’s counsel specifically advised the trial court that plaintiff was not asking for a variance from the present zoning classification; rather, plaintiff sought to have the property rezoned to another, distinct zoning classification.
n
In Long v Highland Park, 329 Mich 146; 45 NW2d 10 (1950), the plaintiffs filed a complaint in circuit court, seeking a declaratory judgment that a zoning ordinance was unconstitutional. The defendant, on *585appeal in this Court, claimed that the courts were without jurisdiction because “the plaintiffs had not exhausted their remedy under the provisions of the zoning ordinance by applying for a building permit, seeking relief from the zoning board of appeals, the zoning commission, and the common council of the city.”1 Id. at 149. This Court held that “[t]here is no merit in the claim.” Id. The Court’s conclusion was based, in relevant part, on the fact that the relevant municipal authorities “could not grant the relief here sought.” Id. This exact situation obtains in the case at bar. Paragon’s complaint alleged that “the zoning ordinance of the City of Novi as applied to Plaintiff’s Property is unconstitutional and is void,” that “the actions of the City of Novi in refusing to rezone Plaintiff’s Property to permit the use as a mobile home park are unreasonable, oppressive and a discriminatory exercise of the City’s police power insofar as it affects Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s Property,” and requested that the circuit court “enter judgment finding that the zoning ordinance of the City of Novi as applied to Plaintiff’s Property described in this Complaint is an unconstitutional abuse of the police power and is null and void.”
Plaintiff wants its property rezoned; it wants to use its property in accordance with a zoning classification (mobile home) that is wholly distinct from the zoning classification (large lot, single family) being challenged in this case. Rezoning is beyond the power of *586a zoning board of appeals, and the “use” to which plaintiff wants to put its land is plainly beyond the permissible scope of any use variance the Novi Zoning Board of Appeals could grant.
in
A
The charter of the City of Novi enumerates those subjects that “the City shall have power with respect to” and those that the city “may, by ordinance or other lawful acts of its officers, provide for . . . .” Novi City Charter, § 2.2. Relevant to this case is subsection 1, which confers on the city the power of
[establishing districts or zones within which use of land and structures, the height, the area, the size and location of buildings and required open spaces for light and ventilation of such buildings and the density of population may be regulated by ordinances in accordance with statutory provisions governing zoning; and to prescribe by ordinance, method of enforcement of conditions imposed by the Board of Appeals on applications for variances or for certificates or licenses under provisions of a zoning ordinance .... [Id., § 2.2(1).]
The legislative function of establishing land use zones by ordinance can be exercised only by the city through its legislative body, the city council.2 And *587also within this legislative compass is the power to circumscribe the conditions under which a zoning board of appeals may grant use variances. Under the ordinances governing this case, the Novi Zoning Board of Appeals is unable to grant the relief plaintiff seeks.
B
The authority under which municipalities enact zoning ordinances is the state zoning enabling act. The provision of that act relevant to the issue before us states:
If there are practical difficulties or unnecessary hardship in the way of carrying out the strict letter of the ordinance, the board of appeals may in passing upon appeals vary or modify any of its rules or provisions relating to the construction, or structural changes in, equipment, or alteration of buildings or structures, or the use of land, buildings, or structures, so that the spirit of the ordinance shall be observed, public safety secured, and substantial justice done. [MCL 125.585(9); MSA 5.2935(9).]
Pursuant to this authority, the Novi City Council enacted § 3104 of its municipal code, which, as the majority duly notes (ante, p 575), provides that the Novi Zoning Board of Appeals may grant a land use variance where “it is clearly shown that the land cannot be used for a zoned use . . . .” A more complete quotation of § 3104, however, demonstrates the legal basis for my dissent.
The Zoning Board of Appeals shall not have the power to alter or change the zoning district classification of any property, nor to make any change in the terms of this Ordinance but shall have the power to authorize a use in a zoning district in which it is not otherwise permitted, provided *588it is clearly shown that the land cannot be used for a zoned use .... [Novi Zoning Ordinance, § 3104(1).]
Plaintiff does not argue that the land cannot be used for large-lot, single family development. Rather, plaintiff’s claim is that such development is not economically feasible. It, therefore, might even be questionable whether plaintiff would satisfy the threshold requirements for the Novi Zoning Board of Appeals to consider the possibility of granting a use variance.
Subsection 1(b) of § 3104 further specifies the permissible bases for the Novi Zoning Board of Appeals to grant a land use variance:
To authorize, upon an appeal, a variance from the strict application of the provisions of this Ordinance where by reason of exceptional narrowness, shallowness, shape or area of a specific piece of property at the time of enactment of this Ordinance or by reason of exceptional topographic conditions or other extraordinary or exceptional conditions of such property, the strict application of the regulations enacted would result in peculiar or exceptional practical difficulties to or exceptional undue hardship upon the owner of such property provided such relief may be granted without substantial detriment to the public good and without substantially impairing the intent and purpose of this Ordinance.
In my opinion, no plausible interpretation of these carefully defined and exacting standards could allow the Novi Zoning Board of Appeals to grant plaintiff’s rezoning request in the guise of a use variance.
c
Disastrous results will flow from the majority’s requirement that every rezoning request must be run through a zoning board of appeals. These boards are *589comprised of citizen appointees with no required expertise in land use or planning. They review each request for a variance as presented. They have no staff of expert or professional planners. They do not, nor are they required to, explore the variety of potential variances to which a petitioner might be able to establish an entitlement. Again, remember that this petitioner does not want a variance. When presented with this petitioner’s request for rezoning to mobile home classification, this board could do nothing other than say, “Get out of here. Go see the city council!”
Another flaw in the majority’s view of this case is the mistaken assumption that running every rezoning request through a zoning board of appeals will produce some definitive relief or establish some kind of binding determination. The majority states, “The City of Novi’s denial of Paragon’s rezoning request is not a final decision because, absent a request for a variance, there is no information regarding the potential uses of the property that might have been permitted, nor, therefore, is there information regarding the extent of the injury Paragon may have suffered as a result of the ordinance.” (Emphasis added.) Ante, p 580. As stated previously, this mistakenly assumes a zoning board of appeals considers, determines, or offers other potential uses. It does not, even when the petitioner is specifically seeking a particular variance, let alone as here where the petitioner does not want a variance but is seeking to rezone. Further, the information “regarding the extent of the injury Paragon may have suffered as a result of the ordinance” is the petitioner’s burden to produce, as was done here, to the planning commission and the city council, and *590then to the circuit court. Assuming this petitioner jumped through the unnecessary, unavailing hoop the majority requires, would any “finding” by the zoning board of appeals be binding on a reviewing court? I hardly think so. The city would still have to present its expert testimony, as it did here, to satisfy the court that there were alternatives within that zoning classification to which the plaintiff could put its property.
D
Finally, I would be remiss if I failed to point out the majority’s complete misunderstanding of the two cases on which it primarily relies, Williamson Co Regional Planning Comm v Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 US 172; 105 S Ct 3108; 87 L Ed 2d 126 (1985), and Electro-Tech, Inc v HF Campbell Co, 433 Mich 57; 445 NW2d 61 (1989). Both cases are inappo-site to the situation here presented. In neither case was a rezoning sought or at issue.
In Williamson, supra, the developer’s proposed plat did not comply with certain requirements of the current zoning ordinance. The Court stated at 188:
It appears that variances could have been granted to resolve at least five of the Commission’s eight objections to the plat. The Board of Zoning Appeals had the power to grant certain variances from the zoning ordinance, including the ordinance’s density requirements and its restriction on placing units on land with slopes having a grade in excess of 25%. . . . The Commission had the power to grant variances from the subdivision regulations, including the cul-de-sac, road-grade, and frontage requirements. Indeed, the Temple Hills Committee had recommended that the Commission grant variances from those regulations. . . . Nevertheless, respondent did not seek variances from either the Board or the Commission.
*591Unlike here, the Williamson developer was not asking that the zoning classification be changed, and the zoning board of appeals had the authority to vary some of the current zoning classification’s requirements.
The majority’s other cornerstone, Electro-Tech, is also inapposite to this case. I signed Justice Brickley’s dissent in Electro-Tech because I agreed with him that the majority seriously misread Williamson. But, putting aside that dispute, any reading of Electro-Tech would quickly disclose that it also did not involve a change in zoning classification. There was no question in that case that the petitioner’s property was in the appropriate zoning classification for the use sought, i.e., another manufacturing plant behind the existing facility. Chief Justice Riley wrote for the majority:
In the instant case, the council had imposed, in addition to the improper dedication requirement, four “valid” conditions on the issuance of the permit. Because Electro-Tech failed to remedy these valid requirements or to submit a revised site plan evidencing compliance therewith, it was unclear whether or how much the improper condition interfered with the owner’s investment-backed expectations. Electro-Tech’s claim, therefore, was not ripe for review. See discussion of Williamson, swpra, in section n(c).
Because we conclude in section n(c), that the City of Westland had not made a final determination regarding the disposition of Electro-Tech’s property, we need not decide at this time whether Electro-Tech has established an unconstitutional taking. [433 Mich 75.]
Those conditions, prerequisites to issuance of building permits, clearly could have been altered, varied, or changed by the city council or the zoning board of appeals. Thus, the plaintiff having failed to *592request that relief, the Electro-Tech majority concluded that there had been no “final” determination by the city. The distinction between this case and both Williamson and Electro-Tech. could not be clearer. This plaintiff does not seek or wish any of the other (who knows how many) possible uses available to it in its current zoning classification. It sought a rezoning of its property so it could erect a mobile home park. This plaintiff received a “final” determination from the City of Novi when the city council, the only body able to grant the relief sought, denied the rezoning request. Plaintiff, then, bearing the very heavy burden of proving the city’s action arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, and confiscatory because it was deprived of all reasonable use of its property, could clearly seek redress in circuit court.
E
In my opinion, the requirements in the zoning enabling act (“that the spirit of the ordinance shall be observed”) and in the Novi Zoning Ordinance (that a use variance may be authorized only “without substantially impairing the intent and purpose of this Ordinance”) would not be satisfied by a use variance that gave plaintiff the relief it seeks. Therefore, because the Novi City Council’s denial of plaintiff’s request to rezone its property constituted the final legal decision available with regard to the actual substance of plaintiff’s request, plaintiff should not be required to seek a use variance in this case.
IV
I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals that a final decision was not obtained and remand this case to the Court of Appeals for review *593of the merits of the circuit court’s opinion and judgment.3 I would also instruct the Court of Appeals to address the effect, if any, of the Novi City Council’s subsequent rezoning of the property at issue to light industrial.
Levin, J., concurred with Cavanagh, J.There is no indication in the Long opinion that the plaintiffs made a rezoning request to the Highland Park City Council. Because such a rezoning request was made in this case, there is no need to consider whether Long and other decisions of this Court should be overruled to require that there always be a request for rezoning.
Any such major change in the use of property, as requested here (i.e., single family residential to mobile home park), would also be subject to § 7.8 of the Novi City Charter, which allows objecting citizens to call for a referendum on such a legislative determination. If, as the majority thinks possible, the zoning board of appeals, without amendment of the current zoning ordinance, grants plaintiff the relief it seeks and allows its “use” to be changed to mobile homes, there would be no ordinance regarding which objecting citizens could exercise their charter-based right of referendum.
At this point, I note my agreement with the majority that “[t]his is not a case in which all development of the land was physically impossible by application of the ordinance” (ante, p 580, n 14) because I think this factor is integral to ultimate resolution of this case.