(dissenting). Because the plain and unambiguous language of MCL 500.3145(1); MSA 24.13145(1) is contrary to the conclusion of the majority, I respectfully dissent. Although the majority may further one of the broad purposes of the no-fault act — avoiding litigation — this judicial amendment of a clear legislative directive will have a pernicious long-term effect. Unless statu*105tory language is ambiguous or a constitutional mandate compels revision, the well-settled principle of this Court is that "the explicit declaration of the legislature is the law, and the courts must not depart from it.” Becker v Detroit Savings Bank, 269 Mich 432, 436; 257 NW 853 (1934).
MCL 500.3145; MSA 24.13145 provides:
(1) An action for recovery of personal protection insurance benefits payable under this chapter for accidental bodily injury may not be commenced later than 1 year after the date of the accident causing the injury unless written notice of injury as provided herein has been given to the insurer within 1 year after the accident or unless the insurer has previously made a payment of personal protection insurance benefits for the injury. If the notice has been given or a payment has been made, the action may be commenced at any time within 1 year after the most recent allowable expense, work loss or survivor’s loss has been incurred. However, the claimant may not recover beneñts for any portion of the loss incurred more than 1 year before the date on which the action was commenced. The notice of injury required by this subsection may be given to the insurer or any of its authorized agents by a person claiming to be entitled to benefits therefor, or by someone in his behalf. The notice shall give the name and address of the claimant and indicate in ordinary language the name of the person injured and the time, place and nature of his injury.
(2) An action for recovery of property protection insurance benefits shall not commence later than 1 year after the accident.
Section 3145 is clear in its directive that a claimant cannot recover benefits for losses incurred more than one year prior to the commencement of the suit; not one year plus the period of time between making the claim and the denial of the claim as the majority holds.
*106The majority amends this statutory directive by use of a three-part response. First, by employing precedent which favors a "practical” reading of the tolling principles; second, basing its decision on perceived paramount purposes of the act rather than the one section in question; and, third, by providing a reasonable-diligence requirement for pursuing reimbursement. However, neither precedent nor the internal provisions of the act can fully support such reasoning.
The majority has explicitly acknowledged that not all panels of the Court of Appeals have accepted the approach advanced in Richards v American Fellowship Mutual Ins Co, 84 Mich App 629; 270 NW2d 670 (1978), lv den 406 Mich 862 (1979). Indeed, other panels have recognized the proper judicial role:
Under Richards, therefore, the permissible period of recovery runs, apparently, from one year prior to the commencement of the action only if there is no hiatus between the giving of notice of loss by the insured and the denial of liability by the insurance company. This seems to us contrary to the plain language of the statute and results in impermissible judicial legislation. We believe the statutory language is unambiguous and see no need for departing from the literal interpretation. [Aldrich v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 106 Mich App 83, 86; 307 NW2d 736 (1981).]
The Court-imposed tolling period in Richards finds no support in the statute. Section 3145(1) is clear and unambiguous and is not subject to interpretation by the Court. We are in agreement with the more recent decisions from panels of this Court which have rejected the Richards analysis in favor of a literal reading of § 3145(1). [Kransz v Meredith, 123 Mich App 454, 458-459; 332 NW2d 571 (1983).]
See also English v Home Ins Co, 112 Mich App *107468; 316 NW2d 463 (1982); Allstate Ins Co v Frankenmuth Mutual Ins Co, 111 Mich App 617; 314 NW2d 711 (1981). And, even if this Court’s recent decision in Welton v Carriers Ins Co, 421 Mich 571; 365 NW2d 170 (1984), does in fact imply favoring the Richards approach, as the majority suggests, its foundation upon purposes of the act may not supplant explicit legislation, no matter how "progressive” the result may appear.
I think Welton casts doubt on the Richards approach of reading a tolling provision into the one-year-back rule. As the majority points out, in Welton we distinguished our decisions in The Tom Thomas Organization, Inc v Reliance Ins Co, 396 Mich 588; 242 NW2d 396 (1976), and In re Certified Question: Ford Motor Co v Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co, 413 Mich 22; 319 NW2d 320 (1982), where we construed a statutory fire insurance policy to include a tolling provision for the period between the filing and rejection of a claim. Ante, pp 98-99.
The second attack on the statute is based on policy and consumer expectations. The majority observes that most people expect that insurance companies will pay their claims without having to begin litigation, and that it is only when a claim is formally denied that litigation will be necessary. The majority thus concludes that to follow the statute as written would require a claimant to file a suit as a "precautionary measure” when the one-year deadline approached. Although the majority approach may further the general policy of reducing litigation, the statute is not necessarily inconsistent with other purposes and provisions of the act. For example, §§ 3142 and 3148 impose sanctions upon an insurer for late payments. Thus, § 3145 may be viewed as a complementary provision which "sanctions” an insured who is not *108diligent in pursuing a claim. See also Pendergast v American Fidelity Fire Ins Co, 118 Mich App 838; 325 NW2d 602 (1982); Davis v Farmers Ins Group, 86 Mich App 45; 272 NW2d 334 (1978). This Court was not privy to all of the arguments and purposes presented to the Legislature when it drafted these specific tolling requirements. When statutory language is as clear as it is here, it is outside our province to second-guess the Legislature as to which policy is paramount in regard to § 3145.
The third response by the majority to § 3145 is to add a requirement that a claimant must pursue reimbursement with "reasonable diligence.” That is, a claimant cannot simply keep the claim open by not responding to requests for information necessary to resolve the claim. The necessity for this addition demonstrates the fact that this Court has engaged in judicial legislation.
The majority does not suggest that § 3145 contains any ambiguity or that the Legislature was not in full command of what it intended to do. To the contrary, the Legislature was cognizant of a need for some tolling. Again, as we said in Welton, supra, and as pointed out by the majority:
[T]he fact that the Legislature has already provided a tolling provision for commencing a no-fault action, triggered by "notice of injury,” suggests both that notice of injury was intended to have no greater effect and that there is less justification for this Court to interfere with the statutory scheme. [Welton, supra, 580, n 4.]
Absent ambiguous language or constitutional infirmity, the judiciary should not substitute policy for explicit directives of the Legislature, especially when, as here, the language is clear and not necessarily inconsistent with other purposes and sections of the act.
Riley, J., concurred with Brickley, J.